African industrial policy in an era of expanding global value chains: the case of Ethiopia's textile and leather industries by Hauge, Jostein
  
 
	
African	industrial	policy	in	an	era	of	expanding	global	
value	chains:		the	case	of	Ethiopia’s	textile	and	leather	
industries	
 
 
 
 
 
Jostein	Løhr	Hauge	
Corpus	Christi	College			
This	dissertation	is	submitted	for	the	degree	of	
Doctor	of	Philosophy	
July	2017	  
 2 
  
 3 
Summary 
 
 
Throughout the history of capitalism, the process of industrialisation has been recognised as 
the engine of economic development. No region in the world ‘suffers’ more acutely from a 
lack of industrialisation than Africa, clearly highlighting the need for industrial policy. 
However, the formulation of such policies is not straightforward in the current era of globalised 
production. In recent years, a debate has taken hold over whether the geographical expansion 
and increased fragmentation of production networks—often referred to as the expansion of 
global value chains (GVCs)—calls for new approaches to industrial policy in developing 
countries. By drawing on the case of Ethiopia, this dissertation demonstrates that industrial 
policy in developing countries needs no new ‘magic bullet’ in the era of expanding GVCs.  
The dissertation applies a funnelling technique, meaning that each chapter builds on 
information presented and arguments made in the preceding chapters.  
Chapter 2 contextualises the importance of manufacturing and industrial policy for 
economic development in Africa. The chapter argues that the manufacturing sector continues 
to play an integral role in the process of economic development, and discusses the role of the 
state in the process of industrialisation, arguing that there are strong justifications for 
intervention through industrial policy.  
Chapter 3 looks at how the expansion of GVCs affects the productive structures of 
developing countries, particularly those in Africa, and asks if industrial policy has to change in 
this new global production environment. I argue that the fundamental problems of participating 
in GVCs are the same as when countries like South Korea and Taiwan industrialised between 
1960 and 1990, although on a different scale.   
Chapter 4 analyses Ethiopia’s industrialisation trajectory and GVC-oriented industrial 
policies in the textile and leather industries. This analysis is based on 6 months of fieldwork in 
Ethiopia, where I carried out several interviews with stakeholders in the private and public 
sector and collected and collated datasets on industrial performance in collaboration with 
government agencies. While the findings of this chapter make an original empirical 
contribution to explaining the specific case of Ethiopia, the insights provided by the analysis 
offer broader conceptual conclusions as well.	
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Chapter 1  
	
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background to the topic and chapter structure  
 
This dissertation is about industrial policy in Africa. Do I focus on any African country in 
particular? The short answer to this question is yes, I focus on Ethiopia. The more detailed 
answer is that this dissertation is also a story more generally about industrial policy in Africa. 
In some ways, one could argue that this makes little sense. Industrial policy is about policies 
formulated at the national level to develop the productive structure of a country’s economy (a 
more detailed definition of industrial policy will be set out in chapter 2). Studying the 
challenges of formulating industrial policy in 54 countries, each with different geographic, 
demographic, social and cultural characteristics, is far beyond the scope of any research project. 
In fact, one can make a strong case that ‘within-country-diversity’ in Africa is greater than in 
any other continent, making the study of industrial policy in the African context a greater 
challenge than any other such ‘continent-centric’ study. For example, the number of languages 
spoken in Africa, both native and official, is estimated to be between 1500 and 2500. In Europe, 
one would struggle to make such a list of languages exceed 100.  
 But in other ways, studying industrial policy in ‘all of’ Africa actually makes some 
sense. While, ultimately, industrial policy should look different from country to country, 
regardless of whether this is in Africa or elsewhere, countries with similar production 
characteristics share somewhat similar industrialisation challenges and, therefore, similar 
industrial policy challenges. In Africa, the production characteristics of all countries are 
strikingly similar—the lack of internationally competitive manufacturing industry across the 
entire continent is so severe, you would struggle to name any internationally competitive 
manufacturing firm of significant size with national origin in an African country. So, the fact 
that parts of this dissertation focuses on Africa as a whole is most importantly the result of an 
observation that many countries in Africa share similar production characteristics.  
 Moreover, for those interested in economic development in low-income countries, there 
is a very interesting debate to be had right now in the African context, given the emergence of 
the ‘Africa rising’ narrative. In short, this narrative postulates that since the early 2000s Africa 
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has broken with its past of underdevelopment and lackluster growth, and that the rise in 
economic growth rates is signifying a future of economic prosperity.  
 Chapter 2 of this dissertation takes a critical look at the ‘Africa rising’ narrative, and, 
by doing so, contextualises the importance of manufacturing and industrial policy for economic 
development in the African context. While we should not discount positive developments in 
Africa, we will see that the ‘Africa rising’ narrative is mostly hype. Even the foundation on 
which the narrative is based on—accelerating GDP growth—is shaky. As measured by per 
capita GDP growth rates (instead of total GDP growth rates) we will see that Africa is still 
underperforming compared to other regions of the developing world, such as Latin America 
and East Asia. Unsurprisingly, poverty rates and vulnerable employment rates in Africa are 
disturbingly high. 
 I will suggest that a big part of the explanation for persistent underdevelopment in 
Africa is the lack of structural transformation—the move away from a production structure 
dependent on primary commodities1 towards higher-productivity activities, most importantly 
manufacturing activities. While it is generally well known that Africa is lacking a productive 
manufacturing sector, chapter 2 will carry out a detailed analysis of the manufacturing 
performance of Africa. How dismal is Africa’s manufacturing performance really and to what 
extent are the aggregate numbers representative of individual countries’ performance? 
 Chapter 2 will also feature a theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationship 
between growth of the manufacturing sector and economic development. If one takes a stance 
that the process of industrialisation is vital to the process of economic development, such an 
investigation is necessary. Although most people do have an understanding of economic 
development as a process of industrialisation (this is why we often use the terms ‘developed 
country’ and ‘industrialised country’ interchangeably), this view is becoming increasingly 
challenged. Some scholars now claim that the traditional view of the process of 
industrialisation is outdated, and that, given the increased scope for productivity growth of 
services, we are now seeing the rise of ‘post-industrial’ societies. While this line of argument 
is mostly applied to the industrialised countries, some even claim that African countries can 
skip the industrialisation phase and ride on a wave of services-led growth instead.  
 While there are disagreements as to how important manufacturing is for the process of 
economic development, few people dismiss the importance of manufacturing altogether. 
However, how to go about achieving industrialisation, more specifically the role of the state in 
																																																						
1 Goods in a raw and unprocessed state, such as natural resources and unprocessed agricultural goods. 
 20 
doing so (i.e. industrial policy), has been a highly controversial debate for centuries. The last 
part of chapter 2 will move on to this debate, suggesting that there are plenty of rationales for 
industrial policy. The main theories of industrial policy will be discussed and buttressed by 
examples, referring especially to the many industrial policy interventions by the ‘Asian tigers’ 
between approximately 1960 and 1990.2 The chapter will also discuss Africa’s industrial policy 
experience. Although today’s evidence suggests that Africa has by and large been unsuccessful 
with industrial policy, we will see that the period of more state intervention and explicit 
attempts of industrial policy—in the 1960s and 1970s—yielded higher economic growth rates 
than any subsequent period of less state intervention—particularly that of complete state 
dismantling in the 1980s and early 1990s. This suggests that African states are far from 
incapable of formulating successful industrial policy, which, in fact, many Western economists 
often accuse them of because of things like despotism, corruption, ethnic fractionalisation and 
bureaucratic inefficiency. 
 But what exactly should industrial policy in Africa look like? While I will argue (and 
have hinted) that this should and will differ from country to country, I will also suggest that 
there are plenty of lessons to be learned from successful industrial policy experiences in the 
past. However, in recent years, a debate has emerged on whether industrial policy in developing 
countries needs a fundamental ‘rethink’ because of global changes in production networks, and 
if, consequently, past experiences of industrial policy hold less validity for today’s developing 
countries trying to catch up to the global technological frontier.  
Since the early 1990s, production has become more globalised, driven by falling 
transport costs, advances in information and communication technology, and lower trade and 
investment barriers. There has been a significant increase in offshoring from high-income to 
low-income countries and, consequently, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in the same 
direction. Developing countries’ share of world FDI inflows surged from 17 per cent to 43 per 
cent between 1990 and 2015 (UNCTAD STAT, 2017). We are basically seeing tasks and 
activities within production networks becoming increasingly geographically dispersed. This 
has led to complex, borderless business networks and production systems, popularly referred 
to as global value chains (GVCs). 
 Chapter 3 of this dissertation will address if and how the expansion of GVCs affect the 
industrial policy challenge in developing countries, particularly those in Africa. A popular view 
																																																						
2 The ‘Asian tigers’ is a reference to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. I will put more emphasis 
on examples of industrial policy from South Korea and Taiwan, as Singapore and Hong Kong are considered 
more ‘special cases’.  
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is that, because of the expansion of GVCs, industrial policy in developing countries today has 
to focus more on inserting the respective country into the ‘niches’ of GVCs, rather than 
building vertically integrated industries. Baldwin (2011, p.3) states that, “Before 1985, 
successful industrialisation meant building a domestic supply chain. Today, industrialisers join 
supply chains and grow rapidly because offshored production brings elements that took Korea 
and Taiwan decades to develop domestically”.  
 I will argue that this perspective—which will be referred to as the ‘GVC lens’, a term 
that scholars of this view have ascribed to themselves (e.g. Milberg et. al., 2014)—rightly 
emphasises the benefits that GVC participation can bring about but has largely neglected 
important literature on industrial policy that focuses on the development of domestic 
productive capabilities through FDI attraction and participation in international trade.  
For example, during South Korea’s and Taiwan’s industrialisation process between 
1960 and 1990, GVCs, although not as prominent as they are today, certainly existed and useful 
lessons can be learned about the way these countries selectively induced foreign firms to 
transfer technology to domestic firms, source inputs locally in certain sectors and generally 
utilised GVCs and international trade for the purpose of enhancing domestic productive 
capabilities. The study of these ‘early’ GVC-oriented policy experiences have been largely 
neglected by the GVC lens. By reviewing this neglected literature and neglected GVC-oriented 
industrial policies in chapter 3, I suggest a new framework for industrial policy in an era of 
GVC expansion. This framework emphasises, most importantly, that a balance needs to be 
struck between niche specialisation in GVCs and building vertically integrated industries. The 
main conclusion is that niche specialisation is not enough in order for industrialisation to be 
successful in the long term. History show us that countries that have been truly successful with 
GVC participation have managed to build up capabilities in production activities that focus on 
more than simple niche specialisation in GVCs, which is usually characterised by low value-
added assembly tasks.  
 Chapter 4 sheds light on the aforementioned topics of the dissertation through an in-
depth study of Ethiopia. I chose to study Ethiopia for primarily three reasons: 1) It has been 
Africa’s fastest growing economy for over a decade now, impressively so without being 
dependent on natural resources, unlike many other fast-growing African economies. This 
statistic alone makes it a unique and curious case for a development economist interested in 
Africa. 2) Ethiopia’s government considers industrial policy as one of the most important facets 
of its economic development agenda, as evidenced by its commitment to industrialisation in its 
5-year development plans, by its explicit emulation of East Asian industrialisation experiences 
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(most importantly South Korea and China), and by its investment in infrastructure aiming to 
create a conducive environment for the manufacturing sector to grow. 3) GVC participation 
plays an integral role in Ethiopia’s industrialisation drive. In its two most highly prioritised 
industries, the textile and the leather industries, the country is inserting itself into GVCs by 
attracting foreign companies to set up manufacturing operations in Ethiopia, focusing mainly 
on apparel and footwear production.  
 The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses economic growth, 
industrialisation and industrial policy in Ethiopia. The manufacturing sector is growing fast in 
Ethiopia but it constitutes a very small share of GDP, so small that other factors must have 
been important drivers of economic growth. We will see that state-led investments in 
infrastructure have been the most important stimulus for the economic boom. But what, then, 
explains the buzz around industrialisation in Ethiopia? The explicit commitment by the ruling 
party to an industrialisation path, in the image of the East Asian industrialisation experience, 
is part of the reason. Another part of the reason are all the industrial policies that the 
government has been putting in place to create a conducive environment for the manufacturing 
sector to grow. This section will also discuss these policies. 
The second part of the chapter moves on to the relevance of GVCs to Ethiopia’s 
industrialisation process. As mentioned, GVC participation and FDI attraction have become 
the centrepiece of policies to develop Ethiopia’s two most highly prioritised manufacturing 
industries. This section examines Ethiopia’s motivation behind developing these industries; the 
structure of the value chains in today’s global context and the GVC-oriented firms in Ethiopia; 
Ethiopia’s export performance in these industries; the GVC-oriented policies that the Ethiopian 
government has formulated to develop these industries; the results that the GVC participation 
strategy has produced in terms of the development of domestic productive capabilities; and key 
challenges for further growth of the industries through the GVC participation strategy.  
Chapter 5 provides the conclusion of the dissertation. It summarises the main findings 
of the chapters and suggests related directions of research that this dissertation does not have 
scope for.  
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1.2 Methodological issues  
	
1.2.1 General choice of methodology: qualitative versus quantitative methods 
 
The methods of investigation applied for this dissertation are qualitative. The reason for this is 
that the nature of the research is more suitable for some facets of qualitative methods, in 
particular historical-comparative research and case-study approach methods, than quantitative 
methods. Let me explain why in greater depth.  
Many of the causal processes that are theorised and empirically verified throughout this 
dissertation are concerned with countries as a unit of study. In particular for this dissertation, 
questions that emerge through such a focus are: what has been the efficacy of industrial policy 
in a certain country?; what can African countries learn from past experiences of industrial 
policy?; what is the relationship between the level of economic development and the productive 
structure of the economy across countries?; how has the participation in global value chains 
affected productive structures of developing countries? Some scholars attempt to answer these 
questions using quantitative methods—specifically by cross-country regression analysis or 
panel data regression analysis (this is cross-country regression analysis over time, in the cases 
where countries are units of study). However, there are shortcomings to this approach. 
Normally, to achieve statistical significance in quantitative studies using countries as units of 
analysis, one must include an enormous number of countries in the sample. For example, in 
quantitative studies examining the relationship between trade openness and growth, the number 
of countries included in the samples have typically ranged between 80—in the case of studying 
only least developed countries—and all the countries in the world that there is data availability 
for—in the case of studying all countries in the world (e.g. Dollar (1992), Frankel and Romer 
(1995) and Yannikaya (2002)). 
This limits the understanding one can develop of each case, and consequently 
compromises the strength of conclusions. For example, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
justifies its mandate of lowering trade barriers worldwide on the sound positive relationship 
between trade openness and economic growth documented by cross-country regression studies. 
Most of these studies are only strongly conclusive on the fact that trade volumes correlate 
positively with economic growth (Hauge, 2011), while the correlation between trade policies 
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and trade restrictions with economic growth is more uncertain.3 While one can argue that this 
is a measurement flaw and can be corrected by more accurate indicators, it is equally a flaw of 
the inability of such an approach to investigate specific cases and countries that are important 
to inform such a question. For example, many qualitative investigations into important cases 
of high economic growth rates and international trade integration, such as South Korea and 
Taiwan between 1960 and 1990, have revealed that relatively protectionist trade policies were 
formulated in tandem with policies for increased trade integration. This suggests that the 
relationship between trade openness and economic growth is more complex than what most 
quantitative analyses have concluded on this matter. This is one of the reasons why qualitative 
methods, for a dissertation like this, is more useful. In particular, the case study method, which 
is the central method applied in this dissertation.  
A second problem that quantitative methods encounter specifically in political 
economy research is the limitations and the measurement problems that come with the need 
for quantifying all variables, probably more so in the context of Africa than anywhere else. 
Take the example of datasets on corruption. There is no straightforward way of measuring 
corruption based on direct observations, so the most commonly used datasets on corruption are 
a selection of opinion surveys: businesspeople are called up and asked how corrupt they think 
country X is on a scale from one to ten. According to Jerven (2015), these datasets are hugely 
subjective, and often false, as businessmen in poorer countries tend to be foreign and therefore 
overstate the level of corruption in those countries. Another overlooked problem is that of 
missing data, or things that are understudied because they cannot be recorded. For example, 
the economics literature on Africa pays far too little attention to the importance of small-scale 
activities in rural areas, simply because there are not enough quantitative records of that 
(Jerven, 2015). The difficulty of quantitatively measuring variables that essentially are 
unquantifiable (or, at best, very challenging to quantify) combined with the lack of data, 
especially in the African context, has led many quantitative economics researchers to use 
proxies instead, like ‘assassinations’ as a proxy for political stability and ‘elections held’ as a 
proxy for the democracy. In some instances, proxies can be a smart shortcut, but researchers 
often lose sight of the levels of abstractions they make. For example, Ethiopia has held 
parliamentary elections since 1995, but the country can hardly be described as democratic. The 
same could be said of Singapore under the rule of Lee Kuan Yew.  Thus seen, not all that can 
																																																						
3 There have been attempts to quantify protectionist policies using various proxies for protectionism, such as black market 
exchange premiums, monopolisation of export sectors, and even dummy variables for socialism, but these are normally more 
inconclusive and have more measurement problems than the studies only looking at trade volumes (Hauge, 2011).  
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be counted counts, and not all that counts can be counted, especially in the context of African 
political economy.  
In fact, no region has ‘suffered’ more than Africa from the insistence of using 
quantitative methods in economics research. In the 1990s, a predominance of economics 
research that examined causes of African underdevelopment did so through the search for the 
African ‘dummy’ by using cross-country regression analysis. The lack of economic growth in 
African countries had to be explained by the ‘meta-structural’ impediments that African 
countries shared in common, whether it was ‘bad’ institutions, lazy culture, too much ethnic 
diversity, natural resource abundance and/or geographical conditions non-conducive to growth, 
such as being landlocked or being stuck in a climate where tropical diseases are rife.  
According to a review of this growth regression literature, 145 explanatory variables 
were found to be statistically significant (Durlauf et. al., 2005), so correlations were definitely 
found. The above theories of causation were suggested in support of the correlations, but some 
of these theories have been flat-out contradicted. For example, Ethiopia, Africa’s fastest 
growing economy in the past 15 years, started growing fast after it became landlocked (it lost 
its access to the sea after the secession of Eritrea). Another star performer is Rwanda, who 
would quite possibly be blamed for too much ethnic-based strife had it failed to recover from 
its 1994 genocide. A more blatant rejection of the regression explanations for 
underdevelopment in Africa is the fact that many of the supposed meta-structural impediments 
to growth have persisted throughout the entire post-independence era but Africa’s growth 
performance has fluctuated substantially. In the 1960s and 1970s, GDP per capita in Africa 
grew at an annual rate between 1 and 2 per cent, at a negative rate of 0.4 per cent in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and then at above 2 per cent since the 2000s. (Chang et. al., 2016).  
In fact, history shows us that many of the most successful cases of economic growth 
have defied these meta-structural impediments to economic development (Chang. et. al., 2016). 
For instance, hardly any of the Asian tigers can be said to have had ‘good’ institutions during 
their early phases of industrialisation. Additionally, Chang (2002) points out how many of the 
rich countries today had all sorts of ‘wrong’ institutions when they were at the stage of 
development of what we today consider developing countries. Moreover, some economic 
success stories, like Austria and Switzerland, were landlocked and still are. Uzbekistan, the 
most economically successful post-Soviet republic, is double-landlcoked (this means that all 
its neighboring countries are also landlocked). This suggests that many of the causal 
explanations for African underdevelopment are not theoretically robust—they simply show 
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correlations. In fact, establishing historical causality is close to impossible by simply using 
quantitative methods. 
This is why qualitative methods come in handy. Qualitative methods are not as easy to 
define as quantitative methods, but an easy way to describe them would simply be those that 
are not quantitative, i.e. those that do not test theories through statistical procedures that 
examine the relationship between numbered variables. Compared to quantitative research, 
qualitative research tends to have more open-ended and emerging questions, a more flexible 
structure, and focus more on rendering the complexity of the situation (Creswell, 2009).  
In particular, a methodological staple of this dissertation is historical-comparative 
methods. In simple terms, I like to refer to this as looking both ‘backwards’ and ‘sideways’. 
This means that causal processes are established by comparing social processes across time 
and places through more thorough case study investigations than what quantitative methods 
would allow for. These methods are most often found in sociology, but nowadays largely 
missing in research questions related to economics. The historical aspect of this method will 
feature heavily, drawing upon a worldview originating back to the 19th century German 
historical school of economics. This school, whose methods can be found in the works of, 
among others, Friedrich List, Gustav von Schmoller and Karl Polanyi, believed that history is 
a key source of knowledge in understanding human actions and economic matters. Its approach 
to research involves searching for consistent historical patterns, constructing theories to explain 
them, and applying these theories to contemporary problems, while taking into account changes 
in technological, institutional and political circumstances (see Chang (2002) for a more detailed 
discussion on the historical method).  
The case study approach is also central to this dissertation. While the case study 
approach could be considered part of this broader category of historical-comparative research, 
the case study approach deserves a detailed discussion, especially seeing that the most 
comprehensive chapter of this dissertation is an application of the case study approach—it is a 
case used to shed light on broader questions of investigation. The section below discusses the 
case study approach, particularly the sources of evidence used to investigate the case of 
Ethiopia, and the usefulness and challenges of this approach. 
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1.2.2 The case study approach in the context of Ethiopia 
 
The chapter on Ethiopia serves as a case to contextualise in depth the issues raised in previous 
chapters, particularly building on chapter 3. While the findings of the research relating to this 
chapter should be understood as a contribution to a better understanding of a particular case, it 
does not preclude insights of broader conceptual interest.  
 In social science research, there are several valuable features of the case study approach 
(for detailed discussions on the case study approach, see for example Ragin, 1987; George and 
Bennet, 2005; and Flyvbjerg, 2006). First, the case study approach allows hypotheses and 
theories to emerge from the researcher’s immersion in the case, rather than from a position of 
detachment. Second, case studies are often the best way to answer questions of how and why 
a particular outcome has come about, i.e. how to trace and identify causal processes. Third, by 
anchoring theoretical propositions in a concrete empirical context, case studies avoid the 
problem of ‘conceptual stretching’: a case is examined as whole rather than as a combination 
of variables. 
 While the case of Ethiopia is certainly unique, readers of this chapter will hopefully be 
able to draw some lessons from a study of it for other low-income countries that are trying to 
structurally transform their economy, and that are also in the process of making the transition 
towards a capitalist, market-oriented economy.    
 
1.2.2.1 Methodological challenges and choice of methods in the case study approach 
 
One of the great strengths of the case study approach is that it allows the researcher to draw on 
a variety of sources. The variety of sources is not only a strength but also arguably needed if 
one applies the case-study approach method, as the approach relies heavily on qualitative data 
that has an inevitable subjective bias. To mitigate this bias, data should be contextualised by 
drawing on many sources and by triangulating different accounts. The different sources of 
evidence I collected and the triangulation technique I applied will be discussed further below. 
First, let us discuss why drawing on such a large variety of sources is particularly useful in the 
Ethiopian context, where numerous methodological challenges present itself.  
 First of all, in Ethiopia, as in many other low-income countries, publicly available data 
is limited and sometimes unreliable (Jerven, 2013, writes extensively about this). Second, when 
approaching a very specific topic (e.g. how do GVC oriented industrial policies in country X 
look like?) in a low-income country—where resources for independent research is nowhere 
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near that of an industrialised country—the existing literature is scarce to start off with. Third, 
many Ethiopian researchers tend to shy away from political economy research, as they consider 
this an invitation for trouble. The ruling party in Ethiopia controls nearly every aspect of 
economic and social life, so, consequently, the direction of social science research in Ethiopia 
is more politically sensitive than in most other countries, especially since 2005, when the ruling 
party’s discourse became more hegemonic. In this sense, being a foreign researcher can be 
advantageous. But being a foreign researcher brings a host of additional challenges. One is 
language. The language barrier is higher than in other parts of Africa, so academics restricted 
to English inevitably miss parts of the picture. There is also a level of scepticism towards 
foreign researchers among some government officials and party members, which can only be 
overcome by building trust over time. It is therefore no coincidence that many foreign 
academics that are well-known for their research on Ethiopia have followed Ethiopia since the 
days of the uprising against the Derg regime.  
 In an attempt to overcome/minimise these challenges, I collected several types of case 
study evidence over the course of fieldwork: elite interviews, documentary evidence, archival 
records, and direct observations at numerous factories and industrial sites. I visited Ethiopia 
three times between April 2015 and December 2016 (April to June 2015, December 2015 and 
October to December 2016), which together summed up to 6 months of fieldwork. Most 
research was carried out in and around Addis Ababa, as all the government offices and the 
main industrial sites currently in operation are near or in the capital city. Some important firms 
are headquartered far beyond the metropolitan borders of Addis Ababa (for example in Adwa 
or Mekelle, in northern Ethiopia), but they tended to have offices or representatives in Addis 
Ababa that I could approach.  However, I did make some longer trips, including a trip to 
Hawassa Industrial Park, Ethiopia’s flagship apparel park project, and to a large state-owned 
textile factory in Kombolcha. 
 Interviews were the key source of evidence. I carried out over 60 interviews with people 
in the government, private sector, private sector associations and non-profit sector (e.g. 
international organisations, research institutes and universities). Both the choice of subjects 
and the choice of questions were obviously linked to my dissertation’s focus on industrial 
transformation, industrial policy, and participation in global value chains, focusing particularly 
on the textile and leather industries.  
Interviewees in the government apparatus included representatives of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Industry, the Industrial Parks Development Corporation, the 
Ethiopian Investment Commission, the Central Statistics Agency, the Ethiopian Inputs 
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Industrial Supply Enterprise, The Leather Industry Development Institute, and the Ethiopian 
Textile Industry Development Institute. Interviewees from the private sector included owners, 
general managers, and deputy managers of companies in the textile and leather industries. As 
I was investigating firms that are participating in global value chains, I sought out those firms 
that are export-oriented or on the verge of becoming so, typically the largest players in the 
country in their respective industries, as measured by export revenues, that are or have the 
potential of having the largest economic impact in Ethiopia. These included both domestic 
firms and foreign firms. 15 firms in the leather industry were interviewed, while 19 firms in 
the textile industry were interviewed. I should emphasise that because I generally interviewed 
the largest firms in the country and because few firms dominate the respective industries (as 
will be evidenced in the chapter), these interviews should be understood as a very importance 
source of evidence. Interviewees from private sector associations included representatives of 
the Ethiopian Chambers of Commerce, the Ethiopian Leather Industry Association, the 
Ethiopian Textile and Garments Industry Association, the Investor’s Association at Hawassa 
Industrial Park, and one industry association that requested full anonymity. Interviewees in the 
non-for-profit sector included representatives of the World Bank, the UK Department for 
International Development, and the Ethiopian Development Research Institute.  
The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that they were guided conversations 
with a loose structure, as new questions often emerged from answers and information that were 
close to impossible to anticipate before the interviews, rather than structured queries (the actual 
chapter will reveal more closely the type of questions that were asked). An attempt was made 
to ask questions in an unbiased manner, so as to not reveal any preconceived notion of the 
answer. As certain interview groups tended to hold similar, and often subjective and biased, 
views, an attempt was made to triangulate the interviews, meaning that I surveyed groups of 
people who held different opinions. In this respect, interviewing representatives from the 
private sector, private sector associations, and the international donor community served as an 
excellent contrast to the interviews with government officials. Quite often, I made an effort to 
ask for relevant contacts at the end of an interview. Thus, the frequency of interviews, 
knowledge of how to go about securing them, and level of trust between myself and certain 
government agencies followed a clear ‘snowballing’ pattern: my most productive trip was by 
far the third one, between October and December 2016. 
Interviews with government officials and the non-for-profit sector followed no 
numerical sampling aim—the aim with these type of semi-structured interviews was to get as 
familiar as possible with the overarching questions of my dissertation concerning the case of 
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Ethiopia, and to gradually identify new and important questions that would be difficult to 
anticipate before the interviews. It was however important to cover the most important agencies 
involved in industrial policy formulation. The list of government agencies mentioned above 
was therefore very carefully targeted. Interviews with firms in the private sector did, however, 
follow a loose sampling aim. As my chapter on Ethiopia makes aggregate claims about the 
GVC-oriented oriented segment of both the textile and leather industries, it was important that 
my interviews covered a sample that was representative of such claims. While it would be very 
challenging to interview managers and owners of every single GVC-oriented firm in the two 
industries, my sample (a total of 34 firms) covered well over 80 per cent of all the GVC-
oriented firms of significant size in both industries (an exact number would be difficult to 
provide, as new firms, especially foreign ones, establish themselves every few months). The 
length of fieldwork largely reflected the level of satiation with the quality and quantity of 
interviews. I did not end my fieldwork until I recognised a high degree of repetition among 
interview subjects and until I had covered large enough firm samples in the respective 
industries.  
Many of the interviews with firm representatives were conducted in factories (which in 
some instances were located in industrial parks), and in multiple instances, I was given the 
chance see the factory floor and stages of the production process. This can be quite useful. For 
instance, this helped me understand better which stages of the production process and parts of 
the value chains were more labour-intensive and which were more capital-intensive. It also 
helped me identify gaps in technological capabilities between firms, particularly foreign versus 
domestic firms.  
Documentary evidence, including newspaper archives, also served as a key data source. 
Ethiopia has a long tradition of bureaucracy as well as love for the written word. While far 
from all of it is published in English, an impressive amount of it is. I gathered hard copies of 
as many brochures, leaflets and publications as I could during my interviews (especially with 
government officials), which turned out to be very valuable, as it turns out much of it is not 
available online. The Ministry of Industry also did me an incredible service in making me a 
tailored time-series dataset on the export performance of the textile and leather industries, at 
the aggregate level, the product level, and the firm level. Moreover, with the help of three 
research assistants based at Addis Ababa University, I scanned through relevant articles of the 
three most relevant weekly English language newspapers— Reporter, Capital, and Fortune—
dating between the years 2004 and 2016. These newspaper articles were a great source of 
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confirming and tracing the exact dates of investment decisions by foreign firms, and the 
establishment and restructuring of certain government agencies.      
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Chapter 2  
	
‘Africa rising’—fact or myth? Contextualising the importance of 
manufacturing and industrial policy for economic development in 
Africa 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This is a fascinating time to study economic development in Africa. Against the backdrop of 
unprecedented economic growth for almost two decades, the narrative of a booming Africa, 
known as ‘Africa rising’, has become so widespread, trendy and glorified, that the phrase even 
has its own Wikipedia article now. As Taylor (2015, p.1) accurately observes, “Barely a week 
passes by without some new official report, media article or conference eulogising the 
continent and its growth figures.” The hype surrounding Africa’s growth is undeniably 
accentuated by the chance to finally provide a contrasting narrative to the ‘African growth 
tragedy’ that prevailed for long. A telling example is the special issue on Africa published by 
The Economist in May 2000, in which it dubbed Africa as ‘the hopeless continent’ because of 
brutality, despotism and corruption, “Acts not exclusively African…but African societies, for 
reasons buries in their cultures, seem especially susceptible to them” (The Economist, 2000, 
p.1).  
This stance was supported by (if not based on) the views of many development 
economists in the 1990s, who searched for the African ‘dummy’ through cross-sectional 
regression analysis (see Jerven, 2015)—African underdevelopment had to be explained by 
what African countries shared in common. Several explanations were offered: ‘bad’ 
institutions, lazy culture, too much ethnic diversity, and geographical conditions non-
conducive to growth. While economic underdevelopment has indeed persisted in most African 
countries throughout the post-independence era, there are reasons to be sceptical of the 
explanations offered through the quest for the African dummy. For example, Jerven (2015) 
points out numerous statistical problems with the regression approaches, and Chang et. al. 
(2016) show through a historical analysis of successful growth experiences that ‘good’ 
institutions, geography and culture are by no means a precondition for economic development.  
 Therefore, it is refreshing to see a counter-narrative to the to the ‘African growth 
tragedy’, a counter-narrative which definitely has more to show for itself than just economic 
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growth. In many African countries, impressive strides have been made especially in the areas 
of health, education and political freedom. But there are several accounts on which the basis of 
the ‘Africa rising’ narrative can be criticised. In fact, there are good reasons to call into question 
the entire narrative, particularly because almost all African countries are still lacking what has 
historically been the main ingredient for rapid productivity growth and economic development: 
an internationally competitive manufacturing sector. This chapter aims to contextualise both 
the importance of manufacturing and policies to promote the manufacturing sector (i.e. 
industrial policy) for Africa.  
This first part of this chapter, section 2.2. will take a critical look at the ‘Africa rising’ 
narrative. We will see that Africa, as measured by various indicators, on aggregate is far from 
‘rising’—GDP per capita growth rates have been and are still low (and at that, mostly driven 
by primary commodity exports), and poverty and vulnerable employment rates are disturbingly 
high compared to other regions of developing countries.   
 The second part of this chapter, section 2.3, suggests that economic underdevelopment 
in Africa can largely be explained by the lack of structural transformation—the move away 
from a production structure dependent on primary commodities towards most importantly 
manufacturing activities – and that it is pertinent for development economists who study Africa 
to devote attention to this issue. The section will investigate both empirical evidence and 
theoretical underpinnings of the manufacturing sector as the main driver of economic 
development. How ‘true’ is it that the process of industrialisation has been the main engine of 
economic development for catch-up economies throughout the history of capitalism? Given 
the increased scope for productivity growth of services and the rise of the ‘post-industrial’ 
society, does this still hold? After discussing the general importance of manufacturing for 
economic development, particularly in the African context, the chapter will move on to take a 
detailed look at the state of the manufacturing sector in Africa in section 2.4. How dismal is 
Africa’s manufacturing performance really, and to what extent are the aggregate numbers 
representative of individual countries’ performance?   
While sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 will establish a strong case for the need for structural 
transformation in Africa, section 2.5 will move on to a more contested issue, which is how to 
go about achieving structural transformation, more specifically the role of the state in achieving 
this and to what extent policies should follow market signals or try to alter them, i.e. what role 
is there for industrial policy? Particularly in Africa, where the state has been one of the most 
demonised social institutions, rationales for state intervention for the purpose of 
industrialisation (which are largely lacking in mainstream economic theory) need to be 
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properly discussed. While history is rife with state failures, this section will provide reasons to 
believe that industrial policy has an invaluable part to play for economic development in 
Africa. 
 
2.2 The ‘Africa rising’ narrative: the arguments and their fallacies  
 
2.2.1 The arguments 
 
Quite probably, the colloquial use of the term ‘Africa rising’ was sparked by the cover of an 
issue of The Economist in 2011, featuring those exact words (yes, the magazine seemingly 
turned around). In 2012, Time magazine also ran the phrase on its cover. According to 
Akwagyiram (2013), bloggers are now calling ‘Africa rising’ a meme. Backed up by more 
analytically rigorous accounts (e.g. Andersen and Jensen, 2013; McKinsey, 2010; Radelet, 
2010; Robertson et. al., 2012), a number of arguments underpin this narrative of a continent on 
the rise.   
The clearest observation that the economic prospects for Africa have improved is the 
turnaround in economic growth.  After the ‘lost’ decades of the 1980s and 1990s (during which 
GDP was declining), economic growth in Africa has picked up. Between 2000 and 2015, 
annual GDP growth in Africa has been 4.6 per cent on average (UNCTAD STAT, 2017). And 
while primary commodity exporting countries are somewhat pulling up these aggregate growth 
rates, the turnaround in growth is surprisingly widespread across the continent (Devarajan and 
Fengler, 2012). 
Second, it is argued the political domain in Africa has become more open after the end 
of the Cold War, and that authoritarian (or even dictatorial) governments have been forced to 
give way to more democratically accountable regimes.  From 1989 to 2003, the number of 
democracies in Africa increased from 3 to 23 (Radelet, 2010).  
Third, some claim that a technological revolution has taken hold across the continent, 
most dramatically illustrated by an increase in the use of cell phones. In the mid 2000s, 
practically no one in Africa had cell phones. As of 2013, there were more cell phones than 
adult people on the continent (Fengler and Rowden, 2013). The increased availability of such 
devices and other ICT devices has made it easier for people to participate in social and political 
life, especially in remote villages. These devices have also had a big impact on people’s 
economic lives by, for example, increasing the efficiency of storing and spending money and 
making it easier for farmers to market their crops. 
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Fourth, there has been a significant improvement in social indicators. Malaria death 
rates, child mortality rates and infant mortality rates have fallen. Immunisation and vaccination 
rates have improved. People are becoming better educated—between 2000 and 2008, 
secondary school enrolment increased by nearly 50 per cent (Fengler and Rowden, 2013).     
Fifth, there has been a significant drop in the level of violence. Between 2002 and 2011, 
Africa’s share of worldwide violent conflicts dropped from 55 per cent to 24 per cent (Africa 
Progress Panel, 2012). Especially West Africa and the Great Lakes region have become more 
peaceful.  
Sixth, spatial and demographic developments are supposed to bode well for the future 
of African economic growth. Today, over 41 per cent of Africans live in cities, a figure which 
is increasing by about one percentage points every two years. Sustainable economic growth 
has historically been positively correlated with increasing urbanization because cities provide 
better operating environments for businesses and provide better services for people than rural 
areas. Africa also looks to be reaping a demographic dividend, with an increasing ratio of 
people in the working population per ‘dependent’. In 2010, Africa’s share of the population 
eligible for work (ages 15-64) was estimated at 42 per cent (460 million out of a total of 1.1 
billion). This share is predicated to increase to 50 per cent in 2030 (Fengler and Rowden, 2013).  
 Many of these developments are decidedly good, especially the improved state of health 
and education and the reduction in violent conflicts. However, a more nuanced analysis shows 
that these arguments miss out on a number of important points. 
 
2.2.2 Their fallacies 
 
2.2.2.1 The illusion and fragility of economic growth  
 
A common mistake many people make when measuring economic growth rates is looking at 
the growth of total GDP rather than the growth of GDP per capita. The former is an important 
indicator of changes to the size and international significance of an economy, while the latter 
is a more reliable indicator of economic development. In theory, a country’s GDP can grow, 
without more output being produced per person. This commonly happens in countries with 
high birth-rates—the population of the country grows, and GDP consequently grows. But 
people are not necessarily better off. So if we are interested in finding out if people are better 
off, materially, as measured by GDP growth, we should look at GDP per capita growth. In 
Africa, a significant part of the growth can be attributed to high birth-rates. Figure 2.1 compares 
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GDP growth rates in Africa and the East Asia and Pacific region, another fast-growing region, 
between 2000 and 2015 (the period of Africa’s ‘rise’), excluding high income countries in both 
regions.4  
 
  
  
 
 
The figure reveals a clear discrepancy in total GDP growth and GDP per capita growth 
in Africa. In the period under consideration, the average GDP per capita growth rate in Africa 
was 2.25 per cent, less than half of the total GDP growth rate. To put this number in perspective, 
the per capita growth rate of the East Asia and Pacific region in the period of Africa’s ‘rise’ 
was 7.6 per cent, well over 3 times that of Africa. Insofar as the ‘Africa rising’ narrative is 
based on economic growth, Africa’s per capita growth figure alone completely debunks the 
narrative. A per capita economic growth rate of 2.25 per cent is hardly impressive for 
																																																						
4 Excluding high-income countries in Africa hardly makes a difference, as there are none apart from the 
Seychelles, which has a tiny population (roughly 100,000). It makes a difference in the EAP region, as it excludes 
Japan, Singapore and South Korea. The rest of the countries in the EAP region are Cambodia, China, Indonesia, 
Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papa New Guinea, the Pacific Islands (a group of 10 countries with a 
total population of 2.3 million people), Philippines, Thailand, Timor Leste and Vietnam.     
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developing countries that are supposed to be on a trajectory of economic development.  
 One might, of course, point out that the average growth rate for Africa obscures the fact 
that some countries have growth exceptionally fast. This is correct, to an extent. The average 
per capita growth rate in the five fastest growing economies in Africa for the period under 
consideration (Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Rwanda5) at 4.8 per cent (WDI, 
2017) differs significantly from the average continental performance. And some of these 
countries, like Ethiopia and Rwanda, are growing at impressive rates without being dependent 
on natural resources. Still, the average growth rate of these very fast-growing economies falls 
well short of that of the East Asia and Pacific region by roughly three percentage points.  
 The fact that recent growth in Africa, especially in per capita terms, has not been as 
spectacular as the advocates of the ‘Africa rising’ story make it out to be is problematic enough, 
but the bigger problem is that even this relatively modest growth performance is unlikely to be 
sustained in the long run in most countries. As Arbache and Page (2009) rightly point out, the 
improved economic performance in Africa after 1995 can be mainly attributed to the reduction 
in the frequency of growth declines and the increase in growth accelerations of resource-
dependent countries (with a few exceptions, as mentioned in the above paragraph). The 
problem is that, with the end of China’s super-growth and thus the commodity price boom of 
the early 2000s, the prospect for growth of Africa’s resource dependent economies is dimming, 
and, together with it, the prospect for the whole continent. These resource-dependent 
economies account for over 60 per cent of the continent’s total GDP, with the combined GDP 
of the two largest of the continent, Nigeria and South Africa, alone accounting for roughly 30 
per cent (IMF, 2017). Furthermore, some of the really large resource-dependent economies, 
like Angola, Algeria, Nigeria and Sudan, are close to entirely resource dependent (see footnote 
18). 
Given all these factors, the continent’s good growth performance can easily evaporate.  
Some would say it already is evaporating. After primary commodity prices started tumbling in 
2014 (especially oil prices), Africa’s resource dependent countries have been in big fiscal 
trouble. Onigbinde (2015) observed that in the summer of 2015, 23 of Nigeria’s 26 states had 
not paid their civil servants for months, while spending for capital projects had been frozen for 
up to a year in some cases. According to Pilling (2016), Angola recently turned to the IMF for 
																																																						
5 Disregarding Equatorial Guinea, a country of roughly 1 million people whose per capita income increased 56-
fold in 15 years (between 1995 and 2010, from $371 to $20,703) due to the finding of a massive oil reserve. 
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a three-year bailout programme, and South Africa’s mining sector has lost 61,000 jobs since 
2012.   
 
2.2.2.2 Quality of growth: the negligible impact on employment and poverty 
 
It is not just that economic growth itself is not that high. The bigger problem is that the growth 
has mainly been a result of a primary commodity price boom (and increased discoveries of 
primary commodities). Consequently, economic and social progress as measured by other 
commonly used indicators, such as employment generation and poverty reduction, have been 
marginal.  
 Most people who enter the labour market in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa6 
(SSA), end up in vulnerable jobs, such as informal jobs and undeclared work. Figure 2.2 
compares the vulnerable employment rate across developing regions in the world. In 2016, the 
vulnerable employment rate in SSA was 69.7 per cent, by far the highest of all developing 
regions in the world, and a lowly 3.2 percentage points lower than the average between 2000 
and 2007. Other developing regions showed a larger reduction in this rate over the same time 
period. The East Asia and Pacific region reduced it from 57 per cent to 47.4 per cent, and even 
Latin America and the Caribbean, whose economic growth rate has been lower than that of 
SSA in this period, reduced it by 3.5 percentage points.  
 These numbers resonate with a report published by The Economist in 2014 on the 
dismal state of ‘decent’ job creation in Africa, which noted that a given firm in Africa typically 
has 24 per cent fewer people on its books than equivalent firms do elsewhere because so many 
people are informally employed in African firms (The Economist, 2014). Hence, the coming 
wave of young people eligible for work might simply not be able to find jobs other than dubious 
ones in the informal sector or toiling for their families. The supposed demographic dividend 
awaiting Africa might therefore turn out to be a demographic disaster.  
 
 
																																																						
6 When presenting aggregate data on Africa in this chapter, I have not always been able to collect the relevant 
data for the entire continent, although I have made my best effort to do so. This is because in certain databases, 
development statistics are aggregated for SSA rather than Africa. Consequently, some ‘aggregate Africa’ data in 
this chapter will be represented by SSA rather than Africa.     
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An even more dire picture emerges if we look at rates of extreme poverty. It is true that 
the poverty situation has improved slightly since the dawn of Africa’s ‘rise’. From 2002 to 
2013, the population share in SSA living on less than $3.10 a day (PPP, in 2011 prices) was 
reduced from 76.5 per cent to 65 per cent (see Figure 2.3). However, over a longer period of 
time, this figure has not changed much—in 1981 (earliest data available) it registered 72.2 per 
cent. The East Asia and Pacific region has dramatically reduced this rate, from 92.1 per cent in 
1981 to 16 per cent in 2013. The same goes for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
where is stayed above 20 per cent until 2002, before falling to 11.3 per cent in 2013. 
 Unsurprisingly, Africa has therefore increased its share of world poverty. In 1999, 
Africa accounted for 21 per cent of the world’s poverty. By 2008, that figure had reached 29 
per cent (as other developing countries slashed their poverty rates during that period, as can be 
seen from Figure 2.3), despite the fact that the continent accounted for only 15 per cent of the 
world’s population (Africa Progress Panel, 2012).  
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2.3 Explaining persistent underdevelopment in Africa: the importance of 
manufacturing for economic growth and development  
 
As seen, ‘Africa rising’ is little more than a hype and there are good reasons to believe that it 
has to do with the lack of structural transformation—the move away from dependence on 
rudimentary agriculture and natural resources to most importantly manufacturing activities. 
The share of manufacturing in economic output in Africa is around 11 per cent, currently the 
lowest of all developing regions in the world (Chang et. al., 2016). Before looking more 
thoroughly at manufacturing performance in Africa (considering several measures, and also 
the degree of homogeneity between countries), it is useful to explore why the manufacturing 
sector is considered to be such a strong driver of economic development, and if current 
technological trends are challenging this traditional view.  
 
2.3.1 Practically all countries that have transitioned from ‘poor to rich’ have done so 
through a process of industrialisation 
 
Obviously, the arguments supporting the manufacturing sector as the main driver of economic 
development are rooted in the clear observation that, throughout the history of capitalism, 
practically all countries that have transformed their economies from low to high income have 
done so through a process of industrialisation. 
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 Between 1750 and 1950, the West’s (and Japan’s) gradual establishment as world 
economic hegemon—starting with the industrial revolution in Great Britain in the late 18th 
century, when the country hosted major technological breakthroughs in textile production and 
steam power—was also a process of establishing itself as the world’s manufacturing hegemon. 
In 1750, Europe, North America and Japan constituted only 27 per cent of manufacturing 
production in the world,7 but by 1900, those regions made up 90 per cent of world 
manufacturing production (Bairoch, 1982). The West’s industrialisation drive made a 
significant contribution to economic growth as well. Between 1820 and 1950, per capita GDP 
in the West grew at an average rate of 1.08 per cent per year, compared to only 0.29 per cent 
per year in the rest of the world.8 In the early 20th century, the world was clearly divided into 
two groups of economies: one was rich and industrialised, the other was poor and dependent 
on agriculture and natural resources. Industrialisation came to be seen as the main driver of 
economic development.  
 After WW2, the world’s manufacturing landscape started to change. As developing 
countries were given more autonomy in steering policies towards their own development 
objectives, they implemented policies to promote industrialisation. As a result, a significant 
share of the world’s manufacturing production has relocated to these countries, particularly to 
East Asia. The ‘star’ performers include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, 
whose pace of industrialisation and economic growth between roughly 1960 and 1990 was 
unprecedented in history, and still is. Since then, they have been followed by countries like 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.  
 According to a study of ‘growth miracles’ by the World Bank in 2008, only 13 
economies in the world have grown at an average annual rate of 7 per cent or higher since 
1950. Only two countries, both with small populations and highly idiosyncratic structures—
Botswana and Oman9—are among the group of 13 that have not grown through a process of 
industrialisation (World Bank, 2008a). A similar study has been carried out by Ocampo et. al. 
(2009). They constructed a sample of 57 developing and transition economies grouped into 12 
regions, and looked at the relationship between the production structure of the economy and 
economic growth in the period 1970-2007. They found that annual GDP growth rates were 
																																																						
7 In the 17th and first half of the 18th century, global manufacturing was dominated by China (porcelains and silks) 
and India (cotton textiles) (Nayyar, 2013). 
8 The West includes Western Europe, Western Offshoots, Eastern Europe, Former USSR and Japan. The rest of 
the world includes Asia, Africa and Latin America. Calculations are made from the Maddison Online Database 
with 1996 Geary-Khamis dollars. 
9 Botswana has amassed its wealth from precious stones (diamonds), while Oman has done so through oil.  
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positively correlated with an increase in industry’s share of GDP in all regions that went 
through sustained periods of growth.  
 The relationship between growth of the manufacturing sector and long-term economic 
growth has in fact been documented as robust by many more scholars (e.g. McMillan and 
Rodrik, 2011; Nayyar, 2013; Rodrik, 2007; Szirmai, 2009; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2011). 
Thus seen, it is not surprising that no country, except a few states exceptionally rich in oil (e.g. 
Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar) or very small financial havens (e.g. Monaco, Lichtenstein), has 
achieved high and sustainable standards of living without developing a significant 
manufacturing sector.10 This is probably why the terms ‘industrialised country’ and ‘developed 
country’ are often used interchangeably. 
 
2.3.2 Theoretical underpinnings 
 
The early theoretical arguments linking the manufacturing sector to economic growth were 
motivated by the observation of structural change taking place in countries going through the 
industrialisation process in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These scholars observed that 
a transfer of labour from agriculture to industry resulted in an increase in overall productivity 
and per capita economic growth because labour productivity seemed to be much higher in 
industry than in agriculture (e.g. Chenery, 1960; Fei and Ranis, 1964; Lewis, 1954).   
But why is productivity higher in manufacturing? Part of the answer can be found in 
Nicholas Kaldor’s three growth laws, which are perhaps the most classic endorsements of 
manufacturing as the engine of economic growth. The three laws postulate the following: 1) 
The growth of GDP is positively correlated with the growth of the manufacturing sector, in 
part explained by the absorption of surplus labour from agriculture to industry; 2) The 
productivity of the manufacturing sector is positively correlated with growth of the 
manufacturing sector (also known as Verdoorn’s law). This is attributed to the increasing 
returns to scale of the manufacturing sector, both static and dynamic. The former refers to 
output level or sector size, while the latter signifies the effect of learning by doing, which is a 
function of both cumulative past output and/or cumulative production experience over time. 3) 
The productivity of non-manufacturing is positively correlated with the growth of the 
																																																						
10 Neither Botswana nor Oman are mentioned, as their current level of GDP per capita arguably does not qualify 
for having achieved ‘high and sustainable standards of living’.  
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manufacturing sector, because of technological spillover effects from the manufacturing sector 
to other sectors (Kaldor, 1966). 
  The superior productivity potential mentioned in Kaldor’s second law is an important 
point. Economies of scale are more easily achieved in the manufacturing sector as 
manufacturing activities lend themselves more easily to mechanisation and chemical 
processing than do other types of economic activities. The ease of spatially concentrating 
manufacturing production is also an important factor behind the greater productivity potential. 
Agriculture is more constrained in terms of space, soil and climate. And some services 
activities are, by their very nature, impervious to productivity increases. Chang (2014) provides 
the example of consuming music: if a string quartet trots through a 27-minute piece in nine 
minutes, we will not say that its productivity has trebled.  
 It is also important to emphasise the third law, as many people tend to forget that 
productivity growth in other sectors are often a result of innovations in the manufacturing 
sector. The world’s most productive agricultural economies are heavy users of chemicals, 
fertilisers, pesticides and agricultural machinery, while the world’s most productive service 
economies rely on top-tier computer technology, transport equipment and, in some instances, 
mechanised warehouses. These spillovers also take form through organisational innovations 
that originate from the manufacturing sector. For example, many fast food restaurants use 
assembly techniques in their kitchens, and some even deliver food on a conveyor belt (‘YO! 
Sushi’ being the famous example). For another example, large retail chains often apply modern 
inventory management techniques that were developed in the manufacturing sector (Chang et. 
al., 2016).  
 The importance of the manufacturing sector for a country’s entire innovation 
infrastructure cannot be highlighted enough. Even in advanced countries, where manufacturing 
production is supposed to have been on the decline since the early 1990s, the bulk of innovation 
happens in the manufacturing sector. In the US, industry still employs 64 per cent of all 
scientists and engineers, and the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of industrial 
R&D (Bonvillan, 2012)—in essence, many services ‘import’ technology from the 
manufacturing sector. This means that the demise of manufacturing would greatly diminish the 
size and also efficiency of the overall innovation infrastructure. Berger (2015) points out that 
in many industries, it is difficult to separate the manufacturing and services segments of the 
value chains (i.e. separating production from R&D and design). For example, in solar power, 
the most promising R&D and innovation involves cheaper and more efficient ways of 
manufacturing photovoltaics. The innovation is in the manufacturing. She predicts that only 
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those countries that can build powerful links between laboratory research and manufacturing 
will have the strongest innovation economies.  
Pisano and Shih (2012) argue that the US is already starting to lose its innovation 
infrastructure (mainly through outsourcing manufacturing activities) through the gradual 
decline of its ‘industrial commons’, which they define as, “The R&D and manufacturing 
infrastructure, know-how, process-development skills, and engineering capabilities embedded 
in firms, universities, and other organizations that provide the foundation for growth and 
innovation in a wide range of industries” (Pisano and Shih, 2012, p.2). For example, the initial 
offshoring of consumer electronics production from the US to then-little-known Japanese 
companies such as Sony and Matsushita, led to the relocation of R&D in consumer electronics 
to Japan—and later South Korea and Taiwan—because it made sense to tightly coordinate the 
transfer of learning between the manufacturers and the designers and somewhat co-locate the 
production, design and R&D environment (and also because these East Asian countries pushed 
for it through industrial policy). As consumers demanded ever smaller, lighter and more 
powerful computers and cell-phones, electronics companies were pushed to innovate in 
batteries. In the process, East Asia became the hub for innovation in the design and 
manufacturing of compact, high-capacity, rechargeable lithium ion batteries, a technology that 
was invented in America (Pisano and Shih, 2012). Plenty of other high-tech activities in the 
US have now been ‘lost’ to these countries in the process of offshoring, including LCDs for 
monitors, TVs and handheld devices; desktop and notebook PCs; hard disk drives; and 
integrated circuit packaging. The main point is that if you lose manufacturing production 
through the process of offshoring, you stand at high risk of losing R&D as well.   
On the flip side, these East Asian countries have gradually built up their innovation 
infrastructure through the process of industrialisation, and it is by no means coincidental that 
these countries have also been some of the world’s fastest growing economies as they built up 
their innovation infrastructure, as already evidenced. So from an innovation standpoint, there 
are good reasons why African countries should pursue manufacturing development. But there 
are many more reasons why, especially for African countries, pursuing a manufacturing 
development strategy is sensible.  
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2.3.3 Why a manufacturing development strategy is sensible particularly for Africa 
 
African countries are often characterised by dependence on primary commodities, so the 
arguments supporting a manufacturing-based development strategy for African countries are 
particularly related to the many macroeconomic benefits of diversifying and transforming their 
production structure towards more manufacturing (in addition to the abovementioned 
arguments).  
 First, as famously postulated by the Prebish-Singer hypothesis, the terms of trade for 
countries that predominantly export primary commodities has tended to deteriorate over time, 
making the prospect of economic development based on primary commodity exports dim in 
the long run (Spraos, 1983, provides a comprehensive review of the subject). There are a 
number of reasons for this. First, agricultural products are characterised by a lower income-
elasticity of demand (known as Engel’s law). Therefore, as the world economy grows (and as 
incomes grow), the relative demands for those products fall. Second, countries specialising in 
producing manufactured goods—and therefore tend to be net importers of primary 
commodities—have the ability to come up with synthetic substitutes for primary commodities, 
as indeed happened with products like guano, saltpetre and natural dyes. This reduces demand 
for primary commodities and thus drive their prices down. Third, primary commodity 
industries are characterised by competitive markets more so than manufacturing industries. 
This means that primary commodity producers (mostly based in developing countries) have to 
pass on all the surpluses generated by productivity growth to consumers, while manufacturing 
producers (mostly based in richer countries) can appropriate such surpluses more easily by 
charging customers higher prices, as many of them operate in oligopolistic markets.  
 Second, diversifying towards more manufacturing will reduce the macroeconomic risks 
associated with dependence on primary commodities. At least since the 1970s, prices of 
primary commodities have been much more volatile than manufactured goods.11 The recent 
downturn in primary commodity prices, in part discussed earlier in this chapter, is a perfect 
example.  This makes macroeconomic management and stabilisation policies a more difficult 
task, especially for countries whose export revenues are highly dependent on primary 
																																																						
11 The price volatility of primary commodities can in part be explained by their sensitivity to global supply and 
demand changes. The end of international commodity agreements in the 1980s, which aimed to stabilise 
commodity prices through supply management schemes and marketing boards, has also had an impact. Nissanke 
(2010) points out that after the global downturn in equity markets in 2002, futures and derivatives markets have 
expanded to target commodities as part of their portfolio diversification strategy. Therefore, the presence of traders 
with little interest in physical trading, so-called noise traders, have increased. These traders are known to make 
asset prices more volatile than what ‘pure market fundamentals’ would imply. 
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commodities. Moreover, the relative ease of collecting tax revenues from international trade 
combined with the fact that alternative tax handles are lacking in African countries, means that 
African fiscal revenues are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in prices of their exports. We 
already saw how Nigeria struggled after its fiscal revenues fell massively with the fall in global 
oil prices. In fact, the strong positive relationship between a country’s export diversification 
and pace of economic growth, especially in the transition phase from low to middle income, 
has become such a stylized fact in the field of development economics (see Hesse, 2008), that 
a country’s export basket composition, rather than its level of income, is often used to 
determine its level of economic development (e.g. Hausmann et. al., 2005). 
Third, and less talked about than the two aforementioned arguments, is the fact that the 
manufacturing sector tends to be the strongest driver for paid employment, particularly in 
developing countries (ILO, 2014a). As mentioned earlier, the majority of Africa’s labour force 
is stuck in vulnerable jobs—non-contractual arrangements in the informal sector, mostly in 
subsistence agriculture. Most manufacturing jobs (at least those in exporting firms) in 
developing countries are offered through formal channels and provide a much steadier stream 
of income. They are also usually subject to labour laws and minimum wage legislation. As we 
will see in chapter 4, Ethiopia’s drive to industrialise is largely motivated by the need to create 
more formal employment opportunities.  
 
2.3.4 Manufacturing versus services: have we entered the post-industrial society? 
 
The services sector has come to dominate the economic structure of many economies in the 
latter half of the 20th century and even more so in the 21st century, both in terms of output and 
employment. There is therefore a growing belief that we have now entered a ‘post-industrial 
society’, in which services are gradually taking over for manufacturing as a source of 
productivity growth and economic development. This is especially apparent in industrialised 
economies, where, as mentioned, the manufacturing sector seems to be shrinking. Michael 
Porter, one of the most well-known advocates of the post-industrial society discourse, has 
argued that services are where the high value is today: 
 
We used to think of services as flipping hamburgers, now we have to think of services 
as rocket science. Services are where the high value is today, not in manufacturing. 
Manufacturing stuff per se is relatively low value. That is why it is being done in China 
or Thailand (McCormack, 2006, p.1). 
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Also in some African countries, services based growth strategies—especially those centred on 
growth of the tourism and telecommunications sectors—rather than manufacturing based 
growth strategies, have become a more common strategy to diversify away from dependence 
of primary commodities (see ACET, 2014; UNECA, 2015).   
 There are good reasons to take the post-industrial society discourse seriously. First, 
given massive increases in firm size, it is now more profitable to procure some services from 
specialist providers rather than produce them within a manufacturing firm (the latter largely 
being the case in the past). Telecommunications, finance, and business services are now 
organised in a way that resembles the manufacturing sector, as scale economies and 
technological advances are more easily incorporated into these services to increase efficiency. 
In some digitalised services, especially in advanced economies, marginal costs of providing an 
additional unit of service have come close to zero, making scale economies even more 
prevalent than in the manufacturing sector. For example, media streaming services, such as 
Netflix and Spotify, can deliver their services around the globe in a flash and have already 
proven their tremendous potential for scale economies. In 2016, Netflix had 93.8 million 
paying subscribers, while Spotify had 40 million paying subscribers. Only 6 years before that, 
both services had a marginal subscriber base (Statista, 2017). 
 Second, the revolutions in ICT and transport technology have made more services 
tradeable. The poster child of services-based trade success is the UK, where trade in services 
now account for 19.4 per cent of GDP—roughly 50 per cent higher than the world average 
(WDI, 2017)—thanks to growth in trade of mainly financial and business services. India is 
another country often cited as having achieved success through exporting services, like 
software, accountancy and the reading of medical scanning images. A third example is 
Rwanda, a country that in the last 10 years has increased its foreign exchange earnings 
considerably through the expansion of tourism services, such as gorilla viewing. In fact, 
Rwanda, and many other African countries, like Uganda, Tanzania and Tunisia, report that 
tourism is the top single earner of foreign exchange for their respective countries. 
 Third, it is not improbable that in the future we will see a type of ‘Engel’s law’ whereby 
the income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods on a global scale becomes 
significantly lower than that of services, as world incomes rise. Especially in the more affluent 
parts of the world, we are seeing that the consumption of services is increasing with rising 
incomes. One aspect is ‘servicising’ what used to be our daily tasks: people are eating out, or 
ordering take-away rather than cooking themselves, and we have the option of getting others 
to clean for us, walk our dogs, and take care of our children. In the end, the same amount of 
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goods is consumed, but an extra layer of services is being added to the ‘consumption basket’. 
Another aspect is simply having more available income and being able to spend more on 
services. For example, spending money on ‘experiences’ rather than ‘things’ has become 
fashionable among the millennial generation.  
 However, there are good reasons to be sceptical of the post-industrial society discourse. 
First, too often, services are equated with ‘knowledge’ work and manufacturing is stereotyped 
as low value ‘grunge’ work. It is dangerous to generalise in either direction. Burger-flipping, 
on the one hand, and the design of space rockets, on the other hand, are services that surely do 
not generate the same amount of value. Likewise, the assembly of an Apple iPod is a 
manufacturing activity that might not generate much value, but the manufacturing of its display 
module and its multimedia processor chip does. Manufacturing is just as much of a 
‘knowledge’ sector as services is. Moreover, the amount of value that accrues to an activity in 
the value chain is often an outcome of market position and power, rather than the complexity 
of the activity. As we will see in the next chapter, the huge chunk of revenue generated in 
business-related services by retailers and brand names in the fast-moving consumer goods 
sectors (the most prominent example being clothes) has a lot to do with the global reach and 
market power that these companies, like Nike and Walmart, have attained over the years.  
 Second, it does not always make sense, or is not always possible, to look at the value 
and productivity generation of manufacturing and services separately. There is a massive 
interdependence between the two. As we have already seen, productivity growth in the services 
sector would not be possible without inputs from the manufacturing sector. And many services 
that have grown rapidly in the last few decades are heavily dependent on manufacturing firms 
as their customers. These include banking, communications, insurance, construction and 
consulting (equally, manufacturing operations run smoothly thanks to these services). Even 
more importantly, producer services, such as transport, design, retail, supply chain 
management and engineering, are by definition linked to the production of goods. A country 
can to some extent specialise in exporting these services, but there are still huge benefits of co-
locating them within national boundaries. This means that those countries which lose their 
manufacturing bases are likely to lose many of their important services as well. 
 Furthermore, in certain manufacturing industries, it does not make sense to separate 
manufacturing, R&D and design activities. Pisano and Shih (2012, p.66) presents a framework 
that explains in which industries it makes sense to co-locate these activities. Basically, in 
industries where major manufacturing process innovations are evolving rapidly and can have 
a huge impact on the product, it makes sense to integrate R&D, design and manufacturing. 
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Examples of industries where the risk of separating these activities are “enormous” include 
biotech drugs, nanomaterials, electrophoretic displays and superminiaturised assembly. 
Examples of industries where outsourcing makes sense include desktop computers, consumer 
electronics, active pharmaceutical ingredients and commodity semiconductors. There is an 
additional, but subtler and less visible ‘symbiosis’ between these activities: many of the people 
who work in process R&D and product design have technical manufacturing experience, 
obtained either through higher education or work experience.    
 Third, low tradability characterises most services because they require consumers and 
producers to be in the same location, like cleaning, grooming, public utilities or education. No 
one has yet invented ways to provide a haircut or house cleaning long-distance. This means 
that countries that rely on their services sector for economic growth will eventually struggle 
with trade balance constraints. Services have in fact been stuck at around 20 per cent of 
international trade since the 1990s. The UK has had a negative trade balance of £4 billion since 
2014, because its trade surplus in services cannot make up for its trade deficit in goods (ONS, 
2017).  Between 2004 and 2011, in India, which, like the UK, is also supposed to be a model 
of service-based economic development, trade surplus in services covered only 17 per cent of 
its trade deficit in goods (Chang, 2014).  
 Fourth, the decline of the manufacturing sector is partly an illusion. Much of the 
apparent fall in the manufacturing sector’s share of GDP in advanced economies is due to the 
decline in the prices of manufactured goods, relative to the prices of services. This is thanks to 
faster productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. Think about how computers and mobile 
phones have become cheaper (holding the quality constant), compared with the cost of getting 
a haircut or eating out. When this relative price effect is taken into account and the shares of 
different sectors are recalculated in constant prices, as opposed to current prices, the share of 
manufacturing has not fallen very much in most high-income countries. In some of them, like 
the US, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden, when calculated in constant prices, it has actually 
increased (Chang, 2014).12 The growth of the services sector is also a bit of an illusion. A lot 
of services that are now supplied by independent companies at home or abroad used to be 
provided in-house in manufacturing firms (for example, catering, security guards, some design 
																																																						
12 The relative price decline of manufactured goods is also a result of price increases of services. Because the 
services sector has lower potential for productivity growth, income growth in advanced economies, combined 
with the fact that many services are not tradable, has led to higher wages and prices in the services sector (Baumol, 
1967), as well as an increased employment share (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987). Thus, there is good reason to 
believe that growth of the services sector has come about as a result of economic growth, and not the other way 
around, as indeed some people argue.  
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and engineering activities). In that sense, there has not been a big restructuring of the advanced 
economies, but more a change in the way we count/measure certain economic activities.  
 
2.4 Africa’s manufacturing performance  
 
2.4.1 Aggregate manufacturing performance 
 
As mentioned earlier, the share of manufacturing in economic output in Africa is currently the 
lowest of all regions of developing countries in the world, at around 11 per cent. This actually 
represents a gradual decay of the manufacturing sector in Africa, which at its height in 1975 
made up 14.7 per cent of GDP (De Vries et. al., 2013). Page (2012) interestingly compares the 
state of value addition across all sectors in African countries to that of a range of countries in 
Asia—China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines and Thailand—when they reached 
lower middle-income status, set as a benchmark of $996 per capita in 2009.13 The most striking 
finding is in the manufacturing sector, whose share both in employment and in value added in 
a ‘typical’ lower-income African country is about half of the benchmark value.  
 Some, however, present a brighter outlook for African manufacturing. Te Velde (2016) 
points out that manufacturing output in SSA grew from $73bn in 2005 to $98 billion in 2014, 
and that manufacturing exports doubled from 50$m to over $100m in the same time period. 
Based on these figures, he calculates that manufacturing value added (MVA) in SSA has grown 
at a rate of 3.5 per cent a year, faster than the global average.  
 But there are some shortcomings to Te Velde’s choices of measurement. Just like in the 
case of economic growth, the growth of the manufacturing sector as measured by absolute 
output can simply be a result of growing populations, which seems to be the case, as evidenced 
by the fact that MVA as a share of GDP has been declining in Africa14 (and in the next 
subsection, we will also see that per capita MVA figures support this conclusion). Comparing 
Africa’s manufacturing growth to that of the global average is also slightly misleading, as one 
would expect the manufacturing sector to be shrinking in industrialised countries, and growing 
in developing countries, given current global economic trends and the stylised trajectory of 
structural transformation (as already discussed). This is indeed the case: industrialised 
economies’ share of world manufactured exports decreased from 84 per cent in 1990 to 62 per 
																																																						
13 Lower middle-income status is defined by the World Bank as falling in the range $996-$3,945, at 2009 prices.  
14 From 2005 to 2014 (the exact time period that Te Velde looks at) MVA as share of GDP in SSA declined from 
11.2 per cent to 10.8 per cent (WDI, 2017).  
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cent in 2013, while the equivalent share for developing countries increased from 16 per cent to 
38 per cent (UNIDO, 2016a). A better comparison would therefore be across the developing 
world only. Table 2.1 compares changes in the manufacturing output share in world total of 
several regions of developing countries. All regions have increased their manufacturing output 
share, as expected. But SSA has, by far, experienced the smallest gain: a change from 0.67 to 
0.69 per cent is in fact negligible.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Manufacturing output shares in world total, 1990 and 2011, and gain or 
loss 
Region 1990 
(%) 
2011 
(%) 
Gain or loss 
(percentage 
points) 
South-East Asia 2.71 5.2 2.49 
South America 4.59 6.9 2.32 
North Africa and the Middle East 3.41 4.77 1.35 
South Asia 1.39 2.52 1.13 
Central Asia 0.19 0.37 0.18 
Central America 0.13 0.24 0.11 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.67 0.69 0.02 
Source: UNIDO (2016a) 
 
 
Looking at the technology composition of manufacturing output in Africa also gives 
cause for worry. Table 2.2 compares manufacturing output in different technology groups— 
resource-based (RB), low-technology (LT) and medium - and high-technology (MT / HT)— 
across regions of developing countries. By far, Africa has the highest dependence on resource-
based manufacturing, at 44.7 per cent of total manufacturing output. While resource-based 
manufacturing can sometimes contribute to the development of productive capabilities (see 
Kjollestrom and Dallto, 2007), they usually involve low value addition, make exporting 
countries more vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations and exhibit lower productivity 
growth than manufacturing with higher technology intensity.  
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Compared to 1990, Africa has actually increased its dependence on resource-based 
manufacturing, and also decreased the share of low technology manufacturing in its MVA. 
This is also worrying, as the low-technology category is often characterized by high labour 
intensity, something African countries need to focus on given the surge of people that will enter 
the labour force in years to come.   
 
 
Table 2.2: Technology composition of manufacturing value added, by region15 
Region 1990 2013 
 RB LT MT / HT RB LT MT / HT 
Africa 42.2 36.1 21.7 44.7 32.9 22.4 
Asia and 
Pacific 
29.8 24.2 46.1 25.1 25.6 49.3 
Latin America 34.3 24.8 40.9 37.9 29.1 33 
Source: UNIDO (2016a) 
 
 
2.4.2 Degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity in manufacturing performance within Africa 
 
Seeing that there are as many as 54 countries in Africa, it is worth looking at the degree of 
homogeneity/heterogeneity between the countries. Table 2.3 presents indicators of 
manufacturing performance of each African country,16 ranked in order of highest to lowest 
MVA per capita in 2015. Three indicators have been chosen for each country, based on data 
availability: MVA per capita, MVA as share of GDP and the rank in UNIDO’s competitive 
industrial performance (CIP) index. The CIP is an index-based indicator, based on three 
dimensions: capacity of a country to produce and export manufactured goods, a country’s 
																																																						
15 See UNIDO (2016a, p.235) for a description of the technology classification groups. A simple typology of these 
technology classification groups can be described as follows: resource based—food, beverages and basic metals; 
low technology—textiles, apparel and fabricated metal products; medium technology—chemicals, machinery & 
equipment and motor vehicles; high technology—radio, TV & communication equipment, medical, precision & 
optical instruments and other transport equipment.   
16 Excluding South Sudan, which is not yet recognised as independent from Sudan in the statistical databases used.  
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technological deepening and sophistication and world impact of a country’s manufacturing 
sector.17  
 The table does indeed show some degree of heterogeneity. Per capita MVA in 2015 
ranged from $1,307 (Mauritius) to $2 (Somalia). Also, SSA is clearly less industrialised than 
North Africa. Furthermore, within SSA, if we exclude South Africa, all the countries with high 
MVA scores have very small populations—Mauritius (1.3 million), Swaziland (1.3 million), 
Seychelles (100,000), Namibia (2.4 million), Botswana (2.1 million) and Gabon (1.8 million). 
The remaining countries in SSA all have an MVA per capita lower than $300, which is 
essentially a negligible manufacturing base. To put this number in perspective, MVA per capita 
in 2015 was $1,323 in Brazil, $2,020 in China, $9,595 in Germany, $8,514 in Japan, $3,591 in 
the UK and $6,056 in the US (UNIDO STAT, 2017). Excluding the African countries with the 
highest MVA scores might seem like an attempt of identifying homogeneity simply by 
removing heterogeneity, but the total population of these 41 remaining African countries 
exceeds 900 million, which is 94 per cent of SSA’s total population, and 80 per cent of Africa’s 
total population.  
 If we look at all the countries’ CIP rank, a more worrisome trend emerges. Out of 143 
countries ranked, not a single African country ranks in the top 40, and if we exclude South 
Africa, not a single African country ranks in the top 65. The reason that some countries score 
high on MVA per capita and MVA as share of GDP relative to their CIP rank (like, for example, 
Mauritius and Swaziland) is because of the lack of technological sophistication and 
diversification. They are generally countries who produce a high volume of manufactured 
goods relative to their size, but tend to be highly dependent on few products with low 
technological sophistication.     
 Another prominent feature observable from Table 1 is the sound correlation between 
MVA per capita and GDP per capita. No countries in Africa with an MVA per capita lower 
than $200 have managed to exceed GDP per capita of $2,000 without being dependent on 
minerals or oil. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
17 For more information on the CIP index, see UNIDO (2016, pp.197-199). 
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Table 2.3: The manufacturing idiosyncrasies of African economies 
Country MVA per capita 
2015 (constant 
2005 $) 
MVA per capita 
2005 (constant 
2005 $) 
MVA as % 
of GDP, 
2015 
CIP 
rank 
GDP per 
capita, 
2015 
Populati
on (2014 
est.) 
Resource 
dependent
18 
Mauritius 1307 1192 14 82 9,252 1.3  
Swaziland 1040 1072 32 88 3,200 1.3  
South Africa 971 952 12 41 5,723 53.5 Y 
Seychelles 917 856 7 N/A 15,476 0.1  
Tunisia 703 684 17 87 3,872 11.2  
Namibia 644 648 11 84 4,673 2.4 Y 
Botswana 487 414 6 79 6,360 2.1  
Gabon 485 396 5 114 8,266 1.8 Y 
Egypt 468 442 16 71 3,614 84.7  
Morocco 421 405 13 67 2,878 34  
Angola 302 258 7 N/A 4,101 6.3 Y 
Libya 256 759 4 N/A 6,179 6.3 Y 
Nigeria 255 149 10 110 2,640 183.5 Y 
Algeria 207 181 4 87 4,206 40.6 Y 
Cape Verde 200 185 5 133 3,080 0.5  
Cameroon 186 171 14 107 1,217 23.4 Y 
Cote d’Ivore 167 172 12 93 1,398 21.3  
Lesotho 145 131 12 N/A 1,066 2.1  
Sudan 143 148 10 N/A 2,414 39.6 Y 
Congo 129 106 4 102 1,851 4.7 Y 
Zambia 120 107 9 109 1,304 15.5 Y 
Kenya 118 110 11 113 1,376 46.7  
Senegal 116 120 11 106 899 15  
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
103 95 8 N/A 1,669 0.2  
Mauritania 97 86 7 N/A 1,243 4.1  
Ghana 95 85 5 119 1,369 27  
Zimbabwe 84 85 10 N/A 924 15  
DRC 69 56 16 N/A 456 71.2 Y 
Mozambique 62 50 12 120 529 27.1 Y 
Uganda 61 65 9 129 705 40.1  
																																																						
18 A country is classified as resource dependent if 25 per cent or more of its exports have been made up of fuels 
and/or mining products since the year 2000. Some countries in the table have extremely high resource dependence 
(over 80 per cent of exports are natural resources). These include Angola, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, 
Libya, Nigeria and Sudan. 
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Guinea-
Bissau 
61 60 12 N/A 572 1.8  
Tanzania 56 48 7 121 878 52.3  
Madagascar 56 55 14 123 401 24.2  
Benin 55 53 7 N/A 762 10.9  
Central 
African 
Republic 
54 81 18 139 323 4.8  
Burkina Faso 49 39 7 N/A 589 17.9  
Chad 47 42 6 N/A 775 13.6 Y 
Malawi 46 46 10 135 371 17.3  
Togo 45 45 8 N/A 559 7.2  
Equatorial 
Guinea 
42 32 0 N/A 14,439 0.8 Y 
Comoros 40 42 5 N/A 717 0.7  
Mali 38 33 6 N/A 724 16.3  
Djibouti 35 30 2 N/A 1945 0.9  
Rwanda 32 29 5 136 697 12.4  
Guinea 28 27 6 N/A 531 12.3 Y 
Burundi 26 23 12 140 277 10.8  
Gambia 25 27 5 141 471 2  
Eritrea 22 22 6 141 844 6.7  
Niger 21 17 5 126 358 19.3  
Ethiopia 18 12 4 138 619 98.9  
Liberia 17 14 5 N/A 455 4.5 Y 
Sierra Leone 8 10 2 N/A 653 6.3 Y 
Somalia 2 2 2 N/A 549 25.5  
Source: Author’s calculation based on UNIDO STAT (2017), Chang et. al. (2016), and WDI (2017) 
   
 
2.5 The role of the state in achieving structural transformation: 
introducing industrial policy  
 
This chapter has so far made it clear that structural transformation of the economy is one of the 
most acute development challenges in Africa. With most importantly a negligible 
manufacturing base, almost all African countries are at the lower rung in the process of catching 
up with the global technological frontier. This section will move on to a more contested issue, 
which is how to go about achieving structural transformation—more specifically the role of 
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the state in achieving this and to what extent policies should follow market signals or try to 
alter them —arguing that there are many rationales for industrial policy. 
Rigorous reviews and discussions on industrial policy in the developing country context 
have been published in recent years (albeit with slightly different angles), for example by 
Chang et.al. (2016), Oqubay (2015) and Wade (2015). Some reflections by these reviews on 
why and how to do industrial policy will feature in this section, but others will not. The aim of 
this section is not to cover the entire literature on industrial policy, but rather to carry out a 
distinct review of the topic, and present justifications for industrial policy that will serve the 
discussions in subsequent chapters well. 
The various theories of industrial policy will be buttressed by examples, that will range 
from 19th century to late 20th century developing countries. While the range of examples might 
be a bit of an eclectic mix, almost all of the examples are of countries when they were in their 
‘catch-up’ phase, i.e. when they were trying to catch up to the global technological frontier and 
had to compete with more industrialised nations. An attempt has been made to illustrate the 
various industrial policy tools with the most relevant examples, partially or fully successful 
with the implementation of such tools. Heavy emphasis has been put on the growth experience 
of the Asian tigers in the post-WW2 era, as these were countries whose pace of economic 
growth and industrialisation were unprecedented throughout the history of capitalism, and still 
are. 
The last part of the section will discuss Africa’s experience with industrial policy in the 
post-independence era. While that experiment by and large failed, the period of more state 
intervention in the 1960s and the 1970s yielded higher economic growth rates than any 
subsequent period, especially that of market liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting 
that a rejuvenation of industrial policy in Africa is far from unfeasible. 
An important caveat should be mentioned. Formulating successful industrial policy is 
not only about using the right tools, but also about the determinants of state effectiveness. There 
is a vast literature on those determinants, but this will not be addressed here. The reason is that 
the eventual aim of this thesis is to analyse the consequences that an external change (i.e. the 
globalisation of production) has on the tools of industrial policy, and if African countries now 
need to do things differently given this change.19 
																																																						
19 Although external changes can affect state effectiveness (for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue 
that different types of colonisation have produced different political institutions in developing countries, and Wade 
(2015) argues that external military threats shaped the East Asian development states) there is little evidence (or 
literature) on the link between the expansion of global production networks and state effectiveness. 
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2.5.1 What is industrial policy? 
 
Clearly, a definition of industrial policy is useful before discussing why it is needed and how 
it is done. It might seem obvious that industrial policy is a policy aiming to develop the 
industrial sector, but the concept is not as straightforward as many people think, nor do 
everyone apply the same definition.20 Chang (1994) uses a debate surrounding the post-WW2 
Japanese development experience to illustrate how the adoption of different definitions can 
result in divergent interpretations of how important industrial policy is for economic 
development: opponents of industrial policy pointed out that subsidies and government loans 
to industries in Japan were relatively small, and hence claimed that industrial policy played a 
minor role in Japan’s growth success. Proponents of industrial policy, who usually understand 
industrial policy in a broader sense than just subsidies and government loans to industry, argued 
that the Japanese ‘administrative guidance’ system, which played a vital part in Japan’s 
industrialisation effort, was part of industrial policy, and hence claimed that industrial policy 
played a huge role.  
But even among proponents of industrial policy, or at least among those who think that 
industrial policy plays an important part in promoting economic development, there are 
unresolved debates on the extent to which industrial policy should be (and/or can be) 
‘horizontal’—aiming to benefit all industries equally, like public investments in education and 
infrastructure—rather than ‘vertical’—aiming to benefit some sector(s) more than others. For 
example, Ethiopia has recently invested massively in big infrastructure projects, such as the 
railway that connects Addis Ababa to Djibouti, and the Grand Renaissance Dam, a hydropower 
dam on the Nile that will stand as one of the 10 largest hydropower dams in the world when it 
is finished in 2017/2018. Should these infrastructure projects be considered horizontal or 
vertical industrial policy? Or are they industrial policy measures at all? 
The European Commission’s (EC) understanding of industrial policy from 2002 is a 
good example of a horizontal definition: “Industrial policy is horizontal in nature and aims at 
securing framework conditions favourable to industrial competitiveness. Its instruments, which 
are those of enterprise policy, aim to provide the framework conditions in which entrepreneurs 
and business can take initiatives, exploit their ideas and build on their opportunities” (EC, 2002, 
																																																						
20 For a more detailed discussion on various definitions of industrial policy than the scope of this dissertation has 
room for, see Chang (1994, p.58) and Warwick (2013).  
 59 
p.3).21 The EC would most likely understand Ethiopia’s infrastructure investments as measures 
of horizontal industrial policy. 
This thesis will stick more closely to a view of industrial policy as detailed in Chang 
et. al. (2016, p.26), which is, “A policy that deliberately favours particular industries—or even 
firms—over others, against market signals, usually to enhance efficiency and to promote 
productivity growth for the targeted industries as well as for the whole economy, but also to 
manage the industries’ decline smoothly”. Because most policy choices have some 
discriminatory effects that lead to implicit targeting, this definition tries to mend a problem 
with the horizontal view of industrial policy. For example, when we educate engineers, we do 
not produce generic engineers but rather engineers in a specialised area. Likewise, physical 
infrastructure (like railways) is location-specific, so it affects different sectors in different 
ways.22 With this definition of industrial policy, the Ethiopian infrastructure projects would 
again be considered industrial policy, but the implicit targeting is taken into account. This is 
not to say that all policies inevitably target. Policies that concern basic education and health 
should not be considered industrial policy. One could arguably make a case that in some way 
or another, basic health and education policies target a sector—for example, a government 
programme to distribute mosquito nets in a Tanzanian mining community with the intended 
effect of reducing malaria death rates could potentially benefit the mining industry in the 
country—but then the term industrial policy would practically be synonymous with 
‘development’ policy, losing its meaning and usefulness. The line has to be drawn somewhere. 
Policies that clearly have no intention of targeting industrial development or favoring one 
industry over another, although it could, like the above example of mosquito nets, should not 
be considered industrial policy. 
Oqubay (2015) criticises the definition in Chang (1994) for omitting structural 
transformation and the various stages of catching up (this criticism is being addressed here 
because the definition in this thesis is a refined version of the one set out in Chang (1994)). 
Oqubay defines industrial policy as, “A strategy that includes a range of implicit or explicit 
policy instruments selectively focused on specific industrial sectors for the purpose of shaping 
structural change in line with a broader national vision and strategy” (Oqubay, 2015, p.18). 
Similarly, Wade (2015) calls for making production transformation clearly formulated in the 
																																																						
21 Admittedly, the EC underlines the importance of needs and characteristics of individual sectors, and concludes 
that industrial policy “brings together a horizontal basis and sectoral applications” (EC, 2002, p.3). 
22 See Chang et. al. (2016, 27) for more examples of how some industrial policies that are traditionally thought of 
as horizontal inevitably target specific sectors. 
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definition of industrial policy. He argues that because industrial policy is understood as targeted 
efforts to change the production structure of an economy in order to accelerate economic 
development, it should more accurately be called “production transformation policy” (Wade, 
2015, p.68). However, in the definition this thesis will stick to, the process of structural change 
(or production transformation if you will) is implicit in the wording ‘enhance efficiency’ and 
‘promote productivity’. Thus seen, the definitions in Chang et. al. (2016), Oqubay (2015) and 
Wade (2015) don’t differ in any significant way, although the two latter ones make the goal of 
structural/production transformation more explicit.   
 
2.5.2 Why is industrial policy necessary? 
 
From the analysis earlier in this chapter and the discussion in the previous section, it might 
seem obvious that most African countries need industrial policy. The definitions of industrial 
policy that have been outlined have variations, but they all put weight on economy-wide 
productivity growth (admittedly, some definitions are more contentious than others, in that they 
emphasise selectivity and market interventions). To claim that African economies need more 
productivity growth is hardly controversial. But how to go about this, more specifically the role 
of the state in achieving this, has been a highly controversial issues for centuries. This section 
will discuss when and why state intervention for the purpose of industrialisation is necessary.  
 
2.5.2.1 The infant industry argument: the most important justification for industrial policy in 
developing countries 
 
The concept of industrial policy can be traced back to the infant industry argument, first 
proposed by a Founding Father and the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, 
Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804).23 The core of his argument was that backward economies, 
which the US was in the late 18th century, need to protect and nurture their industries in their 
infancy through various policy measures until they attain international competitiveness. In his 
Report on Manufactures submitted to the US congress in 1791, Hamilton stressed the 
importance of government ‘patronage’ to new productive ‘pursuits’ (specifically 
manufacturing industry), as this can’t be attained spontaneously.  
 
																																																						
23 Chang (2002, p.25) shows that were thinkers before Alexander Hamilton who had elements of the infant 
industry argument in their writings, but that Hamilton was the first to systematically set it out.  
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The spontaneous transition to new pursuits, in a community long habituated to different 
ones, may be expected to be attended with proportionally greater difficulty…To 
produce the desirable changes as early as may be expedient may therefore require the 
incitement and patronage of government…To this it is of importance that the 
confidence of cautious, sagacious capitalists should be excited. And to inspire this 
description of persons with confidence, it is essential that they should be made to see 
in any project which is new, the prospect of such a degree of countenance and support 
from governments, as may be capable of overcoming obstacles inseparable from first 
experiments (Hamilton, 1934[1791], p.204). 
 
Hamilton also highlighted the difficulty of competing with more advanced industrial 
nations. Observing that manufacturing industry in these nations had governments that provided 
‘bounties, premiums and other aids’ (government support) to their national firms in order to 
achieve a competitive edge, he explicitly advocated an emulation strategy. 
 
But the greatest obstacle of all to the successful prosecution of a new branch of industry 
in a country in which it was before unknown, consists, as far as the instances apply, in 
the bounties, premiums, and other aids which are granted, in a variety of cases, by the 
nations in which the establishments to be imitated are previously introduced. It is well 
known (and particular examples, in the course of this report, will be cited) that certain 
nations grant bounties on the exportation of particular commodities, to enable their own 
workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors in the countries to which those 
commodities are sent. Hence the undertakers of a new manufacture have to contend, 
not only with the natural disadvantages of a new undertaking, but with the gratuities 
and remunerations which other governments bestow. To be enabled to contend with 
success, it is evident that the interference and aid of their own governments are 
indispensable (Hamilton, 1934[1791], p.205). 
 
Whereas Hamilton didn’t properly theorise the infant industry argument, his ideas were 
developed by Friedrich List (1789-1846), who presented a theoretical framework in his 
National System of Political Economy (List, 2005 [1841]). List, like Hamilton, believed that 
infant industries could not be developed without a strong, supportive government. He argued 
that the government not only had the right, but also the duty, to promote economic activities 
that could increase the wealth and power of a nation, and that the promotion of such activities 
necessitated the protection of infant industries and jumping ahead of current comparative 
advantage. 
The infant industry argument has met resistance. The Classical economist David 
Ricardo (1772-1823) outlined a theory in The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 
first published in 1817, in support of free trade and against protectionism. The theory of 
comparative advantage, as it is called, postulates that countries will benefit from free 
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international trade, with each country specialising in the production and export of goods with 
the least relative cost of production, i.e. its comparative advantage (Ricardo, 2004 [1817]).24  
 
2.5.2.1.1 Contemporary controversies 
 
The debate between the supporters of free trade versus the supporters of the infant industry 
argument has held sway for centuries. In today’s discussions, plenty of guns are aimed at the 
proponents of industrial policy, although not always in a convincing manner. Wade (2015) 
quotes an interview with ex-World Bank economist William Easterly, during which he was 
pressed by the interviewer as to why the typical developing country had better economic 
performance in the 1960s and 1970s, when governments intervened more heavily than in any 
later period. Easterly responded, “It is a bit of a mystery why they did well…the growth had a 
lot of mystery for me…it is mysterious to those who advocate hands-off markets” (Wade, 2015, 
p.67).  
But the theory of comparative advantage still seems to hold a convincing case for many. 
It has become immensely popular, so much so that the WTO makes the case for its mandate— 
which is lowering trade barriers worldwide—based on it:  
 
Simply put, the principle of ‘comparative advantage’ says that countries prosper first 
by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can produce 
best, and then by trading these products for products that other countries produce best. 
In other words, liberal trade policies—policies that allow the unrestricted flow of goods 
and services—sharpen competition, motivate innovation and breed success (WTO, 
2016).25 
 
The debate is highly relevant in today’s African context, where one of the most pressing 
challenges policy makers face is whether to conform or defy comparative advantage when 
formulating their industrialisation strategies. After the rapid growth and industrialisation spurts 
of the Asian tigers in the post-WW2 era, a strong case has been made for industrial policy—
the basis for success in these countries was the guiding hand and interventionist policies of the 
state (see for example Amsden (1989), Chang (1994) and Wade (1990)).  
																																																						
24 David Ricardo did not aim to refute Alexander Hamilton (and he didn’t have the chance to refute List, as he 
wrote before him). Ricardo was more concerned about the benefits of free trade and international division of 
labour whereas Hamilton talked more about the importance of the development of national productive capabilities. 
But clearly, they held opposing views: one argued for protectionism, the other against it. 
25 The case for free trade also has a strong support base outside ‘policy circles’, some prominent examples being 
Bhagwati (2004), Irwin (2002), Lal (1983) and Wolf (2005).  
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But others have been drawing on the same East Asian experiences to make a case for 
export-oriented, market-friendly policies with low price distortions and reliance on 
comparative advantage (see for example World Bank (1993) and Lin (2010)). However, neither 
World Bank (1993) nor Lin (2010) neglects the importance of government intervention. For 
example, with reference to the East Asian countries, World Bank (1993, p.6) writes:  
 
In each of these economies the government also intervened to foster development, often 
systematically and through multiple channels. Policy interventions took many forms: 
targeted and subsidized credit to selected industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on 
borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings, protection of domestic import 
substitutes, subsidies to declining industries, the establishment and financial support of 
government banks, public investment in applied research, firm – and industry specific 
export targets, development of export marketing institutions, and wide sharing of 
information between public and private sectors. 
 
It is clear that the debate is not a black-and-white one. The differences of the sides in 
the debate as it is currently carried out come out well in Lin and Chang (2009), an article 
entitled Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries Conform to Comparative Advantage 
or Defy it? A Debate Between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang. Both Lin and Chang agree on 
the end goal—which is the development of productive capabilities, primarily through 
industrialisation —and that the state should play a role in this process. Yet, there are clear 
differences in opinion.  
 Lin argues for a facilitating state that helps the private sector exploit comparative 
advantage. He claims that successful development experiences show that industrialisation is a 
process of climbing the ladder, not jumping the rungs. According to Lin, technological 
upgrading happens in line with nations’ current factor endowments. So, for example, if a 
country were well endowed with labour and short on capital, that country would be wise to 
specialise in labour-intensive activities. He goes on to argue that when surplus earned from a 
country’s current endowment structure is reinvested, this allows both human and physical 
capital to be accumulated, transforming both the endowment and industrial structure towards 
more capital-intensive intensive activities. Lin’s notion does not build directly on Ricardo’s 
version of comparative advantage, but more on the Neoclassical version—the Hekscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) model. The difference between the two is that, while Ricardo’s version 
assumes that nations’ sources of comparative advantage lies in differences in technology, the 
HOS model defines comparative advantage based on factor endowments—land, labour and 
capital. All countries are assumed to have the same level of technology in the HOS model. 
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 Chang argues that there is no guarantee that a country with the ‘correct’ ratio of certain 
factor endowments for an industry will enter that industry, or put in different terms, move 
physical and human capital accumulated from one activity to another. “Blast furnaces from a 
bankrupt steel mill cannot be remoulded into a machine making computers. Steel workers do 
not have the right skills for the computer industry” (Chang’s words in Lin and Chang, 2009, 
p.489). There is nothing natural about entering any sort of industry, whether it is capital-
intensive or labour-intensive. Because the HOS model assumes away international differences 
in technological capabilities, it fails to take this into account. Even in manufacturing industries 
where they are supposed to have comparative advantages, like the apparel industry or the 
footwear industry, African countries have failed to establish themselves internationally because 
they lack the necessary technological capabilities to produce and export their products at a 
sufficient scale and of good enough quality. The main challenge is for developing countries to 
change their productive capabilities, which is why industrial policy is so important. 
 However, there is no denying that developing countries can more easily break into 
industries that have lower technological barriers. Chang argues, in line with Lin, that deviating 
too much from one’s current comparative advantage, whether you use the Classical version 
(differences in technology) or the Neoclassical version (differences in factor endowments) can 
have risks. That is why most countries that have successfully industrialised have put 
investments into industries that conform more closely to their comparative advantages at early 
stages of development, to quickly provide jobs and export earnings.  
But what Lin fails to recognise is that many of these countries at the same time worked 
to defy their comparative advantage. Chang points out that Japan had to protect its automobile 
industry with tariffs for nearly four decades before it became internationally competitive, 
Nokia (the Finnish cell phone company) had to be cross-subsidised by its sister company for 
17 years before it made any profit, and South Korea launched programmes to advance its 
shipbuilding and automotive sectors when it was still a poor country (Lin and Chang, 2009). 
 
2.5.2.1.2 Common tools to nurture infant industries: tariffs and (direct and indirect) subsidies 
 
The main tenet of the infant industry argument is rather simple: in order to advance towards 
the global technological frontier in one or several industries, backward economies cannot 
simply rely on the market mechanism. Government support and interventions, often against 
market signals (i.e. industrial policy) is necessary. The list of various instruments that can be 
deployed to this end is possibly endless, but two commonly used tools are tariffs and subsidies. 
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A tariff is a tax on imports or exports (although export tax is a more commonly used 
term for a tariff on exports) and is perhaps the one tool most closely associated with the infant 
industry argument. The rationale behind an import tariff is to protect industries in their 
infancies against international competition, so that they have the domestic market to serve to 
begin with. It is the most explicit protectionist tool, and is highly controversial in international 
trade debates, as it works against the exports of other countries.  
 Protectionist policies, like tariffs, are closely associated with import-substituting-
industrialisation (ISI) strategies, most prominently deployed in Latin American countries 
between the 1950s and 1980s. But the really ardent users of tariffs have been the rich countries 
of today, in particular Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the US, when trying to catch 
up with the industrial powerhouse of the 19th century, Great Britain. The US in particular, 
which the economic historian Paul Bairoch called “the mother country and bastion of modern 
protectionism” (Bairoch, 1993, p.30), applied high tariffs. Between 1816 and the end of WW2, 
the country had the world’s highest average tariff rate on imported manufactures (Chang, 
2002). 
 A subsidy is a form of financial support provided to an economic activity with the aim 
of promoting that activity. Whereas tariffs are explicit trade policy measures, this does not have 
to be the case for a subsidy (e.g. subsidies for infrastructure investments, R&D and/or for 
worker training programmes). The Asian tigers, whose industrialisation spurts are by some 
attributed to market friendly policies, as already mentioned, were heavy users of direct and 
indirect subsidies during the 1960s and 1970s (even more so if we include non-fiscal subsidies, 
such as targeted loans from state-owned or state-directed banks, which will be discussed later 
in this chapter). For example, many people forget that the government of Hong Kong, the poster 
boy of market-led growth in the post-WW2 period, owned and controlled all land, which they 
used to subsidise housing construction heavily: worker’s housing typically received a 50 per 
cent subsidy (Amsden, 2001). For another example, in Taiwan, export subsidies on 
manufactured goods were among the highest in the world in the late 1960s (Wade, 1990).  
 One could also make a case for the importance of tariffs among some of the Asian 
tigers. Yet, Latin American and African countries have also applied tariffs and subsidies 
without being as successful. This indicates that there is more to successful industrial policy 
than just these tools. Wade (2012) suggests that we stop using “misleading policy dichotomies 
like ‘import substitution’ vs ‘export orientation’” (Wade, 2012, p.266), on which the vices and 
virtues of tariffs and subsidies are often loaded. He argues that we have to get down to the 
nitty-gritty operations of the state. 
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What Wade means by this is that successful industrial policy is not only about specific 
tools (like tariffs and subsidies) per se, but about the intricate ways the state operates with its 
array of incentives designed to improve the production capacity of firms or industries. In East 
Asia, according to Wade, this was done in two ways: ‘leading the market’—when the 
government makes an investment decision that private firms are hesitant to make—and 
‘following the market’—when the government supports some of the bets of private firms. 
POSCO, the South Korean steel-making company that is currently one of the world’s 
largest, is a classic example of the ‘leading’ kind. In the early mid-1960s, no private firm in 
South Korea wanted to undertake investments in steel (according to the World Bank, steel was 
not aligned with the comparative advantage of South Korea at the time), so the government 
took on the initial risk.  
A good example of the ‘following’ kind would be some of Taiwan’s industrial policy 
measures. Across various industries, the Taiwanese government designed a fiscal incentive 
scheme to encourage firms’ bets to make products close to the global technological frontier. 
The government made a list of product specifications that signified eligibility for fiscal support. 
They constantly changed the specification of products, but at any given time, those firms who 
met the specifications were eligible for tax holidays and accelerated depreciation (Wade, 2012). 
 For Amsden (2001), Taiwan is a great example of effectively using reciprocal control 
mechanisms (RCM), whereby the government would give special favours and assistance to 
firms, often in the form of direct or indirect subsidies, in exchange for meeting certain 
performance targets—such as exporting, local content, or product specifications. In addition to 
Taiwan, Amsden argues that this device was key to many of the successful growth experiences 
in the post-WW2 era, such as Brazil, South Korea and China. 
A common RCM would be to grant protection and the privilege of a certain industry to 
sell in the domestic market on the condition that the firms in that industry had to match imports 
with an equivalent value of exports (or to comply with some sort of trade balancing 
arrangement). The RCM has taken other forms as well. In Brazil, a condition for receiving soft 
loans from development banks was to employ non-familial professionals in positions of 
responsibility, such as chief financial officer and quality control engineer. In South Korea, the 
license to establish a general trading company depended on exports meeting criteria related to 
value, geographical diversity and product complexity. In Taiwan, cherry-picked firms would 
be granted facilities in science parks on the condition of spending a certain percentage of their 
sales on R&D and employ advanced production techniques. In China, science and technology 
enterprises were granted special legal status in exchange for performance standards with 
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respect to technically trained employment and the development of new and more advanced 
products (Amsden, 2001).   
 
2.5.2.2 Market failures: industrial policy from the neoclassical perspective  
 
While the ‘historical roots’ of industrial policy can be traced back to the infant industry 
argument, the justification for industrial policy in government circles these days is often 
explained in the language of market failures. For example, when the UK Department for 
Business, Energy, Innovation and Skills (BEIS) asks HM Treasury to fund a certain industrial 
policy intervention, it is normally asked to identify the market failure that justifies the policy.26 
 A central tenet of neoclassical economics is that, other things equal, markets will 
produce the most ‘efficient’ outcomes. The idea of market failures has developed within the 
neoclassical tradition, most importantly by Kenneth Arrow, and is an acknowledgment that 
there are circumstances where markets will produce sub-optimal outcomes.27 
 Perhaps the most common example of a market failure is an externality. An externality 
is a consequence of a commercial activity that affects other parties without this being reflected 
in market prices. A typical case is the environment—free markets do not take into account the 
costs of environmental damage, as a firm’s production might result in environmental 
degradation without this being reflected in market prices. Such environmental damage is 
therefore called a negative externality. However, positive externalities are more relevant to 
discussions on industrial policy, the classic examples being R&D and worker training. Private 
firms will often under-invest in R&D and worker training from a social point of view, as some 
technological knowledge cannot be patented and workers can carry with them skills when 
changing employers. In the post-WW2 period, the lack of private sector investment in research 
was the principle rationale for state-funding of R&D in Europe and the US (Arnold et. al., 
2014). 
 Another example of a market failure is market power. This is a kind of monopolisation, 
where first-mover advantages and the ability to build economies of scale and scope ahead of 
the competition are so important that it becomes a block on innovation (Aiginger, 2007). For 
																																																						
26 To be precise, the UK government uses the phrase ‘industrial strategy, as the term ‘industrial policy’ has become 
highly politically sensitive and toxic. See for example Wade (2012) and Pisano and Shih (2012) for a discussion 
on this. 
27 Of course, governments had been intervening in markets long before the neoclassical economics profession 
produced a reason for it.  
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example, if the competition in the offshore wind turbine market was fiercer (a market that is 
dominated by few firms), the industry might see more innovation.  
 A third example of a market failure is information asymmetry. High levels of 
specialised technical and market knowledge mean that not all private economic actors have the 
basis for making informed policy decisions. For example, credit constraints to potentially 
innovative activities can be a result of information asymmetry: some lenders do not have the 
expertise to understand a new technology and its application. This argument can be conceived 
under other categories of industrial policy as well. For example, the role of state-owned banks 
that provide subsidised credit was briefly discussed in the above section, and will be more 
comprehensively discussed in the below section on risk and uncertainty.  
 
2.5.2.3 Risk and uncertainty: the ‘deepest pocket’ argument 
 
The ‘deepest pocket’ argument underscores that the government has the best ability to take on 
investment projects that involve high risk but can potentially bring very high returns in the 
future. Common tools/institutions to this end are state-owned development banks that provide 
subsidised credit for projects with large capital outlays (as already briefly outlined), or the 
establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Both of these have been tremendously 
important in the process of ‘catch-up’ industrialisation. 
 
2.5.2.3.1 Development banks 
 
Development banks are banks (often state-owned) primarily concerned with the provision of 
long-term capital to industry. Especially in economies lacking long-term capital markets and 
commercial banks willing to bear the risks associated with financing ambitious industrial 
projects, they have become essential providers of funds for industrial development (Ocampo 
et. al., 2009). The usefulness of development banks became apparent as early as the 19th century 
during the industrialisation of Continental Europe and Japan (see for example Aghion, 1999; 
Gerschenkron, 1953 and Yasuda, 1993).28   
 For fast-growing economies in the post-WW2 era, development banks have also been 
crucial, or in the words of Alice Amsden, “of overwhelming importance” (Amsden, 2001, 
																																																						
28 Starting in France, with the creation of institutions such as the Crédit Foncier, the Comptoir d’Escompte and 
the Crédit Mobilier between 1848 and 1852 (Aghion, 1999).  
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p.127). Mexico’s development bank, NAFINSA, accounted for about twice the value of long-
term loans of all private credit institutions in 1961. In Chile, between 1961 and 1970, the fixed 
investments of targeted projects in the industrial sector by the Chilean development bank, 
CORFO, stood at 55 per cent of all fixed investment in industry. In 1957, the Korea 
Development Bank (KDB) accounted for 45 per cent of total bank lending to all industries in 
the country (Amsden, 2001).   
 Development banks have also played an important role in successful implementation 
of RCMs. In many cases, in order for the government to assess performance properly, lending 
arrangements from the development banks often came with thorough monitoring devices. In 
South Korea, the KDB undertook careful appraisal of prospective clients, examining their 
managerial and financial status, past performance, the merits of their proposed project and 
thoroughly checked up on overdue loans to prevent capital from being tied up. In India, a 
common monitoring and disciplining device would be for the Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI) to insist on nominating a director to the boards of borrowing companies (Amsden, 
2001, 2008). 
 Development banks also play a prominent role in some of today’s least-developed 
countries that are growing fast, such as Ethiopia. The Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) 
was established in 1908, but has only recently become well known, as industries in the country 
that enjoy DBE loans at subsidised rates have started booming only a few years ago. The DBE 
provides medium - and long-term loans for investment projects that are engaged in prioritised 
sectors, as mapped out in the country’s development plans, preferably ones that are export 
focused (Oqubay, 2015). Another reason why the DBE plays such an integral part in Ethiopia 
is that foreign banks are simply not allowed to operate in the country. And the understanding 
is that they will be allowed in only when domestic banks have developed the financial, 
managerial and technological capacity to compete against international banks.     
 
2.5.2.3.2 State-owned enterprises 
 
Credit financing through development banks is one way of entering risky industries that 
requires large capital outlays and have high technological and organisational entry barriers. 
The establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is another way, and has been equally 
important for catch-up economies, if not more. An SOE is an entity created by the government 
in order to partake in commercial activities on the government’s behalf. It can be either fully 
or partially owned by the government. 
 70 
 The Asian tigers were big fans of SOEs, although to varying degrees. As mentioned 
earlier, South Korea’s steel-maker POSCO was established as an SOE in the late 1960s. At the 
time, this was quite ambitious for the country—its income was only 4 per cent of US income. 
But Taiwan is the country perhaps best known for hosting a huge SOE sector. From the early 
1950s onwards, Taiwan had one of the largest SOE sectors outside the communist bloc and 
SSA (Wade, 1990). In 1952, the SOE sector in Taiwan accounted for 57 per cent of industrial 
production (Amsden, 1985). It gradually declined in importance, but still played an important 
role for a long time. Between 1950 and 1980, the average investment share of SOEs in gross 
fixed capital formation in Taiwan was 32 per cent, higher than that of other countries with 
sizeable SOE sectors in this time period, such as Singapore, South Korea and Brazil (Short, 
1983). 
 But the establishment of SOEs have also been an important industrial policy instrument 
both before and after the rise of the Asian tigers. In pre-unified Germany, King Frederick the 
Great (1740-86) started the industrialisation process in Prussia by setting up ‘model factories’ 
in steel and linen industries. Japan did the same in the 19th and early 20th centuries in 
shipbuilding, mining, textiles and steel (Chang, 2002).  
In many fast-growing middle-income countries today, SOEs have been supremely 
important. In China, many transnational corporations (TNCs) are made to form joint ventures 
with Chinese companies, most of which are SOEs. In Brazil, the early growth of the aircraft 
industry was led almost entirely by the state-owned aircraft manufacturer EMBRAER, before 
it was privatised in 1994. In Vietnam, the three fastest growing manufacturing industries— 
shipbuilding, steel and apparel—have all followed the same model of initially establishing an 
‘umbrella’ SOE for the respective industry, responsible for setting up production facilities and 
coordinating investments by domestic firms (Chang. et. al., 2016). 
 
2.5.2.4 Interdependence between industries 
 
Because industries are interdependent, it might be necessary for the government to coordinate 
the operations of various industries for the purpose of economy-wide productivity growth (see 
Chang et. al., 2016).  
One aspect of this is demand-complementarities. Obviously, industries buy and sell 
from each other. For example, the car industry buys inputs from the steel, the glass and the tire 
industry. This requires a coordination of investments between the related industries. In theory, 
this could happen through private contracting, but high transaction costs might inhibit this (e.g. 
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a buyer might not trust a credible commitment from the supplier side, or a supplier might 
simply not be willing to make a credible commitment). Government support is often necessary 
to make this happen.   
 A second, and less well-known, aspect of this is the need for government to coordinate 
competing investments. Simultaneous investments by competing firms may result in excess 
capacity in an industry, leading firms to scrap some production capacity, or in the worst case, 
result in bankruptcy. In neoclassical economic theory, this is not a problem as resources 
released through capacity reduction can be redeployed elsewhere. However, in reality, 
investments in fixed physical capital equipment or embodied in workers cannot be easily re-
moulded. Therefore, the government might need to step in to minimise wasteful competition. 
For example, in large-scale capital intensive industries in Japan and South Korea, the 
government let the private sector organize ‘investment cartels’.  
 Another highly important argument in relation to the interdependence of industries is 
how the government can target policies at one industry/sector, but through them, develop other 
interdependent industries, utilising the ‘linkages’ between industries. The linkages argument 
developed by Hirschman (1958) has become very important for industrial policy makers as a 
guiding tool for selection of industries. The argument advocates the promotion of those sectors 
and activities that have the most linkage effects. Hirschman distinguishes between backward 
linkages and forward linkages. A backward linkage happens when promotion of a certain 
activity stimulates supply of inputs to the promoted activity (the input-provision), while a 
forward linkage happens when promotion of a certain activity stimulates the purchase of 
outputs of the promoted activity, excluding final demand (output-utilisation).  
Manufacturing activities are generally known to have a higher degree of linkages 
compared to other sectors (Oqubay, 2015). For example, the promotion of apparel 
manufacturing provides backward linkages to the agricultural sector through demand for 
cotton, other manufacturing activities through the demand for construction material and 
machinery, and services activities such as the demand for transport, consultancy and logistics 
services. Forward linkages in apparel manufacturing include producer services, such as 
marketing, branding, design, retail and distribution. As we will see in the chapter on Ethiopia, 
a big part of the motivation behind developing a domestic apparel industry (and leather 
products industry) is that it can potentially provide backward linkages to the agricultural sector. 
 But this is not to say that strong linkage creation and economic development cannot 
happen by initially promoting non-manufacturing activities, like agriculture or extractive 
industries. The forestry sector in Finland is an often-cited example of successful utilisation of 
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linkages that started by targeting a natural resource (see Jourdan et. al., 2012). Starting in the 
1980s, the country managed to develop an impressive amount of linkages deriving from 
initially promoting sales of timber. Examples of backward linkages in the industry are 
machinery and equipment (for harvesting, cutting and paper manufacture), consultancy 
services on forest management and research institutes on biogenetics. Examples of forward 
linkages are production of various wood types (sawnwood and plywood) furniture (chairs, 
tables), and paper and cardboard (newsprint, art paper, toilet paper, packaging). 
 
2.6 Africa’s industrial policy experience  
 
As we have already seen, most countries in Africa have a negligible manufacturing base to 
date. But this does not mean that industrial policy has never been attempted in Africa. However, 
the degree of state intervention for the purpose of industrialisation has varied. Generally, the 
industrial policy experience in post-independence Africa can be divided into three phases; the 
1960s and 1970s, with industrial policy at the fore; the 1980s and early 1990s, during which 
neoliberal policies dominated; and the mid-1990s to present, which has seen a more prominent 
role for the state, although not so much in relation to industrial policy. 
 
2.6.1 1960s and 1970s: industrial policy at the fore 
 
In the 1960s, many African countries embarked on state-led strategies to industrialise. 
Industrialisation was regarded as synonymous with development at the time, especially if it 
was built on a socialist agenda resonating with the programmes and achievements of the USSR, 
and later China and India (Lawrence, 2005). The policies in Africa most notably involved ISI 
strategies (see Wangwe and Semboja, 2003), focusing on protecting domestic production of 
consumer goods that were previously imported. UNIDO and UNCTAD (2011, p.11) provide 
the following list of instruments that were generally applied in Africa during the ISI period:  
 
(a) restriction of imports to intermediate inputs and capital goods required by domestic 
industries; (b) extensive use of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade; (c) currency 
overvaluation to facilitate the import of capital and intermediate goods needed by 
domestic industries; (d) subsidized interest rates to make domestic investment 
attractive; (e) direct government ownership or participation in industry; and (f) 
provision of direct loans to firms as well as access to foreign exchange for imported 
inputs. 
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The efforts yielded positive results for the manufacturing sector. MVA in Africa as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 9.2 to 14.7 per cent from 1960 to 1975. The employment share 
in manufacturing also increased significantly in the same time period, from 4.7 to 7.8 per cent 
(De Vries et. al., 2013) The increase in manufacturing production resulted in decent economic 
growth as well: GDP per capita grew at an average annual rate between 2 and 3 per cent in the 
same time period. Countries in Southern Africa—South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland— 
were the ones industrialising most rapidly. Their activities were based around low-tech, labour-
intensive industries, such as food processing, apparel and shoes.  
But for many reasons, the ISI strategy was unsustainable. First, few domestic firms 
became competitive in the world market. Governments offered protection to domestic firms 
with little discrimination, no requirements for improving international competitiveness and no 
time limit. Actually, not a single African country generated internationally competitive 
industries during the ISI period (UNECA, 2011).  
Second, the strategy did not lay enough emphasis on generating foreign exchange 
(Meier and Steel, 1987; Stein, 1992). Agriculture was neglected and too heavily taxed, thereby 
reducing export earnings and creating balance of payment problems for the economies that 
grew fast.  
Third, the strategy was too intent on setting up physical production facilities, like 
factories, without paying enough attention to fostering entrepreneurial capabilities that would 
spur industrial dynamism (UNIDO and UNCTAD, 2011). 
Fourth, FDI was badly managed. Foreign firms were given too favourable conditions, 
such as exclusive exploration rights (in the extractive industries) and sole supplier contracts to 
the government. Moreover, these investments were almost entirely directed to the extractive 
industries, limiting the creation of linkages to the domestic economy (Stein, 1992; UNECA, 
2011). 
Admittedly, a few countries were successful with the anti-export strategy that 
characterised African economies in this phase, such as Mauritius and Zimbabwe. They 
managed to accumulate resources from the protected industries to generate enough investments 
for the development of capabilities needed for exporting. 
 
 
 
 74 
2.6.2 1980s and 1990s: debt crises and neoliberal reforms by the Bretton Woods 
institutions 
 
In the early 1980s, African countries started to experience severe balance of payments 
problems due the effects of the global oil crisis in 1973,29 the global decline in other commodity 
prices and insufficient foreign exchange generation to meet growing import demand of 
domestic industries. To alleviate these problems, many African countries sought help from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
These organisations did not share the view that African industry should be promoted 
through government intervention. As outlined in The Berg Report published in 1981, they 
firmly believed that African countries’ economic performance was poor as a result of 
overemphasis on industry at the expense of agriculture, overvalued exchange rates, interest rate 
controls and trade protectionism. Furthermore, the report held the view that the comparative 
advantage of African countries was in agriculture, not industry, and that governments should 
consequently withdraw support to industry (World Bank, 1981).  
The subsequent conditionalities of loans and aid to African governments—the 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs)—focused heavily on reducing government 
intervention through trade liberalisation, privatisation of SOEs and the withdrawal of 
government subsidies (UNIDO and UNCTAD, 2011). The appropriate role for the state, 
according to The Berg Report, was to provide an enabling environment for the private sector 
to flourish by giving market forces more room in the allocation of resources. These policy 
prescriptions were in line with what the World Bank and the IMF recommended in more or 
less all developing countries at the time: limiting government intervention to macroeconomic 
stabilisation policy, general education and infrastructure investments, whilst relying on the 
‘market mechanism’ to eliminate inefficiencies and direct resources to productive uses.  
Neoliberal sentiments swept the world around this time, but the state had acquired a 
particularly bad reputation in Africa. According to Mkandawire (2001, p.293), by the 1990s, 
“The African state had become the most demonised social institution in Africa, vilified for its 
weaknesses, its over-extension, its interference with the smooth functioning of markets, its 
repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its absence, etc.”  
																																																						
29 The global price of crude oil spiked, leaving most African countries that were net importers of oil at the time 
at a disadvantage. 
 75 
The results of the SAPs, both for economic growth and for manufacturing industry, 
were disastrous.30 GDP per capita in Africa declined at an annual average rate of 1.6 per cent 
between 1981 and 1994.31 Unsurprisingly, MVA as a share of GDP also dropped, from a high 
of 17.6 per cent in 1976 to 14.2 per cent in 1994 (WDI, 2017). Some sort of response was 
appropriate to the mounting debt of African economies, but the SAPs did not address the 
shortages of technical skill and industrial entrepreneurship. It undermined economic 
diversification and technological accumulation, and drove firms out of business. Without state 
support, African industry had no chance of catching up with the global technological frontier. 
As Lall (1995) argues, if any potential for technological accumulation lay with existing firms 
in Africa, this was destroyed through the SAPs. Through reliance on comparative advantage, 
the SAPs were supposed to attract foreign capital to gradually ensure growth of the industrial 
sector, but, similarly to what happened in the ISI phase, foreign capital was attracted almost 
exclusively to the extractive industries. Even in the agricultural sector, in which African 
countries were supposed to have comparative advantage, unfettered international competition 
created problems—Nziramasanga (1995) provides the example of the Kenyan sugar industry 
in the 1990s, in which both output and employment fell due to competition from imports.  
Interestingly, the economic decline has been observed in all sub-regions on the 
continent. Mauritius, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe were however exceptions. These 
countries actually managed to maintain or even raise their share of manufacturing in GDP. One 
obvious reason is that three of these four countries did not have SAPs enforced. 
 
2.6.3 Mid-1990s – present: state intervention more prominent, but what about 
industrial policy? 
 
By the mid - to late 1990s, the SAPs had contributed to such a devastation of African economies 
that the international business media even referred to the continent as ‘hopeless’, as mentioned 
in the introduction of this chapter. The loans heaped onto African countries in the 1980s and 
early 1990s had not resulted in productive investments, and thus, by the mid 1990s, several 
African countries had become heavily indebted.  
																																																						
30 Especially the deindustrialisation impact of the SAPs has been rigorously documented (e.g. Mkandawire 
(2005), Mkandawire and Soludu (2003), Riddel (1990), Stein (1992)). 
31 1981 has been chosen as a starting point for the period of low/negative growth in Africa, as this is arguably 
when economic growth significantly started to show a break for the worse in the aftermath of the international 
oil crisis and subsequently the SAPs.  
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In 1996, international donors launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative to provide relief to severely indebted countries, almost all of which were in Africa. 
This was modified in 1999 (as it was criticized for not being flexible enough), making greater 
relief available to more countries, and by making relief available sooner. As a precondition to 
partake in the enhanced HIPC initiative, beneficiary countries were required to prepare poverty 
reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), in which recipient governments themselves had to detail 
how debt relief would be used to reduce poverty (UNIDO and UNCTAD, 2011). Compared to 
the SAP phase, more autonomy was given to beneficiary countries, partly because anti neo-
colonialist and neo-imperialist attitudes were becoming more prevalent worldwide. 
Beneficiary countries were especially encouraged to invest resources in social sectors, such as 
education (primary and secondary) and health. Not surprisingly, the focus on social sectors of 
the PRSPs resonated with that of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—a set of eight 
international development goals to be achieved by 2015, established at the United Nations 
Millennium Summit in 2000 (UN, 2005).32 
 As seen in the previous chapter, the turn of the century saw economic growth in Africa 
pick up, together with a range of other positive developments, like reductions in public debt, a 
decrease in violent conflicts and progress in public health outcomes. However, manufacturing 
as share of GDP in Africa remains the lowest of all developing regions in the world. Although 
the government has featured a more prominent role during the PRSP/MDG phase, industrial 
policy has taken a firm backseat because of the focus on social sector development policies. 
In recent years, however, there has been talk of a rejuvenation of industrial policy in 
the international development community (e.g. Noman and Stiglitz, 2015; Stiglitz and Lin, 
2013; Wade, 2015). As opposed to the MDGs, industrialisation is an explicit goal in one of the 
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); Goal 9: build resilient infrastructure, promote 
sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation (UN, 2015). Structural transformation has 
become a buzzword in the international development community, partly thanks to the chief 
economist at the World Bank from 2008 to 2012, Justin Lin, who pushed for an agenda at the 
Bank that stressed the importance of economic diversification and transformation of production 
activities (see Lin, 2010), much more so than former chief economists. Other prominent 
economists like Ha-Joon Chang, Joseph Stiglitz, Dani Rodrik and Mariana Mazzucatto have 
all published recent bestselling books that explicitly support industrial policy. International 
organisations (other than the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
																																																						
32 Five of the eight goals centred on improvements related to poverty, health or education. 
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(UNCTAD), which has long been a bastion of industrial policy) like the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) are publishing reports that explicitly devote attention to the importance of industrial 
policy (e.g. OECD, 2013a; Salasar-Xirinachs, et. al., 2014). In Africa, the fastest growing 
economy on the continent, Ethiopia, puts industrial policy at the forefront of its development 
plans (see Oqubay, 2015). 
But in the midst of talk of industrial policy ‘renaissance’, there is also vigorous debate 
on how the industrial policy environment has changed. The debate centres in particular on the 
increased fragmentation and globalisation of production processes, and consequently if ‘old’ 
style industrial polices, like those formulated by the Asian tigers, are at all applicable to 
developing countries today. Transnational corporations (TNCs), predominantly based in the 
West, are increasingly outsourcing manufacturing activities to developing countries, and 
therefore, from a developing country perspective, industrial policy revolving around attracting 
FDI is becoming a more important part the entire industrial policy discussion. Should 
developing countries ‘link up’ to the TNCs that invest in their home countries, carrying out 
exactly the type of activities the TNCs want them to carry out, or should they challenge them? 
How can developing countries formulate policies to transfer technology from TNCs, and 
incentivise them to create linkages with the domestic economy? This is the issue at hand in the 
next chapter. 
 
2.7 Summary and conclusion  
 
Given the reversal of sluggish economic growth and improved political and economic climates 
in most African countries since the turn of the millennium, some people have enthusiastically 
embraced a new discourse, claiming that Africa is ‘rising’. And in many ways Africa is doing 
better—compared to 20 years ago, people are healthier, better educated (at least the primary 
school level) and there are fewer violent conflicts. However, in terms of the development of 
productive capabilities, the essence of economic development, ‘Africa rising’ is little more than 
hype. Per capita GDP growth is low, poverty rates and vulnerable employment rates are still 
alarmingly high, and perhaps most importantly, industrialisation is not happening. 
 Throughout the history of capitalism, practically all countries that have transformed 
their economies from ‘poor to rich’ have done so through a process of industrialisation, i.e. 
expanded their manufacturing sector, which has greater scope for productivity growth than do 
other sectors. But some people now claim that we live in the age of the ‘post-industrial society’, 
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in which services are gradually taking over for manufacturing as a source of productivity 
growth. While indeed some services now have tremendous scope for productivity growth (in 
particular digital ones) and some countries are basing their economic growth strategies on 
services (like the UK, Rwanda, and to some extent India), there are still good reasons for 
developing countries not to neglect manufacturing: almost all innovation is closely linked to 
production processes, manufacturing products remains far more tradable than services, and 
ultimately, most services are inherently characterised by lower productivity than 
manufacturing. 
 While the claim that African countries need more productivity growth through 
expanding their manufacturing sector is not highly controversial, the role of the state in 
achieving this is more contentious. This chapter has hopefully provided some examples of why 
and when state intervention for the purpose of industrialisation can be useful (i.e. industrial 
policy). Four justifications were discussed: industries in developing countries need government 
support in their infancies (infant industry argument); the market can in many instances fail to 
allocate resources efficiently (market failures); the government often has the best ability to take 
on the risk of venturing into possibly long-term profitable activities (the ‘deepest pocket’ 
argument); and the need to coordinate and take advantage of the interdependence between 
industries calls for government action (interdependence between industries).  
 While Africa’s experience with industrial policy has not been truly successful in the 
post-independence era, its period of more state intervention in the 1960s and 1970s yielded 
higher economic growth rates and better results for the manufacturing sector than any 
subsequent period, particularly that of market liberalisation and state dismantling in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This gives hope that industrial policy in the African context is not doomed to fail.  
 The next chapter turns to the emerging debate on if and how the productive structures 
and the industrial policy environment in developing countries has changed because of the 
increased fragmentation and globalisation of production processes (i.e. the expansion of global 
value chains), and what African industrial policy should look like in this new global production 
environment.  
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Chapter 3 
	
The expansion of global value chains: how do they affect the 
productive structures of developing countries—particularly those 
in Africa—and what are the implications for industrial policy? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Since the early 1990s, a globalisation of production has taken place, driven by falling transport 
costs, advances in information and communication technology, and lower trade and investment 
barriers. From 1990 to 2015, the world’s trade dependence ratio33 increased from 19.5 per cent 
to 29 per cent, and world FDI inflows as share of GDP increased from 0.9 per cent to 2.7 per 
cent (reaching a peak of 4.7 per cent in 2007) (WDI, 2017). The increase in FDI inflows has 
mostly taken place in developing countries, whose share of world FDI inflows surged from 17 
per cent to 43 per cent between 1990 and 2015 (UNCTAD STAT, 2017). This growth in 
international trade and offshoring is underpinned especially by the fragmentation of production 
processes and the geographical dispersion of tasks and activities within them. This has led to 
complex, borderless business networks and production systems, popularly referred to as global 
value chains. 
 Consider the production, assembly and retail of an Apple iPod, as outlined by Milberg 
and Winkler (2013): the hard drive is made by the Japanese company Toshiba, which offshores 
its hard drive production to companies in the Philippines and China; the display module is 
made in Japan, by Toshiba-Matsushita; the multimedia processor chip is made by the US 
company Broadcom, which offshores most of its production to Taiwan; the central processing 
unit is produced by the US company PortalPlayer; the Taiwanese company Inventec carries 
out the final insertion, test, and assembly in China; and Apple earns its profit through 
overseeing distribution and retail. 
The expansion of GVCs across the world has invigorated industrial policy debates. 
International organisations are increasingly devoting attention to the topic, such as the ILO, the 
OECD, the UNCTAD, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United 
																																																						
33 This is the average of imports and exports of goods and services, as share of GDP. 
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Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the World Bank and the WTO.34 
Additionally, scholars who for long have been concerned with development and 
industrialisation issues from a GVC perspective have in recent years showed a keen interested 
in the implications of the expansion of GVCs on industrial policy.35 These scholars are the ones 
most notably working together with international organisations concerned with the topic, and 
form a view that will be referred to as the ‘GVC lens’ from this point onwards. 
The GVC lens argues for a rethink of industrial policy, questioning whether ‘old’ style 
industrial policies, like those implemented by the Asian tigers in their ‘miracle’ years, are at 
all feasible by today’s developing countries. Milberg et. al. (2014, p.152) states that:  
 
Twentieth-century debates over the merits of industrial policy as a strategy for 
economic development occurred prior to the spread of these complex international 
production networks. Industrial policy viewed through the lens of GVCs will thus differ 
from traditional arguments for industrial policy. The GVC approach puts emphasis on 
firms rather than States, leaving the role of the State less evident than it was in earlier 
phases of late industrialization. 
 
 Similarly, Gereffi (2014a) argues that there is not likely to be a return of what he calls 
ISI and EOI36 policies of old. As a result of the globalisation of production, “Companies, 
localities, and entire countries have come to occupy specialized niches within GVCs. Because 
of this, today’s industrial policies have a different character and generate different outcomes 
than before” (Gereffi, 2014a, p.438). In a related vein, Baldwin (2011) criticizes ‘high 
development theory’—explicitly referring to those theories that advocate structural 
transformation based on emulation of previously successful industrialisers—for not fully 
taking into account revolutionary transformations in industry that have occurred since the mid-
1980s, and suggests that the missing element boils down to GVCs. “Before 1985, successful 
industrialisation meant building a domestic supply chain. Today, industrialisers join supply 
chains and grow rapidly because offshored production brings elements that took Korea and 
Taiwan decades to develop domestically” (Baldwin, 2011, p.3). 
 Milberg et. al. (2014) suggest several ways that industrial policy must change in the era 
																																																						
34 See Milberg et. al. (2014, p.152) for an overview of publications from these international organisations that 
concerns the topic.  
35 The most important publications are Baldwin (2011), Gereffi (2014a), Gereffi and Sturgeon (2013), and Milberg 
et. al. (2014). While many more publications in the GVC literature (and the related ‘global production network’ 
literature) discuss the challenges of developing productive capabilities in developing countries, the debate on if 
and how industrial policy has to change in the era of expanding GVCs most importantly includes contributions 
from these four publications. 
36 EOI referring to export-oriented industrialisation. 
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of GVC expansion: 1) industrial policy must shift from the traditional stance aimed at 
developing fully integrated production structures, i.e. developing the entire industry 
domestically, to a stance focusing on moving into higher-valued tasks associated with the 
industry; 2) while traditional industrial policy may have included protection of domestic 
industry, success in the era of GVC expansion requires easy and cheap access to imports, in 
particular for necessary intermediates; and 3) whereas traditional industrial policy sought to 
build domestic capacity in order to eventually compete with leading TNCs, industrial policy 
nowadays should focus more on negotiating and linking up to TNCs, as the issues facing firms 
and governments these days requires moving up through the chain of production of a particular 
commodity or set of commodities.37 
 But the GVC lens may be leaving out some important aspects of history. Did countries 
like S. Korea and Taiwan—the two most successful examples of late industrialisation before 
the expansion of GVCs since the 1990s—develop in a world devoid of GVCs? And did they 
not link up and bargain with TNCs, inserting themselves in niches of global production 
networks? Nike, one of today’s largest brand names in the global footwear industry (and 
sporting outfits and accessories industry), actually outsourced almost all of its shoe production 
to South Korea and Taiwan from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. Even before that, in the late 
1950s, Taiwan started carrying out massive assembly operations for Japanese companies on 
consumer electronics, including televisions, refrigerators, air conditioners, automobiles, diesel 
engines, and several other items (Wade, 1990). So clearly, GVC participation played a role in 
these countries’ industrialisation strategy. This might actually mean that the expansion of 
GVCs does not require the thorough rethink of industrial policy that some people suggest and 
that there are still plenty of lessons to be learned from these industrialisation experiences. 
 Admittedly, the GVC lens does not fully neglect the role that GVC participation played 
in countries like South Korea and Taiwan. For example, Gereffi (1996) traces the development 
success of Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan by mastering GVC networks. 
Furthermore, the GVC lens’ insistence on joining supply chains rather than building them is 
not uniform. Milberg et. al. (2014) does indeed warn about the dangers of neglecting the 
development of domestic integrated production structures, explaining how “thin” 
industrialisation, especially in low-skill segments, can result in low value added traps.   
 But in approaching this discussion, the GVC lens could arguably show a better 
																																																						
37 The chapter actually identifies six challenges to industrial policy in the era of GVC expansion, but when 
addressing how industrial policy should change, in particular relating to the issues that will be addressed in this 
dissertation, they can most importantly be reduced to these three.   
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understanding and a more thorough review of past industrial policy experiences. It puts focus 
on firms rather than states, but ultimately, industrial policy is about the role of the state in the 
process of industrialisation, so this is a severe shortcoming. In this respect, the ‘Statist’ lens 
(e.g. Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1994; Wade, 1990), which has for long written about issues of 
industrial policy, and perhaps is the most known lens through which industrial policy is 
discussed, needs to be better incorporated. Among those who adopt this lens, there exists a 
rigorous literature on trade policies and policies for technology transfer through FDI attraction 
that does not use the term ‘GVC’, even though GVC participation has been important in the 
cases referred to in this literature. This literature seems to have been somewhat overlooked by 
the GVC lens but is supremely important because we can get key insights into the types of 
policies (through GVC participation) that have resulted in successful industrialisation—like 
requirements on joint ventures, R&D, skills development and local content on TNCs investing 
in the host economy. Part of the Statist lens also goes beyond the dichotomy of ISI and EOI, 
showing especially with reference to the Asian tigers how both protectionist policies and 
export-oriented policies often operated in tandem with and complementing each other (more 
on this later).  
 With a focus on Africa, this chapter aims to critically approach the debate on how GVC 
expansion affects the industrial policy challenge of developing countries. The chapter will 
adopt a Statist lens, as well as review the GVC lens, and use comparative-historical methods 
to illustrate relevant examples of GVC-oriented industrial policies. By doing this, the chapter 
will eventually suggest a framework for GVC-oriented industrial policies, incorporating a 
wider part of the literature than what has been done so far. This framework is intended for 
developing countries of lower income status, of which most are in Africa, hence the Africa 
focus. But this framework is equally relevant for low-income countries in other regions of the 
world, as part the motivation for choosing Africa is not that all countries are part of the same 
continent, but rather share similar structural production characteristics.   
 In section 3.2, I will discuss the definition and the history of GVCs, how to understand 
the GVC ‘buzz’ from a developing country perspective, and show how some of the early 
successful catch-up economies, South Korea and Taiwan, actually formulated GVC-oriented 
industrial policies, unbeknownst to many people. I will make the assertion that the GVC 
expansion since the 1990s (which will be referred to as the ‘GVC era’ from this point onwards) 
has not resulted in substantive qualitative changes in international trade but rather that 
substantive quantitative changes have happened, through a substantial increase in FDI inflows 
to developing countries and increasing power of TNCs. Therefore, the literature on industrial 
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policy as it relates to trade and FDI is relevant for the discussion of GVC-oriented industrial 
policies, and that looking at successful GVC-oriented industrial policies of catch-up economies 
before the GVC era can in fact be useful, although the scale of fragmentation of production 
networks was smaller then.      
 Section 3.3 will analyse in greater detail some of the issues that will be briefly outlined 
in section 3.2, to see more clearly which opportunities and challenges GVCs pose to African 
countries. The opportunities include capitalising on the increasing inflows of FDI and the 
chance to specialise in segments of GVCs, while the challenges are largely linked to the 
problem of getting stuck in low-value added activities in GVCs (no domestic linkage creation) 
and the massive expansion and consolidation of power by TNCs based in the West that we 
have seen in the GVC era.  
 Section 3.4 brings together the analysis in the two preceding sections and presents a 
framework for industrial policy. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 What are really GVCs? Understanding GVCs, measuring GVC 
participation and illustrating successful GVC-oriented industrial policies 
before the GVC era  
 
3.2.1 Understanding GVCs from a developing country (read: African) perspective 
 
The Duke Global Value Chains Initiative, a global hub for GVC research defines a value chain 
as, “The full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception 
to its end use and beyond” (Duke, 2016, p.1). These activities can be contained within a single 
firm or divided among different firms. The term ‘global value chains’ emerged as value chains 
gradually started dividing themselves among multiple firms and spread across countries and 
continents. 
 From the GVC lens (mostly so by international organisations that have published 
material on GVCs, development and industrialisation issues in recent years), a popular view is 
that through the ‘insertion’ into, ‘upgrading’ within and ‘specialisation’ within GVCs, 
developing countries have new avenues for development that didn’t exist before. A recent 
World Bank brief states that “countries that embrace GVCs grow faster, import skills and 
technology, and boost employment” (World Bank, 2015, p.1). One of the few substantial 
reports in recent years that analyses the impact of GVCs on industrialisation in Africa, the 
African Economic Outlook 2014: Global Value Chains and Africa’s Industrialisation, writes, 
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“The country-centric view of trade no longer reflects reality...Global value chains offer new 
opportunities for structural transformation in Africa” (AfDB-OECD-UNDP, 2014, p.124). 
 However, when one starts studying closely what really has changed in the GVC era, 
the whole buzz around this new phenomenon—and how it’s often talked about, as exemplified 
above—appears to be hyperbolic. There has definitely been a change, but from the perspective 
of developing countries, it boils down to two closely interrelated developments: 1) increased 
offshoring by firms in more developed countries, resulting in tremendous increases in FDI 
inflows, alongside with (2) increased control of global production systems by TNCs based in 
more developed countries, particularly in the West. Below, these two developments will be 
explained, before some of its challenges and opportunities will be analysed in detail in section 
3.3. 
 
3.2.1.1 Offshoring and FDI 
 
The proliferation of GVCs has largely been driven by TNCs purchasing more of their raw 
materials and intermediate inputs from abroad, either through outsourcing parts of their 
production to companies in the targeted country, or establishing their own production plant 
abroad to trade within the confines of their own corporation. 
 This became visible as early as the 1960s, when international companies sliced up their 
supply chains in search of low-cost suppliers in other countries (Gereffi, 2014b). It started with 
manufacturers offshoring their activities, typified by American outsourcing to Mexico 
(Maquiladoras) and German outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe, by setting up export 
processing zones (EPZs) for apparel assembly (Fröbel et. al., 1981). In the 1970s and 1980s, 
US retailers and brand-name companies joined manufacturers in search for offshore suppliers 
of consumer goods, expanding operations to most notably East Asia. 
 Although the motivations for offshoring have largely remained the same to date (i.e. 
the search for cost savings, like cheap labour, land and energy), the scale of offshoring started 
intensifying first in the 1990s, driven by the factors already mentioned in the introduction. 
From 1990 to 2015, FDI inflows into developing countries increased from $35bn to $764bn 
(from 17 per cent to 43 per cent of world FDI inflows), which represents a change in FDI 
inflows into developing countries as a share of developing country GDP from 0.08 per cent to 
2.5 per cent (UNCTAD STAT, 2017). Internationalisation of production of goods and services 
are now commonplace in practically all product categories, ranging from apparel, footwear, 
vegetables, fruits, beverages and flowers to computers, mobile phones, automobiles, aircrafts 
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and professional services. 
 As seen from Figure 3.1, the most explosive growth in FDI inflows in developing 
countries has taken place in Asia. This is partly due to the vast population of the region—led 
by a populous and fast-growing China—but also the massive amounts of FDI attracted into 
Hong Kong, which stood at $175 billion in 2015 (UNCTAD STAT, 2017). Although Africa 
accounts for a relatively small share of FDI inflows to all developing countries, its proportional 
increase has been 20-fold since 1990 (from 1.4 per cent to 4 per cent of world FDI inflows), 
with all sub-regions experiencing a significant increase, as seen from Figure 3.2.38  
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
38 As the figure shows, Africa didn’t attract much FDI before the early 2000s. In the 1990s, civil wars were still 
rife and the business climate was largely underdeveloped, an image that was exacerbated in the business media 
(e.g. The Economist (2000)). 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Source:	UNCTAD	STAT	(2017)
Figure	3.1:	FDI	inflows	into	developing	regions,	billion	$
Developing	economies:	Africa Developing	economies:	America
Developing	economies:	Asia
 87 
	
	
 
3.2.1.2 Increasing power of TNCs 
 
The study of power structures in production networks is essential to GVC analysis, as it shapes 
the distribution of profits and opportunities for development. In this respect, a seminal 
contribution to the GVC literature in the mid-1990s distinguished between buyer-driven value 
chains (BDVCs) and producer-driven value chains (PDVCs) (Gereffi 1994, 1999). In BDVCs, 
large retailers and brand name merchandisers, like Wal-Mart and Nike, typically control the 
value chains and specify products to be produced in independent factories in developing 
countries. PDVCs, on the other hand, are characterised by power being held by final-product 
manufacturers, like the aircraft producers Boeing and Airbus, and are commonplace in 
industries with higher capital intensity and skill barriers. 
 However, the distinction between BDVCs and PDVCs is not useful in all contexts. In 
the apparel industry, GAP is a good example of a typical lead firm in a BDVC, without its own 
manufacturing facilities, but Levi-Strauss governs a vertically integrated chain (see Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2001), more in line with the PDVC structure. The food industry value chain is 
typically classified as a BDVC, but in Africa, big companies, such as Nestle, are setting up 
their own production facilities, so it is increasingly acquiring the characteristics of a PDVC. 
 As case studies of GVCs proliferated, it became clear that the BDVC-PDVC dichotomy 
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failed to capture the full complexity of GVC governance structures. The framework introduced 
by Gereffi et. al. (2005) has helped mend this issue; it introduces 5 degrees of power exercised 
by lead firms through its coordination of suppliers, without direct ownership of the firms. As 
opposed the BDVC-PDVC framework, this framework is less prone to typifying certain 
industries into a set power structure. In fact, scholars have been drawing on it to show how the 
form of governance can change as the industry evolves and matures. 
 While the GVCs that have a foothold in Africa fit into many different typologies, the 
common feature is that large TNCs with home bases outside the continent are gaining 
increasing shares of the African market. Recent major deals include Total S.A.’s (France) 
$16bn investment to develop the Kaombo offshore oilfield in Angola, Skypower’s (Canada) 
$5bn investment to establish a solar power plant in Nigeria, and Mac Optic’s (Greece) $4.8bn 
investment to establish a petroleum refinery in Egypt (TIA, 2015).  
 The increasing presence of TNCs in Africa follows from a steady global expansion of 
TNCs, which has in fact been nothing short of immense. From 1990 to 2015, total assets of 
foreign affiliates increased from $5 trillion to $106 trillion (from 18 per cent to 145 per cent of 
world GDP), and employment by foreign affiliates increased from 21 million workers to 80 
million workers (UNCTAD, 2016). Clark (2010) calculated that Wal-Mart, the world’s largest 
retail company, ranked as China’s seventh largest trading partner in 2010, ahead of the United 
Kingdom (Clark, 2010). 
 But not only have TNCs expanded across the world and grown in size, their power has 
also been consolidated significantly. Since the early the 2000s, practically every global industry 
has had only a handful of firms accounting for 50 per cent or more of the industry’s global 
market share (Nolan, 2007).  
 
3.2.2 Measuring GVC participation 
 
As explained, the rise in FDI is a strong indicator of the expansion of GVCs, and FDI inflows 
in a country can be a useful indicator of the extent to which countries (especially developing 
countries) participate in GVCs. UNCTAD (2013) shows an almost perfect correlation between 
countries’ inward stock of FDI and GVC participation as measured through trade in value 
added (this concept will be explained below). Case studies of industries and products (like the 
Apple example in the introduction of this chapter) have also been used to illustrate the 
expansion of GVCs and the different ways that countries and companies participate in GVCs. 
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 However, the fragmentation of production and the increasing trade of intermediate 
goods— goods used as inputs in the production of other goods—have spurred the development 
of new measures.  
 One reason for this is that there is increasing double counting in traditional trade data, 
in that it includes the value of intermediate goods imported at each border crossing (OECD, 
2013b; UNCTAD, 2013). For example, raw material extracted in one country may be exported 
for processing to a second country, then exported to a manufacturing plant in a third country, 
which may export it to a fourth country for final consumption. The value of the raw material 
counts only once as contribution to GDP in the first country, but is counted several times in 
world exports. According to UNCTAD (2013), about 60 per cent of global trade today is in 
intermediate goods, so the problem of double counting has become prevalent.  
 Another reason for this is that the global expansion of production networks is not 
always captured by FDI figures. Especially in BDVCs, supplier firms are sometimes 
domestically owned, and do not involve FDI. This was actually the case with many light-
manufacturing supplier firms in East Asia (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) in the 1960s and 
1970s, which exported their products to brand names and retailers in the US (Milberg et. al., 
2014). 
 Measuring GVC participation through ‘trade in value added’ is a way to mend both of 
these problems. It takes into account both the share of foreign value added in a country’s 
exports—called backward integration—and the share of a country’s value added in other 
countries’ exports—called forward integration. The developing-country share of global TVA 
has increased from 22 per cent in 1990 to 42 per cent in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2013). As seen in 
Table 3.1, Africa’s share of this trade has increased from 1.4 per cent in 1995 to 2.2 per cent 
in 2011.39 This 80 per cent increase is the highest growth in GVC participation of all world 
regions, after South Asia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
39 This low number does not reflect that GVCs are unimportant in Africa. It is rather an indication of Africa’s 
share of world trade, which was only 3.3 per cent in 2013. 
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Table 3.1: Shares of global trade in value added 
Region 1995 2011 
Europe 57.50% 50.90% 
East Asia 14.40% 16.20% 
North America 13.10% 11.80% 
Southeast Asia 6% 6.80% 
Latin America 3.20% 4.30% 
Middle East 2.00% 3.00% 
Africa 1.40% 2.20% 
Russia and Central Asia 0.90% 2.00% 
South Asia 0.70% 1.70% 
Source: AfDB-OECD-UNDP (2014) 
 
 Although Africa’s share of global trade in value added has almost doubled since 1995, 
does this signify a qualitative change in Africa’s trade pattern? Hardly. As we saw in chapter 
2, Africa’s exports are still dominated by primary commodities. The difference seems to be 
that these exports to a larger degree than before go on to be further exported. UNECA (2015) 
confirms this trend: “African countries show high participation rates in GVCs, though at a very 
low level...the larger share of Africa’s GVC participation is in forward integration, driven by 
exports of raw materials.” (UNECA, 2015, p.172). Similarly, the increase in FDI has neither 
brought about any qualitative change in Africa’s trade pattern. In fact, 54 per cent of Africa’s 
inward FDI stock in 2014 went to eight of the most natural resource dependent countries on 
the continent40 (UNCTAD STAT, 2017), clearly showing that most foreign investors are doing 
exactly what they have been doing during the entire post-independence era: going for the 
extractive industries. 
 So we see that the expansion of GVCs has not really changed the productive structures 
of African economies at all, and this is not because Africa is failing to participate in GVCs. 
This goes to show that we have to be careful and scrupulously analyse what increasing GVC 
participation really implies in terms of the development of productive capabilities, and that 
success with GVC participation for developing countries necessitates smart GVC-oriented 
industrial policies, as the next section will elaborate on. 
																																																						
40 Rep. of Congo, DRC, Equitorial Guinea, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. 
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3.2.3 Successful GVC-oriented industrial policies before the GVC era: South Korea’s 
and Taiwan’s GVC-oriented industrial policies 
 
Throughout the history of capitalism, no countries have grown as rapidly (from low to high-
income) or industrialised as fast as South Korea and Taiwan did from roughly 1960 to 1990. 
As detailed through various examples in the previous chapter, these two countries are some of 
the most successful examples of industrial policy formulation. And because of their decently 
sized domestic markets, they arguably hold more general lessons for today’s low-income 
countries than for example the two other Asian tigers, Hong Kong and Singapore, whose 
growth experiences had more idiosyncratic elements. Most importantly, they didn’t begin from 
an agrarian or raw material base (unlike what most African countries are now) that is typically 
taken to be the starting point for industrialisation. 
 Another reason for selecting South Korea and Taiwan as possible case studies to 
emulate for African countries is that the GVC lens is scarce on case studies of successful 
industrial policy experiences through GVC participation pre-1990s (or rather, the GVC lens is 
scarce on fully successful industrial policy experiences, as none of the low-income countries 
that have experienced high growth and industrialisation starting in the 1990s or later have 
reached high-income status). One obvious explanation is that GVCs really started to proliferate 
after the 1990s and therefore, many GVC scholars find it irrelevant to look at growth 
experiences before that time. However, unbeknownst to many, participation in GVCs was very 
much a part of both South Korea and Taiwan’s industrial policy, dating all the way back to the 
1960s, as will be discussed below.    
 Admittedly, some scholars from the GVC perspective have given decent accounts of 
South Korea’s and Taiwan’s industrialisation experience. Focusing on apparel and electronics, 
Gereffi (1996) traces the success of various industries in Japan, and later on Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Taiwan to their mastering the dynamics of GVC networks, moving from: 1) the 
assembly of manufactured goods, using imported components, to; 2) original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM), whereby contractors make goods to be sold under a foreign company’s 
brandname, to; 3) original brand name manufacturing (OBM), whereby manufacturers make 
goods for export and sale under their own label.  
 But in analysing the high growth that these countries experienced throughout the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s through participation in GVCs, industrial policy seems to be somewhat 
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neglected by the GVC lens, or even waived off as unimportant. With reference to the light 
manufacturing industries, Gereffi (1996, p.95) writes: “The East Asian NIEs tended not to use 
specific industrial policies to promote the booming exports of light manufacturing sectors in 
apparel, footwear and toys. State credit, trade, and labour intensive policies were supportive, 
but not determining.” 
 Additionally, there seems to be a well-established belief in a dichotomy between EOI 
and ISI among those who adopt the GVC lens (e.g. Baldwin, 2011; Gereffi, 1990, 1996, 1999, 
2014a, 2014b; Gereffi and Sturgeon, 2013; Milberg et. al., 2014)—a dichotomy that in many 
ways is misleading, as will be explained below—with EOI being considered more successful. 
The GVC lens argues  that the dominant mode of thinking about industrialisation processes in 
developing countries has undergone a gradual shift from ISI—a model primarily established in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe and parts of Asia in the 1960s—to an EOI model of growth as 
established by the Asian tigers from the 1970s. Buttressed by the neoliberal thrust of the 
Reagan and Thatcher governments, EOI became the prevailing orthodoxy for developing 
economies around the world, according to Gereffi (2014b).41  
 In this respect, the Statist lens, with its greater in-depth understanding of the role of the 
state in the East Asian countries, can provide many useful insights. Certainly, like the GVC 
lens, some of those who adopt the Statist lens do indeed make a distinction between ISI and 
EOI, and one can somewhat plausibly argue that there was a shift from more to gradually less 
protectionism as South Korea and Taiwan underwent industrialisation (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 
1990). But at least the Statist lens shows more prominently how ISI policies were important 
for the two countries’ growth strategies. It does not nearly exclusively attribute their catch-up 
to EOI. And, unlike the GVC lens, the Statist lens breaks down important nuances during the 
industrialisation boom of both South Korea and Taiwan that shows how protectionist policies 
featured in tandem with the well-known export-oriented policies. Chang (1993) outlines many 
of these in South Korea: the bureaucracy retained the power to impose emergency tariffs for 
items with excessively high import growth; quantitative restrictions and import area 
diversification regulations were pervasive—as late as 1982, 93 per cent of total imports were 
subject to one or more such restrictions; prohibitive inland taxes were used to virtually ban the 
																																																						
41 It must be mentioned that although the ISI/EOI dichotomy is prevalent in the GVC lens, some of its weaknesses 
are pointed out. Gereffi (2014b, p.11) writes: “the development story for East Asian and other newly 
industrializing economies cannot be captured solely through a contrast of the ISI and EOI models, since the shift 
from ISI to EOI was not total or uncontested in either East Asia or Latin America. Indeed, elements of both 
strategies were intertwined since countries tended to move from relatively easy to more difficult phases of both 
ISI and EOI over time”. However, this lacks further elaboration.  
 93 
import of luxury consumer goods; and subsidised credit to firms who suffered in the short term 
from import-substitution acted in effect as import restrictions. In Taiwan, ISI policies featured 
perhaps more explicitly than in South Korea. In the mid-1970s, almost half the items in the 
tariff schedule still carried legal rates of over 40 per cent (Wade, 1990). And, just like in South 
Korea, Taiwan applied a range of non-tariff barriers after starting to gradually reduce tariff 
rates after the mid-1970s. These included the tying of import licences to export performance; 
restrictions on which countries imports can come from and who can import them (origin or 
agency restrictions); and ‘approval’ mechanisms for import control—for firms wishing to 
import certain inputs, a reference check had to be made to make sure that domestic suppliers 
could not meet the would-be-importer on price, quality and delivery, even if origin and agency 
restrictions were met (Wade, 1990). 
 Below, more details surrounding trade, foreign investment and GVC-oriented industrial 
policies in South Korea and Taiwan between 1960 and 1990 will be discussed, predominantly 
from the Statist lens. There are several ways to go about this. One could be to focus on the 
evolution of specific industries in the respective countries in which the value chains were 
global. Another could be to focus on GVC-oriented industrial policies cutting across industries. 
I will use both approaches, focusing on the evolution of some of the light manufacturing 
industries in South Korea (which is highly relevant for African countries who are in early stages 
of industrialisation), and in Taiwan’s case, focusing on how the government managed FDI 
across several industries.42 After having discussed both case studies in those contexts, I will 
analyse some additional trade-related considerations that were important for both countries’ 
industrialisation drives and closely connected to the GVC-oriented industrial policies.  
 The story of the two countries is not that different. Foreign capital and the participation 
in global production networks have been important for both. But the key that has made South 
Korea and Taiwan succeed with this strategy is that, unlike the failed cases of GVC 
participation (which we will discuss in greater detail in section 3.4), they managed, through 
industrial policy, to transfer technological knowhow from foreign companies, increase local 
content to avoid low-skilled ‘enclave’ assembly, and gradually increase domestic ownership in 
key sectors. 
 
																																																						
42 There are many similarities between the two countries, so this could easily have been done the other way 
around. Taiwan had an equally burgeoning light manufacturing sector that involved global production networks, 
and South Korea’s GVC-oriented industrial policies extended across a range of sectors.  
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3.2.3.1 South Korea 
 
To some, it may seem surprising to provide South Korea as an example of GVC integration. 
After all, the country is generally known to have had a very restrictive stance towards foreign 
investors. From 1960 to 1990, FDI inflows as share of total foreign capital inflows (except 
foreign aid) in the country was a mere 5 per cent, among the world’s lowest (Amsden, 1989; 
Chang, 2006). After almost half a century of Japanese colonialism, there was a strong desire to 
avoid foreign domination of the economy. Consequently, there was a preference for borrowing 
over FDI (Thurbon and Weiss, 2006). The FDI that was permitted was heavily regulated to 
ensure that it delivered benefits to the national economy, usually as specified by the Economic 
Planning Board. 
 However, while FDI inflows have been low in South Korea, the export-oriented light 
manufacturing industry is in some ways an exception, especially with respect to Japanese 
foreign investments. Additionally, FDI inflows do not capture all the international 
subcontracting practices that were prevalent in many of the East Asian countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s, whereby supplier firms in the value chains were domestically owned (Milberg et. 
al., 2014). As we will see below, this type of GVC participation was important in South Korea.  
 
3.2.3.1.1 Light manufacturing: textiles, apparel and footwear 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the textile, apparel and footwear industry was the highest-
earning merchandise export category in South Korea (Amsden, 1989, 2001).43 As mentioned, 
FDI accounted for a small share of total foreign capital in the country, but in some light 
manufacturing sectors it was significant. For example, in the textiles sector (including apparel), 
this share amounted to 20 per cent in 1974 (Chibber, 1999). Close ties to Japan have been 
especially important for the industry.44 First of all, Japan’s own industrialisation agenda was 
crucial. By the late 1950s, the Japanese economy was well into its high-growth phase. 
Experiencing rising labour costs and thus decreasing competitiveness of its labour-intensive 
exports, it was looking for neighbouring countries to relocate some of these activities. Japanese 
capital thus started entering South Korea through direct investments, joint ventures and 
																																																						
43 Textiles, apparel and footwear are not necessarily grouped into an industry, although one could perfectly argue 
that they could be, as textiles are crucial inputs for both footwear and apparel production. But in South Korea at 
the time, firms in textiles, apparel and footwear tended to cluster together (Singleton, 1997). 
44 Although diplomatic relationships were tense between South Korea and Japan in the 1960s, capital based in 
Japan, both Japanese and expatriate Korean, showed an immense interest in setting up operations in South Korea 
(Chibber, 1999). 
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subcontracting (Chibber, 1999). By the mid-1960s South Korean firms were exporting all sorts 
of apparel, mostly to the Japanese and the US markets (Castley, 1997a), using imported inputs 
from Japan.  
 The imported inputs from Japan were crucial for export success of Korean apparel. But 
the way that the relationships were formed, especially through joint ventures, made it easier 
for the Koreans not to simply become stuck with low-value export-oriented assembly tasks in 
the GVC. Two aspects were important.  
 On the one hand, Japanese willingness to form joint ventures with a minority stake 
played a helping hand. Between 1962 and 1974, 52 per cent of Japanese direct investments in 
South Korea were with minority ownership, versus only 27 per cent of US direct investments 
(Lee, 1980). Joint ventures with the Japanese in which Koreans had majority stakes more easily 
facilitated the transfer of technological know-how (learning how to produce synthetic fibres 
was especially important), marketing skills and managerial techniques.  
 On the other hand, the Koreans gradually and systematically pushed for less Japanese 
involvement and a higher degree of national firm ownership (Singleton, 1997). As soon as 
practically possible, the Koreans invested in their own R&D facilities, and by the early 1980s, 
they had acquired the capability to design their own plants and had reduced import dependence 
by developing domestic production capabilities in synthetic fibres, petrochemicals, spinning, 
weaving, dyeing and knitting. It is important to emphasise that the development of the Korean 
textile industry should not be understood purely as a means to provide inputs to the apparel 
industry. Textiles, especially synthetic fibres, was (and still is) considered more technologically 
advanced than apparel, and contributed significantly to export earnings in South Korea, 
especially in light of the high protectionist barriers that the US was starting to apply on 
traditional cotton textiles at the time (Chibber, 1999). 
 The role of the state in promoting the development of domestic capabilities in light-
manufacturing in the form of mutually reinforcing ‘ISI’ and ‘EOI’ policies, if you will, cannot 
be understated. Amsden (1989) points out that the import substitution of synthetic fibres made 
the textile industry more productive and less vulnerable to devaluations of the exchange rate. 
To compensate domestic fibre-using firms for ‘forcing’ them to use domestically produced 
fibres, the Korean government subsidised inputs and handed out subsidised credit in return for 
meeting export performance targets (Singleton, 1997). Other important export promotion 
measures included preferential loans for operation and facility expansion, general tax and tariff 
exemptions on some imported inputs and wastage allowances (Kim, 1980). 
 Another important, but often neglected, part of the story of South Korea’s export 
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success in textiles, apparel and footwear is the attraction of Japanese trading companies. In the 
early 1960s, the Koreans were simply lacking experience and knowledge of foreign markets, 
which made facilitating cooperation with these trading companies crucial. With reference to 
the Japanese trading companies, Chibber (1999, pp.330-331) writes:  
 
These trading companies established links with Korean aspirants to the lucrative export 
markets of the United States and provided them with essential inputs as well as the 
benefit of their sales and marketing networks. In turn, they were able to deliver the 
Korean firms as customers for capital goods to Japanese producers…This is especially 
true in the case of products where brand recognition and quality play a role, like 
synthetics, shoes, and so on—which formed the core of the Korean strategy in initial 
stages. In markets for these goods, not only is quality of central importance, but the 
initiative lies in the hands of the importer in the targeted country and not the exporter. 
Links to these importers, their trust, and their satisfaction reign supreme for export 
success. 
 
 The trading companies were especially important for establishing ties to the US 
markets. In 1966, Japan accounted for 82 per cent of the textile, apparel and clothing market 
in the US, whereas South Korea only accounted for 8 per cent. By the early 1970s, the Koreans 
had made their entry, accounting for 31 per cent of the US market, whereas the Japanese share 
had fallen to 52 per cent (Castley, 1997b). By this time, 50 per cent of South Korea’s exports 
went to the US (Castley, 1997a).  
 Over the 1980s, South Korea’s products became even more prominent in the US. For 
example, Nike, which has been one of the world’s largest brand names in athletic footwear for 
decades, originally outsourced most of its footwear production to Japan. But as costs rose there 
and South Korea started to develop productive capabilities in footwear production, heavy 
subcontracting took place in South Korea. In 1982, 86 per cent of Nike’s athletic footwear was 
produced in South Korea and Taiwan (Locke, 2002). This system of outsourcing and 
subcontracting that started in the 1970s—with especially US retailers and brand names buying 
finished manufactured goods from foreign suppliers—is exactly what spurred the BDVC 
classification in the GVC literature later on (Gereffi, 1994). 
 In conclusion, the story of South Korea’s success in GVC participation, especially in 
the light manufacturing industries, is a story of transferring technological knowhow through 
joint ventures, pushing for increasing local content and international competitiveness through 
various industrial policy tools, especially tariff protection and subsidised credit, and improving 
access to lucrative export markets through trading companies.   
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3.2.3.2 Taiwan 
 
As in South Korea, Taiwan was in need of foreign capital during its early phase of 
industrialisation. And, just like in South Korea, the fear of foreign domination of the economy 
was pervasive. But in Taiwan, foreign investment has been slightly more important and foreign 
borrowing less, compared to the case of South Korea (Thurbon and Weiss, 2006). Although 
FDI inflows only fluctuated between 4 and 8 per cent as a share of gross fixed capital formation 
between 1960 and 1990 (Chang and Cheng, 1992), 20-25 per cent of manufactured exports 
came from foreign firms in the 1970s (Lee and Liang, 1982). 
 The origin of foreign capital has been similar to that of South Korea, with most foreign 
investment coming from the US, Japan and Hong Kong. This investment has not spread equally 
across industries. Textiles, apparel and footwear saw a great inflow of foreign capital, but the 
electronics industry has perhaps been more important for Taiwan. Over half of foreign firms’ 
exports in the 1970s were in electronics and electrical appliances, and foreign firms accounted 
for two-thirds or more of total exports from this industry (Wade, 1990).  
The control of foreign firms operating in the domestic economy has been rigorous since 
the beginning of the industrialisation period, and the government has made sure to utilise these 
investments for the development of productive capabilities, as will be discussed next. 
 
3.2.3.2.1 Managing FDI the ‘right’ way 
 
In the early 1960s, there were plenty of attributes that made Taiwan attractive to foreign 
investors, very similar to those of South Korea. American and Japanese firms were beginning 
to search for low cost labour in nearby countries to relocate production, Taiwan offered 
political stability and disciplined labour, and the country was linked to Japan from the colonial 
era and to the US as an anti-Communist outpost. But the country did a good job in wooing 
foreign investors as well. Among other things, they offered 100 per cent foreign ownership in 
certain industries, guarantees against expropriation and five-year tax holidays. Effort went into 
making foreign firms feel welcome; one common trick was to discover some personal 
connection between the firm and a senior in the Taiwan government (Wade, 1990).  
 Taiwan has generally had a more welcoming FDI strategy than South Korea, but the 
government has bargained strategically with foreign investors, even in the 1960s, when the 
Taiwanese stance toward foreign investors was considered relatively liberal. An oft-cited 
example is the permission given to the Singer Sewing Machine Company (US based) to set up 
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a plant in Taiwan in 1963. The permission granted by the Taiwanese government resulted in 
strenuous objections by more than 250 small, domestically-owned assemblers and suppliers. 
The government argued that inviting the American company to build a plant would save foreign 
exchange and improve the quality of locally made parts. To ensure this, it required that Singer 
locally procure 83 per cent of required parts within one year of commencing operations and 
that it assist Taiwan’s local component producers in meeting specifications. The company did 
not meet the stringent local content requirements after a year, but ended up transferring a large 
amount of technology, upgrading the industry and boosting exports (Gold, 1986). 
 Another example of government-induced technology transfer through FDI attraction is 
the polyethylene plant built in the early 1960s by the National Distiller and Chemical 
Corporation (again, an American firm). To attract the company, the Taiwanese government 
offered a five-year tax holiday, restrictions on imports of polyethylene for three years, 
guaranteed supplies of ethylene (an input that goes into making polyethylene) and unlimited 
repatriation of profits. The Taiwanese government, in return, required that National Distiller 
should export any surpluses over domestic needs, not establish production facilities in 
downstream sectors, and transfer 50 per cent of shares to Chinese nationals after 5 years, to 
make it a 50-50 joint venture (Gold, 1981; Wade, 1990). The distiller plant successfully came 
on line in 1968.  
 Beginning in the 1970s, the Taiwanese government applied a slightly stricter stance 
toward foreign investors. FDI in labour-intensive production came to be discouraged, it was 
faced with higher export requirements and local content requirements, and limits were placed 
on the extent to which foreign firms could capitalise on their technology—typically demanding 
that technology could not be valued more than 15 per cent of the firm’s equity contribution in 
the case of joint ventures, with the intention of making the foreign firm commit more equity to 
the project at hand, thereby carrying more of the risk (Wade, 1990). Foreign investors did not 
always comply with the tough bargaining. For example, the Japanese automotive manufacturer, 
Toyota, withdrew from a joint venture in 1984 after concluding that the Taiwanese government 
insisted on too stringent local content requirements and export requirements. Within eight 
years, 50 per cent of cars were to be exported and local content were to rise to 90 per cent 
(Wade, 1990). 
 But generally, local content policies in Taiwan have been successful, and the strategy 
of linking foreign firms with local suppliers through subcontracting practices became a staple 
of GVC-oriented industrial policies in Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s (see Aw (2003) and 
Schive (1990)). Foreign firms’ links with local producers were assisted by proactive industry 
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associations. For example, the electronics industry association TEAMA (the Taiwan Electric 
Appliances Manufacturers’ Association) aggressively recruited members from both foreign 
and local firms and, with the support of the government, actively promoted the “local content 
programme” (Aw, 2003, p.172). Local producers wanted to take advantage of the technology, 
management skills and sales networks of TNCs. And foreign producers stood to benefit from 
the local content programme because it reduced labour costs and lead-times as long as local 
suppliers met quality standards. Consequently, TNCs started enthusiastically training local 
technicians, providing technical knowhow and management skills to suppliers and cooperated 
with technical schools on internship programmes (Aw, 2003).  
 Also starting in the 1970s, the government became more active in trying to attract R&D 
from foreign companies, especially in high-tech sectors. Incentives included tax write-offs for 
R&D and reductions in taxes on technology imports. Obligations to be met on the foreign firm 
side often involved establishing research departments to train local personnel in advanced 
technology (Wade, 1990). 
 In conclusion, we see that the Taiwanese government has applied a range of favourable 
incentives to attract FDI, but has bargained and cooperated with foreign investors to ensure 
transfer of technology, local content, backward linkages, and export growth.     
 
3.2.3.3 Additional trade – and GVC-related considerations important for South Korea’s and 
Taiwan’s acquisition of foreign technology and industrialisation 
 
3.2.3.3.1 South Korea’s ‘informal’ foreign technology transfer strategies 
 
The above case studies of South Korea and Taiwan focused mostly on policies to transfer 
technologies through the attraction of FDI, in particular local content requirements and joint 
venture requirements. However, in South Korea, while we saw how FDI played an important 
role in the textile, apparel and footwear industry, it was relatively unimportant in most other 
manufacturing industries. This is because in these other industries, South Korea largely 
acquired foreign technologies through other means. 
 In industries such as machinery and shipbuilding, large firms relied heavily on the 
acquisition of foreign technology in the form of foreign technology licensing. Between 1962 
and 1981, the machinery industry accounted for almost half of South Korea’s foreign 
technology license purchases (Kim, 2002). The US was the largest recipient of royalty 
payments for such licenses, followed closely by Japan. However, according to Kim (2003), 
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reverse engineering on imported capital goods was far more important than foreign technology 
licensing as a source of technology transfer. During the 1970s, imports of capital goods made 
up more than 20 per cent of the value of total investments in South Korea. Westphal et. al. 
(1985) compares this rate with four other catch-up economies in the same time period—
Argentina, Brazil, India and Mexico—and finds that the country closest to this rate is Mexico, 
whose imports of capital goods made up 13 per cent of total investments.  
At the time, the international property rights regime was relatively lax, which meant 
that little attention was paid to the legal aspects of copying imported technology through 
reverse engineering. These reverse engineering practices were particularly common in 
electronics, chemicals, computers and pharmaceuticals. 
Kim’s (1980) study of consumer electronics firms in South Korea reveaed that of 15 
domestic black/white TV assemblers in 1975, 11 entered the industry by reverse engineering 
done by experienced engineers poached from firms already established in the industry. 
Similarly, Kim’s (1988) study of 28 South Korean firms involved in computer design and 
computer manufacturing found that a majority of firms used reverse engineering to acquire 
foreign technologies. In South Korea’s pharmaceutical industry, many of today’s leading 
companies that undertake advanced R&D activities and discover new drug compounds started 
as importers of packaged drugs. The lax international property rights regime in the 1980s 
allowed local pharmaceutical companies to get around patented production processes in order 
to reverse engineer the products. 
 The Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), a government supported 
research institute made up of mostly overseas-trained Korean scientists and engineers, played 
an important role in technology transfer strategies. For example, Kim (2002) shows how KIST 
helped Korean firms in the electronics sector negotiate royalty rates for foreign technology 
licenses in colour television technology, and assisted Korean firms in the chemical industry 
reverse engineer polyester film production technology from Japan. 
 
3.2.3.3.2 The importance of the export strategy for South Korea’s and Taiwan’s 
industrialisation 
 
South Korea’s reverse engineering on capital goods imports would not have been possible had 
it not been able to pay for all these imports. They were able to do so largely because of a highly 
targeted export strategy that ran in parallel. Some details of the export strategy have already 
been discussed through various examples in chapter 2 and in the section above—generally, the 
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government would give special favours and assistance to firms in exchange for meeting export 
performance targets. But South Korea’s export strategy arguably became something ‘bigger’ 
than just a technical recognition of balance of payments constraints. In his ‘State of the Nation 
Message’ on January 16, 1965, President Park Chung-hee even called it the economic lifeline 
of the country:  
 
To go with increased production, the government has set another major target—
increased exports…In a country which depends heavily on imported raw materials for 
its industries, export is the economic lifeline…For many years, Korea exported only 
$20m to $30m worth of goods a year…But in the past few years, the government and 
people awoke from sleep and strove. Exports began to expand rapidly. Last year, our 
exports exceeded the $120m mark…We have acquired the self-confidence that we, too, 
can successfully compete with others in the international export race (Amsden, 1989, 
pp.68-69). 
 
Exports as a per cent of GNP in South Korea rose steadily from less than 5 per cent in the 1950s 
to approximately 35 per cent in the 1980s. In tandem, imports as a per cent of GNP rose as well 
(driven by the capital goods imports), albeit at a slower rate (Amsden, 1989). 
 In Taiwan, the export drive was also a central part of the development strategy, as 
already detailed to some extent in the previous chapter and the previous section. From the early 
1960s, several schemes were introduced to give positive discrimination in favour of export 
sales (for both domestic and foreign firms). Fiscal incentives, such as exemption of income tax 
for five years, were handed out to manufacturing firms provided that their exports equalled 50 
per cent or more of production (Lin, 1973). Concessional export credit, which had been limited 
in volume in the 1950s, was expanded. Other methods for stimulating exports included export 
credits, encouragement of export cartels, provision of marketing information and export prizes 
(Wade, 1990). 
 The export promotion strategy required a degree of liberalisation of imports of 
intermediate goods for export production. The system of tax rebates—which allowed exports 
to be exempt from taxes paid on imports used as export inputs—was amplified in the early 
1960s. Exporting firms were also able to obtain import licenses needed for their own 
production more easily, but only if no domestic substitutes were available or if the price of 
domestic substitutes was 10 per cent above the price of the corresponding import (Lin, 1973). 
As a result of these measures, the import content of exports in Taiwan rose fast, from 12.9 per 
cent in 1961, to 19.7 per cent in 1966, to 25.5 per cent in 1971 (Wade, 1990).  
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  A supremely important conclusion emerges at this point. Both South Korea and Taiwan 
were protectionist (as discussed in the introduction to section 3.2.3) and liberal with their 
imports at the same time. This is no oxymoron—both countries realised that importing 
intermediate goods was necessary to ‘feed’ the export strategy (and in South Korea’s case, 
some were important for the acquisition of foreign technology through reverse engineering), 
but a full liberalisation of imports would create severe balance of payments problems and, in 
the case of intermediates in particular, constrain the growth of a domestic supplier industry. In 
other words, while ISI was a tricky business, EOI had an ‘unequivocal’ green light. The export 
strategy relieved foreign exchange constraints, thereby enabling these countries to import 
necessary goods. It also encouraged investments, as it provided a more stable macroeconomic 
environment. 
 Another important aspect of the export strategy for South Korea and Taiwan, more 
explicitly related to GVC participation, was learning about technologies and marketing by lead 
firms in GVCs. For example, as Taiwanese supplier firms inserted themselves in GVCs led by 
large US retailers, such as J.C. Penney and Walmart, many of these retailers set up offices in 
Taiwan to deal directly with small manufacturers. Close links to these buyers were important 
sources of technology. Levy (1994) argues that foreign buyers and traders were among the 
most important sources of technological information and support for SMEs in Taiwan. 
According to Aw (2003), foreign buyers, eager to purchase from cheaper sources, provided 
Taiwanese firms with technical assistance so that they could meet the foreign markets’ quality 
standards and specifications. These GVC-related productivity gains for Taiwanese SMEs were 
initially important in the textile industry, but later became supremely important in the 
electronics industry as well (see Gee and Kuo, 1998). In South Korea’s case, several studies 
with domestic firms have also pointed to the importance of GVC-participation whereby foreign 
buyers of locally produced goods under OEM arrangements provide technological knowhow 
to ensure that locally manufactured products meet buyers’ stringent specifications (e.g. Kim, 
1987; Kim, 1980).  
 
3.3 How do GVCs manifest themselves in developing countries, particularly 
Africa? 
 
Having discussed the definition of GVCs from a critical perspective and having examined the 
history of GVC-oriented industrial policies in two of the most successful growth experiences 
throughout the history of capitalism, we can now examine how the productive structures of 
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developing countries (in particular African countries) are affected by the expansion of GVCs 
(and how they could be affected in the future), before turning to how those countries can cope 
with these changes in section 3.4 .  
 In doing so, this section will look at both the opportunities and the challenges posed by 
the expansion of GVCs. Among the opportunities are the possibilities to capitalise on the 
increasing inflows of FDI and the chance to specialise in ‘niches’ of a GVC, which, for a single 
country, is arguably easier than trying to do all the things in a vertically integrated value chain. 
Both FDI attraction and niche specialisation are increasingly happening in physical spaces 
known as special economic zones (SPZs) and export processing zones (EPZs). Attention will 
therefore also be devoted to the importance of these zones.  
The challenges are less well known. First, while niche specialisation can be beneficial, 
firms (and countries) can get ‘stuck’ in low value added activities in GVCs. Second, when 
developing countries specialise in low value added activities that have low entry barriers, TNCs 
further up in the chain often end up relocating the activities they initially outsourced to supplier 
firms in one country, to another country that offers cheaper labour, thereby ‘tossing’ firms out 
of the chain. Third, and most importantly, the expansion of GVCs has been accompanied with 
a massive expansion and consolidation of powerful TNCs, as briefly outlined in the previous 
section. This has resulted in a distribution of profits in GVCs in favour of TNCs from 
predominantly the West, which has, together with intensified global competition between 
developing countries, made it more difficult for developing countries to appropriate their ‘fair’ 
shares of value in the value chain. 
 
3.3.1 Opportunities with the expansion of GVCs45 
 
3.3.1.1 FDI 
 
As mentioned, the expansion of GVCs especially since the 1990s has entailed a massive 
increase in FDI into developing countries. From a developing country perspective, FDI inflows 
from richer countries can yield a number of benefits. In the short term, it can boost 
employment; it can increase foreign exchange and tax revenues; it can assist the integration of 
host countries in the world economy; and it can have a positive impact on infrastructure 
																																																						
45 The general gains from trade openness is one of the opportunities with GVCs that is often referred to in the 
literature (e.g. OECD, 2013b; UNCTAD, 2013) but will not feature in this section, the reason being that it is 
arguably not directly linked with participation in GVCs per se, but rather participation in international trade.    
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development and the business environment (Farole and Winkler, 2014; Gallagher and Zarsky, 
2007).  
There are also benefits to be derived from FDI that are more long term in nature. Below, 
explanations for these long term benefits will be discussed, focusing mainly on three effects: 
technological transfers/ spillovers, competitive pressures and human capital development. 
Additionally, this section will look at the world’s most famous example of successful FDI 
attraction, namely Singapore. 
 Technological transfer, or spillovers, is the principal channel that the economic 
literature has identified as a mechanism through which FDI inflows benefit the host economy. 
Especially during the last 50 years, it has become clear that the development of productive 
capabilities in developing countries has not happened through innovation but through 
imitation—a process of acquiring technologies that more developed countries already have, 
often embedded in the practices of TNCs (frequently generated through their corporate R&D). 
A common channel through which spillovers happen are backward linkages with local 
suppliers in the host country, when TNCs provide technical assistance, training and other 
information to raise the quality of suppliers’ products and help them meet on-time delivery 
(OECD, 2002; Paus and Gallagher, 2008). TNCs also are known to assist local suppliers with 
purchasing raw materials and intermediate products (especially from abroad) that help 
modernise and upgrade their production process (OECD, 2002). Spillovers can also happen 
through simple demonstration, as domestic firms are exposed to TNCs’ products, production 
processes and marketing strategies. 
 A second channel through which FDI is often argued to be beneficial for the host 
economy is competition. The logic is that the presence of foreign firms will exert greater 
pressure on competing domestic firms to be more productive. As a result, domestic producers 
are thought to reduce inefficiencies and make a greater effort to incorporate new technologies 
in the production process, thus raising their productivity and consequently the average 
productivity of the industry (Paus and Gallagher, 2008). 
 Third is the possibility of enhancing skills of the local workforce through attracting 
foreign companies (this is largely related to the first point, as skills development can in some 
ways be seen as a type of technology transfer). Although tertiary education and training 
programmes by the host country government is important, it is also recognised that skills 
development often happens through training programmes implemented by foreign 
companies—sometimes even outside the host country, by sending workers to intensive training 
programmes to model factories based in TNCs’ home countries—or on-the-job learning. 
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Labour mobility between firms in the host country (both foreign and domestic firms) eventually 
ensures that knowledge is transferred between firms. The demand for certain types of skills by 
TNCs can also provide host-country governments an indication of the type of skills that are 
useful for international competitiveness, and thus encourage them to adjust and construct 
education and TVET programmes accordingly (OECD, 2002). 
  
3.3.1.1.1 The world’s most successful in FDI attraction? A brief overview of Singapore’s 
experience 
 
 We have already seen how South Korea and Taiwan utilised FDI in their industrialisation 
strategies. But, of the Asian tigers, the most popular example of strategic use of FDI for 
economic development is Singapore (and probably among the most popular examples in the 
world). Between 1971 and 1995, net FDI inflows as a share of gross fixed capital formation in 
Singapore was 22.9 per cent, the highest in the world in this period (Chang, 2006). Between 
1980 and 1990, Singapore received more FDI in absolute terms than any other developing 
country (Huff, 1995). This is astonishing considering that it had a population of less than 3 
million people in 1990. On a per capita basis, using 1990 population, the figures for FDI 
inflows were $767 for Singapore compared to $1.50 for China, the latter of which was the 
fourth largest least developed country (LDC) recipient of FDI at the time (Huff, 1995).  
Given the lack of entrepreneurial talent and technological knowhow in Singapore in its 
early phase of industrialisation, attracting TNCs from abroad provided a perfect strategy to 
acquire state of the art technology and access to global production networks. The Economic 
Development Board (EDB) has played the central role in promoting Singapore to foreign firms 
and ascertaining the capabilities that foreign firms need in order to be in Singapore. Policies 
for attracting FDI included liberal entry and ownership conditions, a range of custom-designed 
financial incentives (perhaps most importantly tax breaks) and efficient and transparent 
administration (Lall, 2000). 
Policies have also focused on raising the knowledge content of TNC subsidiaries in 
Singapore. The principal device was investment incentives tied to the introduction of higher 
value added operations, training of local staff and the dispatching of Singaporean engineers to 
TNC headquarters to acquire new technical skills (Wong, 2003). Policies have also encouraged 
joint ventures and technology alliances, usually facilitated by the EDB, particularly in high-
tech industries, such as semiconductor wafer fabrication and chemicals (Wong, 2003).  
In parallel with these policies, the Singaporean government made heavy investments in 
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infrastructure and education oriented towards the TNCs that they were attracting. For example, 
the government purposefully planned modern living environments with good housing, R&D 
facilities and efficient transport infrastructure to help attract foreign companies (Prime, 2012). 
In parallel, the government made sure to build basic infrastructure, such as roads, ports, airports 
and telephone lines. With respect to education, the country’s renowned TVET programmes 
have been critical. A distinguishing feature of the many TVET institutions in Singapore is that 
they were established and run as collaborative ventures between the EDB and overseas 
partners. Some partners were well known TNCs, like Philips, ABB and Seiki, while others 
were highly regarded industrial training institutes in Europe, like the French 
Electrical/Electronic Industry Federation and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(Wong, 2003). 
Singapore remains of the most internationally integrated economies—after 
Luxembourg, it has the highest GVC participation in the world (OECD, 2013b). 
 
3.3.1.2 Niche specialisation: joining the chain rather than building it 
 
The expansion of GVCs entails that production has become increasingly fragmented. Until the 
1990s, the argument goes, industrialisation in developing countries focused on building 
vertically integrated industries, i.e., building the entire supply chain (Baldwin, 2011; OECD, 
2013b). With reference to the industrialisation era before the 1990s, Baldwin (2011, p.4) states, 
“The touchstone fact was that no nation could become globally competitive without a broad 
and deep industrial base. Building such a supply chain took decades, so considerations of scale, 
coordination, and commitment posed massive development challenges.”  
Today, a popular view is that nations can industrialise by joining some value chains 
rather than building them, and that they don’t necessarily need to develop vertically integrated 
industries (Baldwin, 2011; Bigsten and Söderbom, 2009; Cattaneo et al., 2013). In other words, 
GVCs are making it relatively easier for developing countries to industrialise by allowing them 
to specialise in particular segments of an industry (stages of production, tasks or business 
functions)—niche specialisation so to speak—without having all the ‘upstream’ capabilities in 
place, and thus start to export more quickly at a lower cost. AfDB-OECD-UNDP (2014, p.129) 
even claims that developing countries can break into high tech sectors this way: “The presence 
of high tech goods in a country’s export basket no longer implies the presence of a wide set of 
industrial capabilities, but merely the presence of the respective assembly operation.” 
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China is an often-cited example to prove the benefits of niche specialisation that has 
been enabled by GVC expansion. The country’s export success in manufacturing products46 
largely reflects its assembly activities: the share of processing trade (exports that use duty-free 
imported inputs) in China’s total trade has increased rapidly since the 1990s, almost reaching 
50 per cent in 2011 (OECD, 2013b). Between 2000 and 2008, China accounted for 67 per cent 
of the world’s processing exports (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). In large part, China’s processing 
activities reflect a triangular trade pattern. Advanced parts and components are produced by 
more developed countries (typically Asian countries, like South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, but 
sometimes the US), then exported to China, where different intermediates are assembled into 
finished products, and finally the assembled products are often exported to the US or developed 
countries in Europe, where they may undergo additional processing (like packaging and 
marketing) before being sold on the market. The making of an Apple iPod is a perfect example. 
The hard drive and display module is made in Japan, the multimedia processor chip is made in 
Taiwan, assembly and testing is done in China, and distribution and retail is done by Apple 
(whose headquarters are in the US). 
Some Latin American countries have also been benefitting from industrialisation drives 
based on niche specialisation in GVCs. Costa Rica is a good example. From the 1980s onwards, 
the country has implemented several reforms aiming for more integration in international trade, 
including the establishment of a dedicated investment agency (CINDE), a free trade zone, and 
preferential trade agreements with dozens of countries. These reforms have provided a 
tremendous boost to Costa Rica’s FDI stock, which in 2011 stood at 37 per cent of GDP, second 
only to Chile in Latin America (OECD, 2013b). The country has attracted in particular large 
IT companies interested in setting up assembly plants for microprocessors. Foreign investment 
in the industry started in the 1990s with Intel, and gradually, other companies such as HP and 
IBM have set up production facilities (COMEX, 2011). Most inputs are imported for simple 
assembly, before being exported for more processing in the US The niche of this industry that 
Costa Rica has specialised in has allowed the country to diversify from its traditional exports, 
banana and coffee, towards manufacturing. 
We already know that Africa’s integration into global production networks and FDI 
inflows are relatively low, so it is unsurprising that there are not many successful examples of 
industrialisation through niche specialisation on the continent. There are, however, a few 
exceptions. The most notable ones are Egypt (electronics industry—video displays), Mauritius 
																																																						
46 By 2000, China’s manufactured exports had expanded 26 times the value recorded in 1981 (Memedovic, 2004).   
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(apparel industry) Morocco (apparel industry and automotive industry) and Tunisia (apparel 
industry) (OEC, 2016). Most of these countries that export apparel products generally perform 
CMT functions on imported fabric, before exporting them to brand names or retailers based in 
the West (more on the global apparel and textile industry in chapter 4). The automotive sector 
in Morocco stands as the largest export-oriented manufacturing industry in any one African 
country, with estimated export earnings of $5.43b in 2015, employing over 100,000 people 
(Saleh, 2016). The growth of the sector has benefitted from attracting foreign automotive 
companies to SPZs, most notably French ones, such as Renault (the largest) and Citroën. The 
cars are assembled in Morocco, using mostly imported inputs, before they are exported to 
Europe for sale. 
 
3.3.1.3 EPZs 
 
The physical spaces most commonly known as EPZs have become an integral part of FDI 
attraction and GVC participation (and often based on niche specialisation) for developing 
countries. An EPZ is a geographically delimited zone (usually physically secured, for example 
by a fence) that provides special financial incentives for foreign companies (although 
sometimes to domestic companies) for them to relocate production to host countries, most often 
manufacturing activities. These zones go under a variety of different names—apart from EPZ, 
SPZ and free trade zone (FTZ) are frequently used terms. World Bank (2008b) uses the SPZ 
terminology, and within that category, distinguishes between FTZ, Traditional EPZ, Hybrid 
EPZ, Freeport, Enterprise Zone, and Single Factory EPZ. Many more terms are known to be 
used. In fact, Boyenge (2007) lists thirty-two different titles for such zones, indicating slight 
differences in terms of concessions, regulations and subsidies. In this chapter, the EPZ 
terminology will be used, as almost all of these zones involve a high degree of export 
processing, referring broadly to the zones that have a wide variety of regulatory frameworks 
that most importantly contain special financial incentives for primarily foreign companies. 
Milberg and Winkler (2013, p.242) provides a concise, yet comprehensive list of such 
incentives: 
 
Some of the typical incentives offered under EPZs include exemption from some or all 
export taxes, exemption from some or all duties on imports of raw materials or 
intermediate goods, exemption from direct taxes such as profit taxes, municipal and 
property taxes, exemption from indirect taxes on domestic purchases, exemption from 
national foreign exchange controls, free profit repatriation for foreign companies, 
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provision of streamlined administrative services especially to facilitate imports and 
exports, and free provision of enhanced physical infrastructure for production, 
transport, and logistics.  
 
Madani (1999) lists additional features, such as more flexibility with labour laws for firms in 
the zone than in the domestic market, generous income tax holidays, and subsidised utilities 
and rental rates. 
Alongside the expansion of GVCs, the number of EPZs in the world has exploded. As 
seen from Table 3.2, the number of countries with one or more EPZ in 2006 was 130, up from 
93 in 1997, and 29 in 1975. From a world total of 3,500 zones in 2006, developing countries 
tallied 3,126 of these (Stein, 2012). Employment by EPZs reached 66m in 2006, up from 22.5m 
in 1997. China’s export processing activity has been a huge driver—the country’s EPZs 
account for over 60 per cent of total EPZ employment in the world. 
 
 
Table 3.2: EPZs in the world, 1975-2006 
 1975 1986 1987 2002 2006 
Number of countries with EPZs 25 47 93 116 130 
Number of EPZs 79 176 845 3000 3500 
Employment (millions) N/A N/A 22.5 43 66 
Employment China (millions) N/A N/A 18 30 40 
Source: Boyenge (2007) 
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Table 3.3: Countries ranked by highest employment in EPZs, 2006 
Rank Country Employment Number of EPZs 
1 China 40,000,000 164 
2 Indonesia 6,000,000 N/A 
3 Mexico 4,312,000 N/A 
4 Philippines 1,128,000 78 
5 Vietnam 950,000 191 
6 Pakistan 888,000 26 
7 UAE 552,000 16 
8 South Africa 535,000 6 
9 Malaysia 492,000 213 
10 Czech Rep. 487,000 13 
Source: Boyenge (2007) 
 
 
Table 3.4: EPZs in Africa, 1971-2006 
 1971 1997 2006 
Number of EPZs 1 40+ 155+ 
Top countries with 
most EPZs 
(employees number 
/ of zones) 
Mauritius (N/A / 
1) 
Kenya (N/A / 
14), Egypt (N/A 
/ 6) 
South Africa (535,000 / 
6), Tunisia (259,000 / 6), 
Egypt (209,000 / 57), 
Morocco (145,000 / 2), 
Nigeria (111,000, 6),  
Mauritius (65,000, 1) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Boyenge (2007), Stein (2012) and World Bank (2008b) 
 
 
In 1990, only three African countries, Egypt, Tunisia and Mauritius, had EPZs with any 
significant employment or exports (Stein, 2012). Africa is still relatively small on the world 
EPZ map, but definitely not absent. As seen from Table 3.4, the continent was estimated to 
have over 155 EPZs in 2006. Of these, Stein (2012) estimates that there are 91 in SSA spread 
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over 20 countries, with employment of roughly 1,05m. South Africa has by far the most 
employees, with an estimated 535,000 (Table 3.3). 
 Why do developing countries go to such great lengths to set up EPZs? It’s obviously 
closely linked to FDI attraction, so the general motivations for attracting FDI also apply to 
motivations for setting up EPZs. Mallani (1999) lists 3 primary goals of an EPZ: 1) to promote 
foreign exchange earnings by promoting non-traditional exports; 2) to provide jobs to alleviate 
underemployment in the host country; and 3) to attract foreign investment and engender 
technological transfer. Milberg and Winkler (2013) point out another important reason (closely 
related to point 3 by Mallani), which is the importance of collaborating with lead firms, not 
only in order to reach their markets, but also for the potential of industrialisation of the host 
economy. 
 The export gains from EPZs are especially important. In Costa Rica, EPZ’s share in 
manufacturing exports increased from 10 per cent in 1990 to 53 per cent in 2005, while during 
the period 2001-2005, total exports in the country grew by 55 per cent (Engman et. al., 2007). 
In Bangladesh, EPZs’ share of the growth in total foreign exchange earnings increased form 
0.02 per cent in 1983 to 18 per cent 2004 (Hossain, 2005). In Africa, Mauritius is the most 
prominent example of reaping export dividends thanks to EPZs. The country saw its share of 
exports produced by EPZs jump from 3 per cent to 53 per cent of total exports between 1971 
and 1986, while in the same time period, total exports skyrocketed from Rs3.9m to Rs4.96b 
(Engman et. al., 2007). The investments came mostly from Hong Kong, and were targeted at 
the apparel industry. Mauritius has also been successful in securing increasing local content in 
its apparel EPZs. By 1982, domestic producers were supplying 41 per cent of all the 
intermediate inputs going into the EPZs, including nearly all the cardboard boxes, and a large 
proportion of the cloth, thread, buttons and trimmings (Willmore, 1995).  
 
3.3.2 Downsides with the expansion of GVCs  
 
3.3.2.1 Getting stuck in low-value added activities 
 
All the opportunities with GVC expansion for developing countries that were discussed in the 
previous section are closely linked—the production activities that happen through FDI 
attraction are usually within a segment of a value chain, quite often in an EPZ context. Several 
examples of countries that have been successful to various degrees with GVC participation 
were presented. But in fact, there are equally many, if not more, examples of countries that 
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have participated in GVCs without much success. The main issue in the failed cases is the lack 
of technological spillovers and/or linkages to the domestic economy. These countries typically 
start with and end up doing a simple task for one or several foreign firms that requires little 
skill. A typical result is that the FDI ends up creating some jobs only within the confines of the 
EPZ, becoming a ‘cathedral in the desert’, or an ‘enclave economy’, in the words of Gallagher 
and Zarsky (2007). 
 In fact, econometric studies trying to find a link between FDI attraction and productivity 
growth in the host economy are ambiguous at best. Cross-sectional studies tend to find 
statistically significant evidence of positive spillovers, while those based on panel data are 
more likely to find negative spillovers (Farole and Winkler, 2014; Görg and Greenway, 2004; 
Paus and Gallagher, 2008). 
 While EPZs tend to increase exports, the high share of local content that, for example, 
the Mauritian case achieved, is an exception rather than a rule. According to Milberg and 
Winkler (2013), the range of 3 to 9 per cent of inputs purchased domestically is more common, 
which has been the case for El Salvador, Guatemala, the Philippines and Sri Lanka in the mid 
to late 1990s. For an extreme example, take the Dominican Republic. 30 years after the creation 
of the first EPZ in the country, the average purchase of domestic inputs in all EPZs was no 
more than 0.0001 per cent of the value of all inputs used.  
 On average, it might seem that East Asian countries have performed better than the rest 
of the developing world in terms of GVC participation (thus far, this chapter has discussed to 
varying degrees of detail the successes of China, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan). Below, 
we move to another region of the world, Latin America, which on average has been far less 
successful than East Asia in relation to GVC participation.  
 Case studies from three countries will be presented: Mexico, Dominican Republic and 
Brazil. Mexico is a prime example of FDI attraction in high-tech sectors but with few linkages 
to the domestic economy. The case of the Dominican Republic tells a similar story, but in low-
tech sectors. The Brazilian case does not illustrate a lack of backward linkages, like the other 
two, but rather how GVC power structures and well-protected rents by TNCs hinder developing 
countries from reaping the profits from producer services. 
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3.3.2.1.1 Mexico: the ultimate example of massive, but mostly failed, FDI attraction in the IT 
industry 
 
In the early 2000s, more than 90 per cent of FDI inflows to developing countries were dispersed 
between only 10 countries, and Mexico was one of the top three (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007). 
In addition to being a prime case of massive FDI attraction, it illustrates a stark change from a 
relatively strict stance against foreign investors, which was partly successful, to a highly 
liberalised regime for FDI.  
In the IT sector, a sector that has become hugely important for Mexico, TNCs were 
limited to 49 per cent of ownership of domestic firms between 1950 and 1980; they had to 
invest between 3 and 6 per cent of gross sales into R&D; and domestic parts and components 
had to account for at least 45 per cent of value added for personal computers and 35 per cent 
for minicomputers (Paus and Gallagher, 2008). This relatively interventionist strategy was 
successful in generating growth and diversification of the domestic IT sector.  
But it was not successful in achieving international competitiveness, and by the mid-
1980s, continuing balance of payments problems and a debt crisis (the plunge in the oil price 
in 1982 being a contributing factor) swung the pendulum towards neoliberalism. After signing 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, the shift towards free 
trade was more or less complete. President Carlos Salinas’ (1988-1994) plan was to create jobs 
and modernize the economy through large increases in FDI.  Global flaghships of the IT 
industry, like Hewlett Packard (HP) and International Business Machines (IBM), moved 
massive manufacturing assembly operations to Guadalajara, Mexico, as wages were low and 
labour unions weak, there was proximity to the US market and tariffs on high tech exports was 
eventually lowered to zero under NAFTA (Paus and Gallagher, 2008).  
 There were initial hopes that local firms would evolve into contract manufacturers and 
suppliers to the US-based TNCs, but these hopes were short-lived. Companies like HP and 
IBM invited contract-manufacturing firms based in the US instead, such as Flextronics and 
Solectron, to co-locate in Guadalajara. In turn, these contract manufacturing firms built their 
competitive advantage by managing a third tier of local suppliers mostly in East Asia. Less 
than 5 per cent of inputs were sourced from Mexico (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007). While the 
attraction of lead firms from the US was initially a source of employment and income, this 
changed in the early 2000s. The high-tech stock bubble burst, making US lead firms search for 
cheaper production sites, so China’s WTO membership in 2001 could not come at a better time. 
 114 
China became the lead production platform for these firms, and manufacturing operations in 
Guadalajara were severely cut back or relocated.  
In the early 1980s, Mexico actually had some indigenous firms who manufactured their 
own computers, like Scale and Electron Computers, and joint venture assembly manufacturers, 
such as Electronica Panter and Microtron, that worked alongside TNCs and in some instances 
supplied global firms like IBM, Motorola, HP and Kodak (Palacios, 2001; Wilson, 1992). By 
1987, an impressive 56 per cent of domestic demand in Mexico’s IT industry was met by 
domestic supply (Paus and Gallagher, 2008). 20 years later, the entire domestic computer 
industry was nearly extinct. A large reason for this was not only that TNCs were free to import 
all of their inputs, but the skill content of jobs given to Mexican workers was extremely low, 
thus generating very few knowledge spillovers. Among the employees of foreign firms in 
Guadalajara, only 6.9 per cent had graduated from high school (Paus and Gallagher, 2008). 
Furthermore, the TNCs conducted almost no R&D operations in Mexico—they saw the 
country primarily as a place for assembly manufacturing operations. 
So who is to blame for this lack of technological spillovers? Gallagher and Zarsky 
(2007) argue that the promise of Mexico’s “Silicon Valley” went unfulfilled for two reasons. 
One is the global restructuring and increased competition of the IT industry. The emergence of 
China as a key player in the global production system, with a rare combination of low wages, 
a huge domestic market, and impressive productive capabilities, made it more difficult for 
Mexico to compete internationally. The second is the lack of government policies aimed at 
building the capacities of local firms. From the mid-1980s onwards, Mexico’s government 
failed to put in place incentives for foreign firms to use domestic inputs; there was no 
government-provided development financing for domestic firms; and high interest rates 
choked domestic investments and put upward pressure on the peso, which further biased TNC 
procurement away from domestic suppliers. As Gallagher and Zarsky (2007, p.9) writes: 
 
The experience of other late-industrialising countries, especially in East Asia, is that 
the state must proactively promote local learning, knowledge, and innovation. With 
such policies in place, FDI spillovers can be garnered. Without them and the growth of 
local knowledge assets they engender, MNCs will transfer only low-skilled, low-wage 
and ultimately footloose operations. Rather than a proactive industry policy to develop 
domestic firms and markets, Mexico adopted a “maquila mindset” that oriented 
industrial development solely around attracting MNCs to produce for export.  
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3.3.2.1.2 Dominican Republic: apparel EPZs with no linkages 
 
From the mid-1980s, the participation in GVCs through EPZs in the Dominican Republic 
expanded rapidly. From 1985 to 1994, the number of EPZ increased from 4 to 32, exports by 
EPZs increased from $0.2b to $2.8b ($1.6b of which was apparel and textile exports), and EPZ 
employment rose from 35,720 to 176,311 (Engman et.al, 2007). So from an employment and 
export point of view, GVC participation has had a positive impact on the domestic economy. 
 However, as already mentioned, the problem of linkage creation has been pertinent, 
with less than 0.0001 per cent of the value of inputs used in production in the EPZs purchased 
domestically. Shrank (2001) cites three reasons for the low degree of linkage creation. First, a 
domestic capital and intermediate goods industry did not exist, and there has been little attempt 
to develop one, through, for example, ISI policies. Second, for those local suppliers that did 
exist (and initially survived the entry of EPZs), few were able to meet world market standards 
(i.e. EPZ standards) for price, quality, delivery terms and level of output. Third, many local 
suppliers simply did not see it profitable to serve the EPZs—they were comfortable with the 
profit margins in the domestic market. 
 Apart from the obvious problem that the attraction of foreign firms through setting up 
an EPZ did not create any linkages to the Dominican economy, there was an additional 
problem. The types of activities that were carried out in EPZs in the Dominican Republic were 
simple, labour-intensive activities that required very little skill, relying on the country’s relative 
labour cost advantage over other countries. When relative labour costs increase, a firm (or even 
an entire country) risks losing the production activities to other countries with cheaper labour, 
just like what happened in the Mexican case. Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) provide the case of 
a firm making denim jeans in an EPZ in the Dominican Republic during the early 1990s. It 
specialised in sewing denim jeans, using materials imported from the US, designed in the US 
and cut in the US, selling them to a major international brand-name company. The local firm 
began by getting $2.18 per pair of jeans. But as neighbouring countries devalued their 
currencies, thereby reducing their labour costs in terms of US dollars, the firm in the Dominican 
Republic was forced to reduce its charge-rate. However, even this was not enough and the work 
was eventually sourced elsewhere.  
The vulnerability of this firm (and most firms in the EPZ) in the Dominican Republic 
was that it specialised in a niche task (sewing) in the GVC, a low-value added activity subject 
to fierce international competition that could easily be sourced elsewhere. The actual activity 
did not even allow for enhanced value-addition. Most of the value was appropriated at the 
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design and branding stages of the GVC anyway.   
   
3.3.2.1.3 Brazil: GVC power structures hindered functional upgrading in the shoe industry 
 
For those familiar with the expansion of the shoe cluster in Sinos Valley, Brazil, it might seem 
confounding to provide it as a case study of how GVC participation can go wrong. From the 
1960s to the 1990s, the cluster grew rapidly to become recognised as one of the largest players 
in the global footwear industry, reaching close to $1b in export earnings in 1995 (Nadvi, 1995), 
accounting for almost all of Brazil’s shoe exports. Its employment creation has been 
impressive, not only in shoe manufacturing but also in its supplier industry. Analysing the 
cluster’s performance in the 1990s, Schmitz (1995, p.11) writes, “Roughly speaking, for every 
job in shoe manufacturing, there is a job in the local supplier industry,” the latter consisting of 
jobs in the local cattle ranching sector and in firms producing uppers, soles, heels, insoles, 
insocks, shanks, glues, nails, eyelets and dyes.  
 So the lack of backward linkages is not what has been the problem with the Sinos Valley 
shoe cluster. Rather, it has been an issue of power structures in the GVC that shoe producers 
in the cluster participated in. The Sinos Valley cluster mostly sold its shoes to buyers based in 
the US, who supplied large US chain stores. This started as early as the 1960s, when these 
buyers started targeting suppliers in the cluster that could deliver larger volumes of 
standardised products. The larger firms were able to meet the new requirements, experiencing 
increases in product quality in the process.  
The early 1990s saw the rise of rival Chinese producers and downward pressure on 
prices (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). By that time, shoe manufacturers in the Sinos Valley 
cluster had built up 3 decades of experience in the global footwear industry, and one would 
expect that some of the manufacturers in the cluster would move further up the value chain to 
marketing and design, where rents were better protected. This did not happen however, as 1) 
large producers in the cluster were reluctant to move to areas of design and marketing for fear 
of retaliation from the cluster’s main buyers, which represented nearly 40 per cent of the total 
cluster exports and 2) US buyers did not diffuse their capabilities in design and marketing. The 
cluster simply got stuck selling shoes to the Americans at declining prices. 
So this example shows that it is perfectly possible for firms (or even entire industries) 
to become locked into a low-value added activity as a result of power structures within the 
chain. 
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3.3.2.2 GVC expansion and the profit squeeze for developing countries 
 
As seen thus far, the expansion of GVCs brings with it plenty of opportunities but has produced 
different outcomes largely because of different policy interventions. On average, East Asia has 
been more successful than other regions of developing countries. However, regardless of policy 
interventions, the expansion of GVCs brings with it inherent challenges for developing 
countries. This section will discuss two important challenges in this respect, both of which are 
contributing to a profit squeeze for developing countries One is the expansion and 
consolidation of power by TNCs, especially by those based in the West (as already mentioned 
in section 3.2.1), which allows these TNCs to appropriate increasing shares of profits. Another 
is the ‘race to the bottom’ by developing countries—the expansion of GVCs has (partly) 
resulted in a massive increase in the global supply of unskilled labour over the last decade, 
causing increased competition in especially light manufacturing industries. Together, these two 
developments are causing downward pressure on profits and prices in the products/parts of 
GVCs that developing countries are specialising in.  
 
3.3.2.2.1 ‘Cannibalised’ by TNCs 
 
Section 3.2.1 showed that there has been a steady global expansion and consolidation of TNCs 
since the 1990s. These TNCs are predominantly based in the West. Of the top 100 companies 
in the world, as ranked by market value by the Financial Times in 2014, only eight are from 
developing countries —six from China, one from Brazil and one from Russia (FT, 2014). Of 
these eight, only one is outside the oil or banking sectors, the Brazilian beverage company 
Ambev.  
Not a single African firm makes the list of the top 100 companies in the world. While 
it comes as no surprise that African firms are not big players on the global stage, more 
unexpectedly, they play a marginal role on their own continent as well, largely because of the 
increasing market shares that TNCs from predominantly the West are gaining in Africa. While 
detailed aggregate data on the role of TNCs versus the role of domestic firms in Africa is hard 
to come by, a recent ranking of the largest domestic firms in Africa (see Table 3.5) can help us 
draw some conclusions. In the SSA region excluding South Africa (SSAXSA countries)—
made up of 47 countries and often considered to most accurately represent Africa in an 
aggregate manner, at least when talking about the continent from an economic point of view—
Flour Mills of Nigeria, an agribusiness company, is the largest outside the extractive industries. 
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The fact that it ranks as low as 95 illustrates the marginalised role that domestic firms in 
SSAXSA countries play outside the extractive industries. By contrast, the largest agribusiness 
company in Europe, Nestle, ranked 9 of all companies in the world in the same year, with an 
estimated turnover of $100.6 billion, 63 times larger than Flour Mills of Nigeria. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Africa’s largest companies ranked by turnover, 2013 
Rank Company Country Sector Turnover Net profits 
1 Sonatrach Algeria Petroleum $72bn $9bn 
2 Sonangol Angola Petroleum $33.3bn $3.1bn 
3 Sasol S. Africa Chemicals $17.5bn $2.4bn 
4 MTN Group S. Africa Telecoms $15bn $2.5bn 
5 The Bidvest Group S. Africa Diversified $14.6bn $0.4bn 
6 Eskom S. Africa Electricity $14.1bn $1.6bn 
7 Shoprite Holdings S. Africa Retail $8.9bn $0.3bn 
8 Vodacom Group S. Africa Telecoms $8.2bn $1.2bn 
9 Imperial Holdings S. Africa Diversified $7.9bn $0.3bn 
10 De Beers Consolidated 
Mines 
S. Africa Mining $7.4bn $1bn 
….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. 
95 Flour Mills of Nigeria Nigeria Agribusiness $1.6bn $0.05bn 
Source: Africa Report (2013) 
 
 
 Outside the extractive industries, foreign companies account for practically all 
investments of any significant size in Africa, which explains why African firms themselves are 
more or less invisible. A most recent case in point is the stakes bought by Danone (the world’s 
biggest yogurt company, based in France) in Africa’s major dairy companies. In 2014, it bought 
a 40 per cent stake of Brookside Dairy Limited, East Africa’s largest milk company, giving 
Danone access to over 140,000 milk farms across the East African region. Beyond this 
acquisition, the company has also set plans to raise its stake in the Moroccan dairy company 
Centrale Laitiere to more than 90 per cent. Centrale Laitiere holds a 60 per cent share of the 
Moroccan dairy market (UNECA, 2015). With respect to the African food and retail industry, 
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UNECA (2015) writes:  
 
Transnational foreign-owned firms in the longer run are not far from taking full control 
of almost all profit-making opportunities at the expense of the (…) weak African 
smallholder agriculture, totally crowding out along the way the emergence of 
indigenous-owned food giants or branded agribusiness (…) there is urgent need to see 
African governments intervene to prevent emerging success stories of the indigenous 
food sector be financially cannibalised and owned across Africa by the most financially 
endowed firms in the food and retail industry (UNECA, 2015, pp.108-109). 
 
How, precisely, is this a problem for developing countries? The consolidation and 
global expansion of TNCs that has been evidenced in this section and in section 3.2.1 means 
that a tremendous amount of power lies in the hands of very few companies based in the West. 
In essence, the type of globalisation we have witnessed in the last three decades has resulted in 
a small number of actors appropriating increasing shares of profits—accruing from 
technological dominance (fortified by strong protection of intellectual property rights), brand 
name recognition, and privileged access to low-cost capital—over a larger market.  
The technological dominance of these companies is tacit in nature, and act as natural 
barriers to entry. They offshore parts of the results of their innovations (that is, use them to 
produce things abroad) but not the innovative capabilities themselves, locating almost all their 
technology-creating activities in their home countries. Relatively little R&D, other than lower-
level support laboratories, tend to be relocated to developing countries (Dicken, 2011). This 
trend was actually observed as early as the 1960s by Raymond Vernon. In his product life-
cycle theory, he argued that products have a cycle of globalisation, with (mass) production 
eventually being offshored to poorer countries, with the richer countries retaining much of the 
profits (Vernon, 1966). 
Unsurprisingly, the last few decades of increased offshoring have coincided with 
increased corporate profits as share of national income in almost all major industrialised 
countries. Milberg and Winkler (2013) find that US corporate profits as a percentage of 
corporate gross value added increased from 23 per cent to 32 per cent from 1970 to 2010, while 
at the same time, US goods imports from low - and middle-income countries as a percentage 
of total goods imports increased from 10 per cent to over 50 per cent. TNCs based in the West 
are basically growing their profit shares from intangible activities that are increasingly 
knowledge - and skill-based.  
Especially branding is becoming a key strategy through which these TNCs make 
profits. We are seeing this most importantly in industries in which production technology is 
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now standardized, like apparel, footwear, consumer electronics and to some extent 
automobiles. For example, in the car industry, production technologies are now widely shared. 
In the words of Ford Chairman William Clay Ford Jr., “It’s easy to build a car. It’s harder to 
build a brand” (Davis, 2009, p.200). Some brand power is associated with considerable 
technological design content (such as Apple), but the maintenance of brand loyalty is usually 
the main source of rent generation (think about the marketing and advertising efforts by Nike).   
Moving on to the ‘tangible realm’ (as opposed to the ‘intangible realm’; e.g. branding, 
design and retail) we see that those companies possessing capabilities only in parts of the value 
chains with low entry barriers are losing out. For example, in the coffee industry, producing 
countries (growers and exporters) appropriated half of the total income of the final retail price 
of processed coffee (roasted and ground) until the mid-1980s. When the farm-gate prices of 
coffee crashed in the early 1990s, retail prices of processed coffee stayed the same, shrinking 
the income share of producing countries. This change was driven by increased market power 
of the largest coffee TNCs, who controlled marketing and distribution links. Today, 90 per cent 
of the total income from coffee, calculated as the average retail price of a pound of processed 
coffee, goes to the countries where the TNCs have their home base (UNECA, 2013).  
We are seeing a similar trend in low-technology labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries. According to Kaplinsky (2005), after sustained growth in the prices of globally 
traded manufactures until the early 1980s, we have witnessed an aggregate relative decline in 
these prices, most significantly for those exported by developing countries. On a more detailed 
level, using trade data between 1988 and 2001, he finds that: 1) the percentage of manufactures 
exported to the EU with negative price trends are significantly higher among those 
manufactured goods that come from low-income and lower-middle-income countries than 
those that come from upper-middle-income and high-income countries; and 2) a higher share 
of resource-based and low-technology manufacturing sectors have experienced negative global 
price trends compared to medium-technology and high-technology manufacturing sectors. 
Using more recent data, Milberg and Winkler (2013) find a similar trend by looking at the price 
of US manufactured imports that predominantly come from developing countries. They find 
that clothing, footwear, textiles, furniture and toys have all experienced import price declines 
in the US (relative to US consumer prices) over two decades of more than 1 per cent per year 
on average, or 40 per cent in the period from 1986 to 2006. 
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3.3.2.2.2 A race to the bottom and a fallacy of composition 
 
Part of the reason for the relative price decline in goods that developing countries are exporting 
can be explained by the asymmetric power relationship within GVCs: TNCs/lead firms based 
predominantly in the West are retaining the most profitable segments of value chains over a 
larger market, thus making it more difficult for firms based in developing countries to do 
anything different than that which is based on cheap labour. 
Another factor contributing to this relative price decline is the increased competition 
among these countries. With greater participation of China and other Southeast Asian countries 
in the global economy, the developing country share of low-tech manufacturing exports has 
almost tripled since 1980 and the global pool of unskilled labour has doubled since 1990 
(Kaplinksy and Morris, 2001; Kaplinsky 2005, 2013).  
Lin (2013) argues that China’s wages will eventually rise, giving a window of 
opportunity for lower-income countries, especially in Africa, to enter low-technology 
manufacturing industries. However, the low-wage labour capacity in the Asian production 
system is far from exhausted. Countries like Bangladesh, India and Vietnam have developed 
better capabilities to take over after China than what most African countries currently have. 
Alongside untapped capacity in the Asian production system, the number of people 
looking for unskilled work in Africa is also rapidly increasing. Africa’s population is growing 
at an alarming rate—by 2030, the continent is expected to have 1.6 billion people. With the 
current youth bulge in Africa, an estimated 800 million of these are expected to be eligible for 
work in 2030, compared to 460m in 2010 (Fengler and Rowden, 2013). As mentioned in 
chapter 2, the majority of the current working population in Africa end up in vulnerable jobs, 
which means that a colossal number of jobs would have to relocate from Asia to Africa to 
absorb this surplus. So the global competition in low-technology manufacturing looks only 
likely to solidify, with what seems like an endless supply of cheap labour in Asia and especially 
Africa in the years to come. 
Therefore, TNCs from high-income countries are likely to continue to enjoy a ‘race to 
the bottom’ among developing countries—declining global wages as a consequence of an 
abundant supply of unskilled labour in those countries. At the same time, developing countries 
are likely to suffer from a ‘fallacy of composition’—many of them entering the production of 
low-technology manufacturing goods in the belief that it will significantly boost their export 
earnings, only to find out that the earnings are nowhere as high as expected, as the prices of 
those goods have fallen exactly because so many countries have started producing them.  
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3.4 Implications for industrial policy  
 
3.4.1 General applicability of industrial policy and the importance of learning from 
history 
 
Industrial policy is ultimately formulated at the national level. As such, it would and should 
look different from country to country, based on social, political and economic circumstances. 
But this does not mean that useful generalisations cannot be made—this thesis is certainly 
attempting to make some. And by doing so, it is clear that the proposed tools in this section 
should not serve as a blueprint for all 54 countries in Africa. As mentioned in the introduction, 
the focus on Africa is not motivated by the fact that all countries are part of the same continent. 
Rather, it is an observation that most African countries share the same economic structural 
characteristics—they are low-income, they are largely dependent on exports of unprocessed 
agricultural goods and natural resources and they reveal an acute lack of manufacturing and 
other production activities that embed higher levels of technology. Certainly, the industrial 
policies proposed in this section are equally applicable to low-income countries outside of the 
African continent that share similar production characteristics. Many would actually be 
applicable more generally to middle income countries too, as all developing countries share the 
challenge of catching up with the global technological frontier and are engaged in investment 
and trading relationships with richer countries (and companies from those countries) that have 
far more bargaining power than them. 
 Additionally, the importance of the industrial policy tools mentioned in the previous 
chapter cannot be understated. The chapter analysed a range of such tools, focusing on tariffs 
and subsidies (direct and indirect); strategic credit allocation through state-funded lending; the 
establishment of SOEs to enter risky industries that require large capital outlays; and policies 
to maximise domestic linkages and coordinate investments between interdependent industries.  
This general taxonomy of industrial policies is a result of studying the historical 
contexts of their successful implementations. Today’s industrial policy plans are rarely 
formulated out of thin air but usually have elements of inspiration from previously successful 
(or failed) industrial policy experiences. For example, in the late 1980s, many of the leaders of 
today’s ruling coalition in Ethiopia, the EPRDF, read books on South Korean industrial policy 
while fighting a guerrilla war against the ruling communist regime (Weis, 2016b). According 
to the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who ruled Ethiopia from 1995 to 2012, taking 
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inspiration from the East Asian experience has been crucial for Ethiopia’s industrial policy 
formulation since the early 2000s (the next chapter will discuss Ethiopia’s industrial policy 
regime in greater detail). 
However, with the expansion of GVCs since the 1990s, certain tools have arguably 
become more critical than they were before, especially those that relate to international trade 
and investment—those that have been referred to as GVC-oriented industrial policies in this 
chapter. We now turn our attention to them.   
 
3.4.2 GVC-oriented industrial policies 
 
In the African context, AfDB-OECD-UNDP (2014) emphasises five key considerations that 
must guide policy measures in the era of GVCs: 1) Policies must be value-chain-specific and 
provide the best environment for developing/integrating into the identified value chain with the 
most potential. 2) Making the most of value chains implies trade-offs, as prioritising one sector 
over another creates winners and losers. 3) Entrepreneurship and collaboration between the 
public and private sector is crucial, and requires strong business associations. 4) The power 
and ownership of a GVC can determine which pathways to productivity growth are open and 
which are not. For example, upgrading to higher-value processing activities may not be feasible 
in certain GVCs due to the tight control of processing activities that is retained by large 
manufacturers, such as in the global coffee or cocoa industry. 5) Low-road strategies in GVCs 
risk a ‘race to the bottom’. Therefore, when African countries attract foreign firms in order to 
integrate themselves into GVCs, they must also focus on creating skills and domestic 
productive capabilities for upgrading within GVCs.  
 These five considerations are supremely important, but most of them were arguably 
equally relevant 50 years ago, and thereby do not point out if or how industrial policy needs to 
adjust to the new era of globalisation. Point 4 is an exception. As we have seen, the proliferation 
of GVCs has entailed a rise in global power of the largest TNCs, which has restricted options 
open to developing countries in terms of creating their own GVCs—for example, the creation 
of its own automobile or electronics GVCs by South Korea (more on this later). 
Milberg et al. (2014) more instructively discuss how industrial policy must be changed 
in an era of GVC expansion. I mentioned their three points in the introduction, which serve as 
a useful basis for a general discussion of GVC-oriented industrial policies.  
 
 124 
3.4.2.1 Vertically specialised industrialisation or developing fully integrated production 
structures? 
 
To recap, the first two points of Milberg et. al. (2014) were: 1) industrial policy must shift from 
the traditional stance aimed at developing fully integrated production structures (i.e. the entire 
industry domestically), to a stance focusing on moving into higher-valued tasks associated with 
a certain industry; and 2) while traditional industrial policy may have included protection of 
domestic industry, success in the era of GVC expansion requires easy and cheap access to 
imports, in particular for necessary intermediates.  
These two points are interrelated—specialising in a segment of an industry rather than 
developing fully integrated production structures largely means being more liberal with 
imported inputs. Engaging in this type of vertical specialisation, rather than hosting a fully 
integrated chain, can indeed bring about economic benefits. Many East Asian countries, as we 
have seen previously in this chapter from the examples of South Korea, Taiwan and in 
particular China, have achieved some success from principally manufacturing assembly 
activities. Taking advantage of its large pool of low-wage English-speaking workforce, India 
has also reaped benefits from specialising in particular segments of global service industries 
(e.g., call centres for IT companies or banks and back offices of airlines). 
Particularly in the GVC era, FDI attraction for developing countries has almost become 
synonymous with niche specialisation (mainly in manufacturing industries). When doing so, if 
a liberal stance towards importing intermediate inputs is not already a requirement by foreign 
companies, failing to have it makes it almost impossible to attract FDI, as foreign buyers can 
largely ‘pick and choose’ which country to outsource to in a world where cheap labour is more 
easily accessible and plentiful than before. Even 60 years ago, when this was not the case, we 
saw how Taiwan made a strenuous effort to woo foreign investors by offering 100 per cent 
foreign ownership, guarantees against expropriation and five-year tax holidays.    
Staritz et. al. (2016) provide the example of the apparel industry and shows that, first 
of all, it is difficult for one country to produce all the types of fabric and yarn that that country 
needs in its apparel production, especially if there is a contract with a huge Western buyer that 
demands a large variety of clothes. Second, lead firms in the industry tend to have a range of 
suppliers that do different things, and often prefer to have a range of designated textile suppliers 
that export their products to apparel suppliers in other countries.  
Furthermore, a strategy focusing on niche specialisation is far easier for countries with 
lower levels of technology and skills and provides a quick route to creating jobs and earning 
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foreign exchange. As we have seen through various examples in this chapter, almost all the 
cases of niche-specialisation, regardless of the long-term result on the development of domestic 
productive capabilities, have been successful in generating export earnings and local 
employment, especially those doing so through the set-up of EPZs. 
However, the benefits of specialising in segments of GVCs are limited, especially those 
which use cheap labour and low levels of technology. As Milberg et. al. (2014) actually 
emphasise, call-centres and other service activities that India has come to specialise in are low-
skill-based and have not brought about much technological upgrading. In countries like South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, vertical specialisation only brought about benefits because they 
used it as a basis for building higher-level productive capabilities, including especially 
nationally-controlled GVCs (e.g., electronics in South Korea or Taiwan) and at that as a part 
of ambitious industrial policy strategies. Malaysia is said to be in a ‘middle-income trap’ 
because it has not been able to use its GVC participation for productive-capability upgrading 
as much as South Korea, Taiwan or Singapore have done (Cherif and Hasanov, 2015). China 
is still struggling to achieve high domestic content in high-technology manufacturing, even 
though it is close to acquiring control over full-fledged GVCs in textiles, apparel, and consumer 
electronics. We also saw the examples of many Latin American countries that became stuck in 
low value added activities because of GVC participation.  
The key point here is that a careful balance needs to be struck between the benefits that 
vertical specialisation and a liberal trading regime can bring about, and the need to develop 
domestic productive capabilities. We saw how in the case of South Korea and Taiwan, they 
carefully balanced the need to import intermediate inputs and capital goods with the strategy 
of developing a domestic supplier industry. But too many of today’s low income countries are 
failing to strike this balance, particularly neglecting the need to create backward linkages to 
the domestic production of inputs needed for manufacturing activities. Unconditional FDI 
attraction policies may lead to employment creation and export earnings, but are not sufficient 
to ensure a domestic supplier industry. Kaplinsky and Morris (2016) distinguish between the 
two different strategies as ‘thinning’ (vertical specialisation) and ‘thickening’ (creating 
domestic linkages). They argue that for low and middle-income countries, the thickening 
strategy is relatively more important.   
Coming back to the example of the apparel industry, Staritz et. al. (2016) argue that for 
a host country to transform its domestic industry through FDI attraction, it is crucial to build 
linkages to input industries. While it is difficult, and not necessary, to produce all inputs 
domestically, there are possibilities to produce at least some, such as cotton. This is important 
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not only for the linkage perspective, but it also benefits the foreign company in that it reduces 
lead times when certain inputs can be sourced domestically.  
From this point of view, Ethiopia—arguably the most successful African country in 
nascent stages of industrial transformation—is going in the right direction when it declares that 
a central goal of its industrial policy is to reduce its dependence on imported inputs in the 
highly prioritised manufacturing industries, textiles and leather products. Such a policy stance 
is taken, among other things, in order to create better linkages to the supplier industries 
(Ethiopia has Africa’s largest livestock population and good opportunities for cotton 
cultivation), to avoid using scarce foreign exchange reserves on importing inputs, and to reduce 
the risk of foreign firms relocating their production activities to other countries, as frequently 
happens in these type of labour intensive manufacturing-industries. 
Clearly, for this to happen, industrial policy must play a role, examples being tariffs on 
imported inputs and local content requirements. The latter is now prohibited by the WTO,47 
but to some degree remains a policy option for LDCs. And not all African countries are 
members of the WTO (such as Ethiopia), and can therefore legally use them. However, as 
mentioned, putting requirements on foreign investors to use local inputs is not easy in a global 
context where possible sourcing locations are abundant, and would be less contested if 
introduced more informally through negotiations with foreign investors. UNECA (2013) 
suggests that the host country puts requirements on the foreign firm to report regularly on local 
sourcing and the degree of local value added, including a clear ‘roll-out’ plan for future local 
sourcing. “Such a mechanism is likely to focus the minds of their chief executives, engender a 
climate of moral enforceability and help to encourage local linkages” (UNECA, 2013, p.244).  
But it is not as if the wheel has to be reinvented. A current example to draw inspiration 
from could be Brazil’s ‘Inovar Auto’ program, which aims to develop a domestic automotive 
industrial base by incentivising foreign automotive firms to use inputs from local suppliers by 
granting tax exemptions depending on the degree of local sourcing (Pascoal et al. 2014). 
Another example would be Bangladesh, which has achieved considerable success in creating 
backward linkages in the manufacturing of knit apparel by granting firms cash subsidies for 
exports made from locally produced yarn and fabrics (Staritz and Frederick, 2012). 
																																																						
47 The regulations on tariffs for WTO members are somewhat more complicated than that of local content 
requirements. The WTO works towards lowering tariffs worldwide, and all WTO members are required to bind 
(that is, set the upper limit on) at least some of their tariffs. But some countries (many of them in Africa) have yet 
to bind their tariffs. This means that there is some ’water’ in the tariff profiles of African countries - the difference 
between bound and applied tariffs. Additionally, many of the countries that have bound their tariffs have done so 
at quite high levels.  
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Furthermore, the cases of both South Korea and Taiwan that I provided earlier in this chapter 
serve as useful examples for how to bargain with foreign investors by striking a balance with 
handing out financial incentives to attract them, but at the same time inducing them to source 
inputs locally. 
 
3.4.2.2 Linking up to TNCs or challenging them?  
 
3.4.2.2.1 How far up the value chain and how ambitious? 
 
The third point of Milberg et. al. (2014) was that whereas traditional industrial policy sought 
to build domestic capacity in order to eventually compete with leading TNCs, industrial policy 
nowadays should focus more on negotiating and linking up to TNCs, as the issues facing firms 
and governments these days requires moving up through the chain of production of a particular 
commodity or set of commodities. 
This is perhaps the most valid one, and is similar to point 4 made by AfDB-OECD-
UNDP (2014). Some of these benefits have already been mentioned in the previous section—
linking up to TNCs can provide quick stimulus to export earnings, it can create jobs and 
stimulate a local supplier industry. 
An issue so far not explicitly discussed in this section though is that of technology 
transfer from foreign companies,48 more specifically the extent to which low-income countries 
are able to develop locally owned capabilities in the manufacturing activity at hand (not only 
the inputs, which were discussed above, but all the way to the finalised product) through linking 
up to TNCs. An increasingly common model in many low-income countries, especially in 
BDVCs, is that a Western brand name or retailer (a lead firm) identifies an outsourcing 
location, and does not subcontract directly to national producers in that country but facilitates 
the entry of suppliers from a slightly higher income country, for example China, to carry out 
production. A critical question is whether the low-income countries are able to induce 
technological spillovers and eventually build up nationally owned manufacturing firms. In 
other words, should domestic firms move up the GVC only insofar the TNCs would allow them 
to or should they eventually aim to challenge the production activity initially carried out by 
TNCs in the host country?   
																																																						
48 Only implicitly discussed because it was not mentioned that local content requirements can be a way of 
transferring technology from foreign firms to local suppliers. For example, in Taiwan, the local content 
requirements on Singer Sewing Company encouraged the company to assist local suppliers in raising the quality 
of their products.  
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This is where GVC-oriented industrial policies come into the picture. One way of 
inducing technological spillovers can be through joint ventures between domestic and foreign 
owned partners. The idea is that this will give domestic partners easier access to higher-level 
technologies. We saw how this was the case in the South Korean joint ventures with the 
Japanese in the textile industry, not only for learning production techniques but also for 
acquiring managerial and international marketing skills. Another way could be to encourage 
the conduct of R&D in the host country. In the 1970s, Taiwan, for example, did this by offering 
foreign companies tax write-offs on R&D activities. A third way can be through human capital 
requirements, say to reach an agreement with a foreign company on an increasing share of local 
employees in technical and managerial positions after a certain number of years. Training 
programmes should also be initiated, one way being to send local employees to model factories 
of TNCs’ home countries. But it is also important to construct TVET programmes in the host 
country that match the skills demands of foreign companies, either through industry-specific 
training institutes or in higher education institutions. In Singapore, TVET programmes were 
run and established as collaborative ventures between the government and overseas partners. 
Additionally, clustering foreign and domestic firms together increases the chance of labour 
mobility between the foreign and domestic workforce. 
But even if a host country manages to develop nationally owned capabilities in all of 
its manufacturing activities, from the inputs needed in production to the finalised end product, 
will that be enough for sustained economic development? It definitely goes a long way, yes, 
but as I have shown, especially in the GVC era, profits in the manufacturing segment of GVCs 
are becoming increasingly squeezed, especially in the low-tech segment.  
This is why industrial policy-makers should pay attention to the possibility of upgrading 
not just through the development of capabilities to physically produce goods but also through 
the development of producer services, such as design, marketing, and branding. Government 
support for capability developments in these producer services, especially for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), should most importantly include subsidies and public 
service provision for export marketing and design. And in this sense, it is not as much as linking 
up to TNCs as it is about challenging them. For low-income countries this might seem like a 
thankless task given the global foothold that Western TNCs have established in the area of 
producer services, spending billions on R&D to maintain brand loyalty, and on design and 
marketing (just think about Apple and Nike). However, it is not impossible. Sammy Ethiopia, 
an Ethiopia-based company specialising in hand-woven textiles and garments, is doing just 
that.  Their products are spun, woven, dyed and embroidered using techniques stemming from 
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old Ethiopian traditions, but also designed and branded by the company. They export their 
products to high-end retailers in Australia, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. Although it is 
questionable whether an operation like this can be duplicated with more modern techniques 
(Sammy Ethiopia’s products are largely marketed based on the fact that they are hand-made), 
it is a good example of something African that sells in Western markets, completely ‘made in 
Africa’, and is a testament for the potential of African brands in the West.  
Another prominent example from Ethiopia would be Solerebels, an Ethiopian footwear 
brand that sells shoes and sandals made from Ethiopian leather and recycled car tyres. Just like 
Sammy Ethiopia, their products are handcrafted and incorporate Ethiopian artisan traditions 
and designs, but with twists that bear more resemblance to Western products. Unlike Sammy 
Ethiopia, Solerebels actually have their own retail stores abroad, in Spain, the US, Switzerland, 
Singapore and Taiwan. In addition to branding their products as something uniquely Ethiopian, 
Solerebels is also trying to appeal to a growing fair-trade and eco-friendly consumerism in 
Westerns markets. The company claims zero carbon footprints and is fair trade certified.  
Industrialisation strategies in African countries aiming to immediately compete in 
producer services, where large TNCs have an immense competitive advantage, might seem 
overly ambitious, but being ambitious and doing things that are not aligned with one’s 
‘comparative advantage’ is exactly what has characterised the really successful catch-up 
economies. In the early 1960s, there was little to indicate that Japan would be one of the world’s 
largest automobile manufacturers, yet the country protected its automobile industry for nearly 
four decades. For another example, could anyone have predicted that Nokia would be famous 
for cell-phones, when it had to cross-subsidise its electronics division for nearly 17 years before 
making a profit (Lin and Chang, 2009)? Similarly, in the mid-1960s, the World Bank strongly 
advised the South Korean government against starting a steel industry, as it was not aligned 
with the country’s current comparative advantage. The government did not heed that advice, 
took on the risk by setting up a steel SOE (POSCO), and as a result, South Korea has become 
one of the world’s largest steel producers (Wade, 2012). African countries and other low-
income countries should not completely deviate from current comparative advantage, but these 
examples show that risk-taking and going for activities and industries that seem far out of reach 
can yield significant benefits in the long run.     
   
3.4.2.2.2 Learning about end markets and varieties of value chains 
 
While challenging TNCs is ultimately necessary to capture profitable segments of value chains, 
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including in the area of producer services, connecting to TNCs in the meantime can be valuable 
in terms of learning about standards and preferences that are required by consumers and firms 
in end markets, and not just in terms of learning about technologies and management practices.  
 Lead firms in GVCs often have home bases to which firms in low-income countries are 
trying export their products, and so, when lead firms specify the exact characteristics of what 
their suppliers should produce and how they should produce it, this can allow the low-income 
country firm to learn about the nature of markets in those countries. With growing product 
differentiation and increased consumer awareness of social and environmental concerns, 
quality standards set by lead firms for their suppliers are a key mechanism through which 
suppliers learn about producing things for consumers in higher-income countries (Gereffi et 
al., 2011; Gereffi and Lee, 2012). These standards can induce firms to improve the quality of 
their products and upgrade production management—we saw earlier in this chapter how this 
type of technology acquisition was very important for many SME’s in Taiwan.  
 However, it should be born in mind that the specifications from lead firms’ do not 
always lead to more technology-intensive activities. TNCs normally make sure that the 
activities that are outsourced do not encroach on the high-earning core competences of lead 
firms. The case of the Sinos Valley shoe cluster in Brazil discussed earlier is a perfect example.  
Another interesting observation is that connecting to lead firms with home bases in 
different markets often leads to different outcomes in terms of the type of capabilities that are 
developed, which goes to show that knowing the end market matters. For instance, in the 
apparel industry, US buyers tend to demand high volumes of very basic products from their 
suppliers, with relatively low ‘design intensity’. Asian suppliers from Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Kenya follow these requirements. On the other hand, EU buyers tend to require smaller orders, 
higher fashion content, and prefer more design intensive products. Supplier firms in Mauritius 
and Madagascar follow this model, and hence adopt a different production style (Morris et. al., 
2011). 
However, linking up to TNCs is not the only way to improve knowledge of foreign 
markets. Establishing (or linking up to) trading companies that connect buyers and sellers but 
do not produce any goods, can also be a way. For example, the relationship with Japanese 
trading companies, and later the establishment of national trading companies, was crucial for 
the South Korean export strategy in the US. Especially in the light-manufacturing sector, where 
a lot of initiative lies with the importer of a product, and not the exporter, links to importers, 
their trust, and their satisfaction reigns supreme.  
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3.5 Summary and conclusion 
 
Since the 1990s, falling transport costs, advances in communication and information 
technology and lowered trade and investment barriers have led to the globalisation and 
fragmentation of production networks. These complex, borderless business networks are 
popularly referred to as GVCs. 
 The GVC era has created a buzz in the development community, leading some to claim 
that, “The country-centric view of trade no longer reflects reality…Global value chains offer 
new opportunities for structural transformation in Africa” (AfDB-OECD-UNDP, 2014, p.124). 
There seems to be an established belief among scholars who have long studied development 
and industrialisation issues from the perspective of GVCs (the GVC lens) that industrial policy 
for developing countries in the GVC era has to take a different form compared to the ‘old’ style 
policies that characterised the development path of the Asian tigers. Most importantly, the 
GVC lens calls for an approach to industrial policy that 1) shifts its ‘traditional’ stance from 
aiming to develop fully integrated production structures, to one focusing on specialised tasks 
associated with a certain industry, and 2) focuses more on linking up to TNCs, in contrast to 
traditional industrial policy, which emphasised building up domestic capacity in order to 
eventually compete with TNCs. 
 In line with the GVC lens, I have recognised that the aspect of industrial policy focusing 
on attracting FDI and linking up to TNCs is more important now than before the 1990s. Also 
in line with the GVC lens, I have acknowledged the increased importance that niche 
specialisation (such as assembly manufacturing) is acquiring, especially through activities in 
EPZs (China being the prime example), and that looking at lead firm (TNC) strategies has to 
become of greater importance for industrial policy. 
 But at the same time, I have argued that the buzz around GVCs is something of a hype 
and that the GVC era has not brought about significant qualitative changes for African 
countries (and other developing countries for that matter). The changes are, I argue, rather 
quantitative: a) more offshoring and FDI inflows to developing countries, and b) increasing 
power of TNCs. 
 Building on these observations, I claim that the GVC lens fails to acknowledge the 
important role of policies for GVC participation in the case of the Asian tigers. By adopting a 
Statist lens, I have presented case studies of GVC-oriented industrial policies from roughly 
1960 to 1990 in South Korea and Taiwan (and shorter case studies of other countries), going 
through the literature on industrial policy that looks at policies related to trade and foreign 
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investment; a literature that seems to have been overlooked by the GVC lens in the discussion 
on how industrial policy has to adapt to the GVC era. From this, I conclude that, while 
production networks have indeed become more fragmented since the 1990s, ‘old style’ 
industrial policy still holds relevance. 
 First of all, I show that GVC participation has been a part of these countries’ 
industrialisation strategy. Both South Korea and Taiwan participated in global production 
networks, especially in light manufacturing industries, controlled by Japanese and US firms. A 
telling example is that Nike outsourced almost all its shoe production to Taiwan and South 
Korea in the early 1980s.  
 Second, using especially these two countries as models to study for today’s African 
countries (and other developing countries), I looked at the GVC-oriented industrial policies 
implemented, and concluded that, while niche specialisation and linking up to TNCs rather 
than challenging them has played a vital part of successful industrialisation strategies, policies 
to build domestically owned GVCs (vertically integrated industries) are ultimately what 
separates the really successful late-industrialisers from many of today’s countries stuck in 
‘middle-income traps’. Therefore, the discussion on industrial policy in the GVC era should in 
greater detail include policies for increasing local content and technology transfer. In particular, 
the encouragement of technology transfer would involve requirements on foreign firms to set 
up R&D facilities and education/skills programs; and joint venture requirements, preferably 
with the host economy having a majority stake. As the cases of Taiwan and South Korea show, 
financial incentives were often handed out in return for fulfilling these requirements.  
 Three cases in Latin America—Mexico, Dominican Republic and Brazil—were shown 
to support these conclusions. Using different industries in each case, they showed how FDI 
attraction without requirements for building domestic productive capabilities has caused low-
value added ‘traps’ in their respective GVCs. 
 I also showed how the expansion of GVCs has resulted in a relative price decline of 
low-tech manufactured goods, especially those exported by developing countries. Two 
developments have produced this result: 1) TNCs in the West are consolidating and expanding, 
appropriating profits in the producer services segment over a larger market, and 2) The 
competition between developing countries in especially low-tech manufacturing has become 
incredibly fierce, with the global pool of unskilled labour more than doubling since 1990. 
 Therefore, I also suggested that African countries have to become more serious about 
formulating industrial policy that aims to build capabilities in producer services. This may 
sound overly ambitious for African countries, but I have provided the examples of two 
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Ethiopian firms that have managed to do so. On a related note to ambitiousness, I also 
emphasised the point that those countries who were really successful with industrial policy 
were mostly deemed overambitious in early phases of development, like for example South 
Korea (steel), Japan (automobiles) and Finland (cell phones).  
 Lastly, I looked at the importance of learning about end markets for export-oriented 
strategies. In this sense, linking up to TNCs can be useful. In the apparel industry, we saw that 
US and EU buyers tend to demand different specifications from their suppliers, shaping the 
type of capabilities developed among supplier firms (and countries). However, there are 
alternative ways of going about this. For example, in the case of South Korea, linking up to 
Japanese trading companies that connected US buyers with Korean companies were a way of 
learning about consumer preferences in the US market.   
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Chapter 4 
	
Ethiopia’s industrialisation trajectory and GVC-oriented 
industrial policies: the case of the textile and leather industries 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the mid-1980s, Ethiopia pierced the conscience of the world with a devastating famine that 
took the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The image of Ethiopia as Africa’s drought 
and famine-stricken country in need of salvation, portrayed in a 1984 BBC television report, 
still sticks for many people. But in recent years the narrative has started to change. It seems 
like the vision of Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s strongman from 1991 until his death in 2012, of an 
Ethiopia following the fast-paced growth of East Asian countries like South Korea and China, 
is slowly starting to manifest itself. Since 2004—when results from policies of Ethiopia’s first 
national development plan, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme 
(SDPRP), started to materialise—Ethiopia’s economy has been booming. GDP per capita 
skyrocketed from $136 in 2004 to $619 in 2015 (WDI, 2017). While acknowledging that this 
growth has started from a low base, a more than four-fold increase in GDP over a 12-year time 
span is impressive. It translates into an annual GDP per capita growth rate of 7.96 per cent, one 
of the highest in the world in this period. 
 Since coming to power in 1991, Ethiopia’s ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been scrutinised and criticised by the 
international community for its authoritarian style. At the same time, its capable, committed 
and relatively egalitarian state-led development model has been praised. Some now hail 
Ethiopia as Africa’s ‘lion’ (Smith, 2013), a stand-alone success story in a continent where most 
countries’ economic growth rates rise and fall with primary commodity prices (Pilling, 2016). 
They are not wrong in doing so, given that the Ethiopia hype definitely has more to show for 
itself than ‘just’ economic growth. In the past decade, impressive results have been achieved 
in the areas of infrastructure development, education and health. The road network is estimated 
to have quadrupled since 1997; net enrolment in primary schools reached 79 per cent in 2014, 
up from only 19 per cent in 1994; and the average life expectancy has hit 64 years, an 
impressive increase of 12 years since 2000 (Oqubay, 2015).  
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 The infrastructure projects in particular stand out. With help from the Chinese, the 
government has recently completed the construction of a light rail in Addis Ababa (the first 
ever metro in a capital city in Sub-Saharan Africa) and a 756 km railway connecting Addis 
Ababa and several industrial parks in the country to the port in Djibouti. Ethiopia’s Grand 
Renaissance Dam, which is expected to be completed by December 2017, will stand finished 
as the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa. 
  For many, though, it is the anticipation of rapid industrialisation that creates the 
Ethiopia buzz. While MVA as a share of the economy in Ethiopia remains a modest 4.8 per 
cent (MoI, 2016b), manufactured goods exports have grown from $21m to $436m between 
2004 and 2015 (WTO, 2017). A self-proclaimed developmental state inspired by the Asian 
tigers (Clapham, 2015; Oqubay, 2015; Weis, 2016a), Ethiopia has formulated a slew of 
industrial policies, most notably since the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) in 2010 was 
launched.  
Unsurprisingly, scholars have started devoting attention to the industrialisation push, 
some focusing generally on industrial policy and economic performance, (e.g Altenburg 2010; 
Cramer and Chang, 2014; Gebreeyesus, 2013; Oqubay, 2015), some on the politics of 
industrialisation and the ‘developmental state’ (e.g. Clapham, 2015; Weis, 2016a), and others 
on partly successful sector case studies in the Ethiopian context, like the floriculture industry 
(Abebe and Schafer, 2015; Oqubay, 2015), the leather industry (Abebe and Schaefer, 2015; 
2013; Brautigam et. al., 2017; Oqubay, 2015) and the textile industry (Staritz et. al., 2016; 
Staritz and Whitfield, 2017). 
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the scholarly literature on Ethiopia’s 
industrialisation trajectory and industrial policies, but focusing particularly on the rising 
prominence of FDI and GVC participation in Ethiopia’s industrialisation push. FDI inflows 
have surged in Ethiopia in recent years, from $288m in 2010 to $2,168m in 2015 (UNCTAD 
STAT, 2017). It is particularly two highly prioritised labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries, the textile and leather industries,49 that foreign investors are flocking to Ethiopia 
for. According to McKinsey (2015), Ethiopia is now Africa’s most attractive location for 
apparel sourcing, outcompeting African counterparts with low wages and cheap electricity. 
																																																						
49 Throughout this chapter, the textile industry refers to both the process of transforming cotton and synthetic 
fibres into fabric and the process of transforming fabric into most importantly clothes/apparel, but also some other 
textile based products, like towels and bed sheets. The process of transforming fabric into clothes is often known 
as the apparel or garment industry. Similarly, the leather industry refers to both the leather products industry (most 
importantly footwear production, but also the production of other leather products, like belts, bags and wallets) 
and the leather tanning industry (i.e. the process of transforming raw hides and skins to finished leather). When 
necessary, distinctions between the stages of production will be made. 
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And with rising wages in countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam, it is not a long 
shot to predict that Ethiopia will become one of the world’s, if not the world’s, most attractive 
outsourcing destination for these industries.  
Brautigam et. al. (2017) and Staritz et. al. (2016) have paved the way with excellent 
analyses of Ethiopia’s industrialisation push through attracting FDI and inserting itself in the 
GVCs of these two global industries. Building on the previous chapter, this chapter aims to go 
deeper than the two aforementioned papers on if and how the Ethiopian government is using 
industrial policy to build domestic productive capabilities in these two industries through 
participating in GVCs, the results achieved so far, and the prospects for the future. Similar to 
many countries in Latin American that were reviewed in the previous chapter, is Ethiopia likely 
to simply become stuck in low value added activities in the value chains? Or is it doing the 
right things in terms of creating linkages and inducing technology transfer, more in line with 
how the East Asian countries did it? 
This chapter is separated into two parts (each with several subsections). The first one, 
4.2, discusses economic growth, industrialisation and industrial policy in Ethiopia. While the 
manufacturing sector is starting to flourish in Ethiopia, it has not been the main driver of 
economic growth. This section looks at the factors underpinning that growth. But what, then, 
explains the buzz around industrialisation? The explicit commitment by the EPRDF to an 
industrialisation path, in the image of the East Asian industrialisation experience, is part of the 
reason. Another part of the reason are all the policies that the government has been putting in 
place to create a conducive environment for the manufacturing sector to grow. This section 
will also discuss these policies.  
Building on the previous chapter, the second part of this chapter, 4.3, moves on to the 
relevance of GVCs to Ethiopia’s industrialisation. As mentioned, GVC participation and FDI 
attraction has become the crux of policies to develop Ethiopia’s two most highly prioritised 
manufacturing industries–the textile industry and the leather industry. This section examines 
Ethiopia’s motivation behind developing these industries; the structure of the value chains in 
today’s global context and the GVC-oriented firms in Ethiopia; Ethiopia’s export performance 
in these industries; the GVC-oriented policies that the Ethiopian government has formulated to 
develop these industries; the results that the GVC participation strategy has produced in terms 
of the development of domestic productive capabilities; and key challenges for further growth 
of the industries through the GVC participation strategy. 
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4.2 Economic growth, industrialisation and industrial policy in Ethiopia  
 
4.2.1 What are the drivers of Ethiopia’s economic boom? 
 
In the African context, Ethiopia’s economic growth clearly stands out. Figure 1 compares the 
GDP per capita growth rates of Africa’s five fastest growing economies in the period 2004-
2015, excluding countries whose growth has been highly volatile, such as Angola, Cote 
D’Ivore and Nigeria. As mentioned, the average of Ethiopia’s GDP per capita growth rate was 
7.96 per cent in this period. As seen from the figure, there is a significant gap between Ethiopia 
and the second fastest growing economy, Rwanda, whose average GDP per capita growth in 
this period was 4.98 per cent. The growth performance comes across as even more impressive 
when considering that, except for Rwanda, Ethiopia is the only country in Africa whose GDP 
growth has been consistently high for over a decade without relying on a natural resource boom 
(Chang et. al., 2016). The following sub-sections will analyse the drivers of this growth. 
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4.2.1.1 Manufacturing 
 
Part of the growth can be attributed to growth of the manufacturing sector. MVA has grown at 
an annual rate of 11.5 per cent from 2004 to 2015, far outperforming Rwanda (WDI, 2017). 
Manufactured goods exports have grown 21-fold in the same time period, from $21m to 
$436m, largely thanks to the increasing earnings of the textile and leather industries. This 
represents more than a doubling of manufactured goods exports’ share of total merchandise 
exports, which itself has grown from $503m to $3,819m in this time period (WTO, 2017). 
 However, MVA as a share of GDP in Ethiopia remains 4.8 per cent (MoI, 2016b), well 
below the African average of 10 per cent (Chang et. al., 2016). The country scores below the 
ACET 1550 average on most structural transformation indicators, including diversification, 
export competitiveness, productivity, and technological upgrading (ACET, 2014). Chandra 
(2013) benchmarks Ethiopia’s economic performance over the past 30 years against six 
countries that were at similar income levels and shared fundamental economic characteristics 
in the base year51–Bangladesh, China, India, Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR (the most 
similar country being Vietnam, according to Chandra). Of these countries, Ethiopia is the only 
one that has yet to go through a major shift of the economic structure from agriculture to 
manufacturing, as measured by each sector’s share of GDP. Agriculture and services still 
dominate the Ethiopian economy, as seen from Figure 5.2.52 We can also see that, although the 
manufacturing sector has grown in absolute terms, its contribution to GDP has been relatively 
constant over the last 5 years. 
 
																																																						
50 A group of 15 countries in SSA that make up a majority of the region’s GDP, manufacturing and agricultural 
production. They are: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal in West Africa; Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda in East Africa; and Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia in 
Southern Africa.  
51 All were poor, predominantly agricultural economies that exported mostly agricultural commodities and 
minerals, and imported nearly all manufactured goods they consumed.  
52 In the figure, manufacturing is a sub-category of industry. This means that the three categories, agriculture, 
industry and services, together sum up to 100 per cent of the economy.  
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4.2.1.2 Infrastructure investments 
 
Seeing that the manufacturing sector is growing but still not at a point where it is contributing 
significantly to the economy, what factors then underpin this impressive economic boom? 
 Massive federal spending on infrastructure and construction, which has in some part 
boosted growth of especially the agriculture and services sectors, were cited as the most 
important factor in my interviews. More than 40 per cent of the federal budget is spent on 
infrastructure projects, primarily transport and power generation (Oqubay, 2015). The hallmark 
project is the Grand Reneissance Dam (GRD)—a hydroelectric whose construction was started 
in 2011 and is expected to open by the end of 2017. Upon completion, the dam will have a 
yearly production capacity of 6,000 MW, making it the largest hydroelectric plant on the 
African continent and the fifth largest in the world. With a budget of close to $6bn, it is also 
the single largest infrastructure project ever to have been undertaken by an Ethiopian 
government. 
The Dam is financed almost purely domestically, as the World Bank and even the 
Chinese government have been hesitant to fund the project because of ‘hydro-political’ 
sensitivities with Egypt. Seeing the unwillingness of international creditors to become involved 
in the project, the government has encouraged public sector workers and other salaried 
employees to pledge a month’s salary to the project. This has been done by issuing a special 
Renaissance Dam bond that are within the means of domestic savers. The government has also 
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enabled the diaspora community to invest in the project by issuing a version of the bond 
denominated in foreign currencies (Berhane, 2013). This domestic financing scheme has 
largely worked, as purchasing the bond is seen as a civic duty (Weis, 2016a). 
The GRD is not the only hydroelectric project in Ethiopia. In fact, the country has the 
second largest hydropower potential in Africa, after the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Deloitte, 2014), and is steadily increasing its electricity production, 86 per cent of which is 
currently hydroelectric. As seen from Figure 4.3, total electricity production more than doubled 
from 2004 to 2011.  New hydroplants that are contributing to this increase in output include 
Tekeze (300MW), Gilgel Gibe 2 (420MW) and Tana Belese (460MW) (Deloitte, 2014). With 
the completion of the GRD, electricity production is set to increase even more steeply.   
 
 
 
 
 
Transport systems are also highly prioritised. The flagship project in this area is the 
recently inaugurated 756 km railway that connects Addis Ababa and other industrial areas 
(recently built industrial parks, or parks in construction) of Ethiopia to the port in Djibouti. It 
is one of many construction projects in the country built and financed by the Chinese–built by 
the China Railway Group and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, and financed 
through concessional loan arrangements by the Exim Bank of China, the China Development 
Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.  
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source:	Deloitte	(2014)
Figure	4.3:	Ethiopia's	electricity	production	(million	kWh)
 142 
The road network in Ethiopia has also grown at a rapid pace. According to the Ethiopian 
Roads Authority, the road network expanded from 26,550 km to 53,997 km between 1997 and 
2011 (Cramer and Chang, 2014). Current projections put the road network at over 90,000 km 
(Oqubay, 2015). 
These types of infrastructure investments are incredibly important for manufacturing 
development in Ethiopia. Over 90 per cent of firms in the export-oriented manufacturing 
industry that I surveyed cited high logistics costs (specifically referring to the high cost of 
transport of goods to the port in Djibouti and the cost of clearing a container there) as one of 
the key issues they would like the government to address. The recently completed railway that 
connects industrial zones in Ethiopia to the port in Djibouti is built mainly for the purpose of 
easing these logistics costs. 
The boom in construction driven by the federally funded infrastructure investments is 
giving a boost to related economic activities as well. Cement production in Ethiopia has soared, 
growing from 800,000 tons in 1999 to 10m tons in 2012, making Ethiopia the third largest 
cement producer in Africa. The average annual growth of cement was more than twice that of 
the world in this period. Given its capital-intensive nature, the cement industry’s direct 
contribution to employment has been limited; employment in cement factories increased from 
only 1,648 in 1992 to 7,233 in 2012 (Oqubay, 2015). But it has created significant downstream 
employment through forward linkages to downstream cement product manufacturers (concrete 
products and ready mix cement). It has also brought about employment opportunities in 
construction services. This increase in labour demand by the construction industry is ironically 
causing somewhat of a nuisance for other industries that rely on cheap labour: shoe and apparel 
factories around Addis Ababa are reporting problems of high labour-turnover because of the 
slightly higher wages offered by the construction industry (the problem of labour turnover will 
be addressed in section 4.3.7) 
 
4.2.1.3 Services and agriculture  
 
In addition to construction services, many other services are booming as well. These include 
commercial services (wholesale and retail trade); hotels and restaurants; transport; financial 
intermediation; and public services (public administration, social services and health services) 
(World Bank, 2016). Some of the growth of these services can be attributed to high levels of 
state spending on infrastructure, whilst others are related to increased tourism and foreign 
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investment (more on foreign investments later in this chapter). 
Ethiopian Airlines is a remarkable example of services growth in the transport segment. 
The state-owned airline was established decades ago, but started growing rapidly in the late 
2000s, alongside many other state-prioritised development projects (this was the time when 
most industries started experiencing growth, as a result of targeted government action 
articulated in 5-year development plans). From 2013 onwards, no firm in Ethiopia, either public 
or private, has brought in as much foreign exchange as Ethiopian Airlines. In 2015, it became 
Africa’s most profitable airline, serving more than 80 international destinations. From 2011 to 
2016, the number of annual passenger increased from 3.7m to 8.8m and annual net profits 
increased from $100 to $280m (The Economist, 2016). It was recently rated the 6th most 
dependable airline in the world by CBS News (CBS, 2015). 
Growth of the agricultural sector has also been a key driver of growth. The total area of 
cultivated land increased by 2.7 per cent between 2004 and 2014, and annual yields have grown 
at about 7 per cent per annum (World Bank, 2016). Growth in both land use and yield have 
centred around the major cereals (teff, barley, wheat, maize, and sorghum). The reason is that 
since the 1990s, Ethiopia’s agricultural development programs have focused on cereal 
intensification, particularly through the promotion of modern agricultural technologies, most 
importantly the use of chemical fertilizer (Spielman et al., 2010). Fertilizer use has focused on 
cereals because food security is a high priority in Ethiopia. Fertilizer use by smallholder 
farmers increased by 144 per cent between 2004 and 2014 (World Bank, 2016). The Ethiopian 
government has also invested heavily in the provision of rural public services since 2000, 
including rural education and health, rural infrastructure, extension services, and strengthening 
of public agricultural research. 
While much of the productivity increases in agriculture and efforts to strengthen food 
security are related to cereals, a different type of land cultivation practice has been driving 
export growth of the agricultural sector, namely floriculture. Cut flower exports increased from 
three tons in 2003/04 to more than 50,000 tons in 2011/12, with export earnings rising from 
$0.32m to about $200m. From 2007 to 2012, the sector’s employment grew from 25,000 to 
50,484 (Oqubay, 2015). The industry grew from a single firm in 2000 to about 100 firms in 
2014 (World Bank, 2014). The industry has also created indirect jobs through the associated 
expansion of horticulture. Linkage effects have included backward linkages to packaging 
products and forward linkages to cold chain logistics and air transport (Ethiopian Airlines).  
Seeing that between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of Ethiopia’s population obtain their 
livelihoods directly or indirectly through subsistence farming, it is not surprising that the 
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agricultural sector has featured as a top development policy priority in Ethiopia. Since the first 
5-year development plan in 2005—the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to 
End Poverty (PASDEP)—even industrial policies have paid attention to raising livelihoods in 
agriculture, mainly through linkages to the agricultural sector by for example promoting 
manufacturing industries that use agricultural inputs that are or can easily be provided by the 
domestic agricultural sector (i.e. cotton for the textile industry and hides and skins for the 
leather industry, more on which will be addressed later in the chapter). The success Ethiopia 
can boast in reducing extreme poverty is largely due to the targeted policies aimed at 
developing the agricultural sector. From 1995 to 2011, the number of people living in extreme 
poverty in the country was reduced from 60.5 per cent to 30.7 per cent (WDI, 2017). 
In conclusion, the manufacturing sector in Ethiopia is still in nascent stages of 
development, and the high economic growth rates over the past decade are more a result of 
infrastructure investments and growth in services and agriculture (in some part related to those 
infrastructure investments). So why then is Ethiopia is predicted by many to soon become 
Africa’s industrial powerhouse? Much of it has to do with the government’s clear vision and 
idea of industrialisation. 
 
4.2.2 A state committed to industrialisation 
 
4.2.2.1 The emergence of a developmental state?  
 
Particularly in Ethiopia, the ideological origins of party officials have been influential in 
shaping development policy. According to Arkebe Oqubay, long-time member of the ruling 
party and the current head of Economic Planning and Supervision at the Prime Minister’s 
Office, “the historical roots and political ideas of the ruling party (in Ethiopia), in power for 
two decades under a dominant-party multiparty system, have shaped the policies behind the 
new economic dynamism” (Oqubay, 2015, p.72).  
The ruling party—the EPRDF—is often described, for better or worse, as an 
authoritarian regime with control of almost every aspect of the economy (Clapham, 2015; Weis 
2016a). Before it became the government in 1991, the EPRDF was a rebel group fighting 
against the Derg (a socialist military junta) which had, in turn, deposed of Emperor Haile 
Selassie in 1974. The EPRDF is an alliance of four parties, each with roots in certain regions 
and ethnic groups of Ethiopia. The party with roots in the Tigray region of the north, the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), has held a majority of influential cabinet positions since 
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1995, and is undoubtedly the most powerful faction of the EPRDF.   
 Whereas the EPRDF was formed in 1988, the TPLF was formed in 1975, immediately 
after the Derg takeover. Its organisation has been shaped by the military discipline and 
hierarchical chain of command required over a 16 year-long armed guerrilla struggle. Like the 
Derg, the TPLF was also inspired by socialist thinking (although TPLF ideology would change 
to a more market-oriented approach), so in some ways, then, it is possible to draw parallels 
between the Derg regime and the TPLF: military-like organisational structures drawing from 
the same student Marxism of the early 1970s. But the TPLF is known to have had a stronger 
intellectual bend. A fascinating aspect of the party’s intellectual drive was the establishment of 
a Business College in Hagereselam towards the end of the insurgency in the late 1980s. The 
College’s initial faculty consisted of six foreign-trained cadres with graduate degrees in 
economics, accounting, management and statistics (Weis, 2016a). Although many of the 
economics textbooks were written by US economists influenced by the Reagan-era, the idea 
was simply to learn the techniques from those textbooks, while keeping firmly with the 
Marxist-Leninist orientation of the party and a vision of state-led industrial development. 
Considerable resources were put into translating the works of Lenin and writing studies on 
Albania’s socialist revolution and South Korean industrial policy (Weis, 2016b). 
 The influence of the state-led industrialisation experiences of South Korea and other 
countries in East Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan and, later, China, cannot be understated. In an 
interview with the New African in 2011, Meles Zenawi summarised Ethiopia’s development 
model in the following way: 
 
Essentially, the concept hangs on the prudent combination of market forces and state 
intervention, where the state plays a leading role not only in providing infrastructure 
and basic services, but also in providing the right conducive environment for the 
development of productive and manufacturing capacities. For sure, the experience of a 
number of East Asian countries supports the validity of our approach (New African, 
2011, p.2). 
 
In a recent interview conducted by myself, a long time TPLF member and Special 
Adviser to the current Prime Minister, Hailemarian Desalegn, recounted his experience of 
studying for a distance-taught MBA programme in 1991 at Open University in the UK, together 
with Meles Zenawi and several other high-ranking TPLF officials, “Where we studied in 
particular the East Asian experience” (Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, interviewed by 
the author in Addis Ababa, May 13, 2015). Similarly, a researcher at the renowned Ethiopian 
Development Research Institute (EDRI) stated in an interview, “I would say that the current 
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development strategy of Ethiopia is inspired by a mix of South Korea and China” (EDRI 
researcher, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, April 15, 2015). 
 The East Asian influence has not happened purely through ‘intellectual’ channels, but 
also more directly through development assistance. Around the time when the Ethiopian 
government was formulating a development strategy for 2010-2015, they began regular, high 
level consultations on industrial policy with a delegation of Japanese experts from the Tokyo-
based National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). Prime Minister Zenawi had 
approached GRIPS at a workshop hosted by the economist Joseph Stiglitz, and between 2009 
and 2011, a delegation from GRIPS conducted quarterly seminars for the Prime Minster and 
his economic advisers (Weis, 2016a). The dialogue focused largely on drafting an economic 
master plan and turned out to be integral in the formulation of the five-year national 
development plan for the period 2010-2015, the Growth and Transformation Plan. The plan, 
published by the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, put a growth 
target for the industrial sector at 21.4 per cent per year in the five-year period, significantly 
higher than that of both the agricultural sector (14.9 per cent) and the services sector (12.8 per 
cent). It also emphasised how efforts to develop skills and infrastructure should be focused to 
meet the demands of the growing manufacturing industry (MoFED, 2010). 
 Another feature of the Ethiopian regime that is important for understanding its approach 
to industrial policy is its insistence on being autonomous from the ideological demands of 
Western donors. It would not be an exaggeration to call the EPRDF, and in particular the TPLF 
branch of the EPRDF, anti-neoliberal. This makes Ethiopia highly unique in the African 
context–a continent where the World Bank and the IMF had immense influence in the 1980s 
and 1990s through the SAPs and the PRSPs (see chapter 2 for more details). In his book, 
Globalization and Its Discontents, Joseph Stiglitz recounts details of his conversations with 
Meles Zenawi in 1997, Stiglitz’ first year as chief economist of the World Bank. At the time, 
the IMF had suspended its lending programme to Ethiopia due to the country’s ‘unstable’ fiscal 
revenue generation. The IMF demanded structural reforms, most importantly liberalisation of 
the financial sector, but Zenawi staunchly refused. Stiglitz, according to his own accounts, 
managed to lobby the World Bank and, eventually, the IMF to restore development assistance 
to the country (Stiglitz, 2002).  
Prime Minster Zenawi later wrote a book chapter for an academic book edited by, 
among others, Stiglitz. In the chapter, entitled ‘States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and 
the Case for a Developmental State’, he discusses at length what he sees as shortcomings of 
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neoliberal and neoclassical economic theory in explaining how activist states are successful in 
achieving sustained economic development (Zenawi, 2012).  
 Given the strong influence of the East Asian industrialisation experiences on Ethiopian 
development policy, it comes as no surprise, then, that there are several aspects of the 
developmental state literature that resonate with the Ethiopian model: The centrality of 
industrialisation to the government’s political agenda, the preference for economic planning, a 
state that ‘governs’ the market, and the existence of large SOEs in a number of strategic 
industries–for example the Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC) and the state-owned 
enterprises in the textile industry, like Kombolcha Textiles and Bahir Dar Textiles. 
 Oqubay (2015) describes the Ethiopian state as one aspiring to become developmental. 
Drawing on the works of Amsden (1989), Chang (1994), Evans (1995), Mkandawire (2001) 
and Wade (1990), he defines the developmental state as one characterised by the “Exclusive 
pursuit of development; public mobilization around a grand vision; and state capability, 
embeddedness, and autonomy” (Oqubay, 2015, p.74). He points to Ethiopia’s national 
development plans and income targets, as well as the consistently high levels of federal 
spending on infrastructure and human development, as evidence for the exclusive pursuit of 
development and public mobilisation around a grand vision. For state capability, he uses the 
example of the ruling party’s strong organisational capabilities, while admitting that the state 
bureaucracy inherited from the Derg regime has been more difficult to transform. He also 
points out the difficulties the state has faced in maintaining autonomy while at the same time 
developing trust with private actors, especially as the social actors with economic power 
changes alongside economic diversification. 
 In a similar vein, Clapham (2015) writes that Ethiopia is, “One of the clearest examples 
in Africa of the application beyond East Asia of the idea of the developmental state” (Clapham, 
2015, p.10).  He is, however, critical of the Ethiopian state’s insistence of controlling all aspects 
of the private sector, and calls for higher freedom of action to the private sector in order to 
generate higher levels of production. 
 Weis (2016a), on the other hand, contends that the term ‘vanguard capitalism’ better 
describes Ethiopia’s contemporary political economy—combining the “Centralising political 
logic of a Leninist movement party with the expansive logic of capitalist markets. At its base 
lies the monopolisation of state-society relations by the EPRDF which, in turn, allows for the 
creation, centralisation and strategic use of economic rents by its administration” (Weis, 2016a, 
p.i). But he does not attribute the term vanguard capitalism to the entire period of EPRDF rule. 
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He traces changing stages of the Ethiopian political economy, as seen from Table 4.1, clearly 
acknowledging a ‘developmental’ discourse. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Evolution of Ethiopia’s political economy since 1991 
 
1991-2000: Liberal reforms Constitutional reform and introduction of a 
multiparty system. Dismantling of the 
socialist command economy and (partial) 
market liberalisation. 
2000-2005: Origins of the ‘developmental 
state’ 
Reform of administration and civil service, 
and the formulation of a national industrial 
policy. Closer integration of state and 
market. 
2005-2012: Towards transformation The idea of a developmental coalition 
between party, state and people becomes a 
hegemonic discourse. New fusion of 
political, administrative and economic 
structures under the direction of the party: 
‘vanguard capitalism’    
Source: Based on Table 1 in Weis (2016a), p.24. 
 
 
According to Weis, the EPRDF centralised economic rents in the early 2000s without 
a corresponding degree of control over society, hence leaving the party vulnerable. The EPRDF 
suffered a near-defeat in the general elections in 2005, and consequently claimed a hegemonic 
vanguard role, increasing the party’s power over both state and market. This vanguard direction 
does not fully fit into the ideas of a developmental state, according to Weis. However, he sees 
the term vanguard capitalism as complementary to the developmental state characterisation: 
 
The framework of vanguard capitalism also diverges from—or, rather, complements—
the literature on African ‘developmental states.’ Seen from the perspective of this 
literature, the highly managed nature of markets in Ethiopia is the most rational 
response to the pervasive market failures that characterise emerging economies. This is 
the point of view taken by the EPRDF government, which cites the example of East 
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Asia’s state-led industrialisers as a key influence for its policies. However, merely 
branding the EPRDF state as ‘developmental’ offers little insight into the nature of 
Ethiopia’s economic transition. It assumes the neutrality of economic institutions – seen 
as technical solutions to technical problems – which in reality are highly political and 
the outcome of long struggles over the nature and direction of the state. By putting the 
party at the centre of the relationship between state and market, the framework of 
vanguard capitalism adds substance to the debate around a specifically Ethiopian 
developmental state. In so doing, it ties in with the EPRDF’s own writings on the 
subject, which emphasise the need for the mobilisation of society by a revolutionary 
movement party as the basis of state-led industrial transformation (Weis, 2016a, p.21). 
 
Weis’ claim that a developmental state assumes neutrality of economic institutions is 
not entirely correct—the developmental state literature does not develop a notion of the state 
as purely technocratic. However, in Ethiopia’s case, Weis adds substance to the developmental 
state characterisation by identifying a shift in the EPRDFs discourse, towards more hegemonic 
rule since 2005. Therefore, while Ethiopia is unarguably Africa’s clearest example of a 
developmental state, the vanguard capitalism description is also fitting.  
 
4.2.2.2 Industrial policy in practice 
 
The previous section showed how, although the manufacturing sector is in nascent stages of 
development, the Ethiopian government has a strong vision of state-led industrialisation, very 
much in the image of the East Asian industrialisation experiences. This reinforces the belief 
that what we are seeing in Ethiopia right now is the beginnings of rapid industrialisation. It 
also largely explains why people, in particularly those interested in African industrial policy, 
associate Ethiopia with industrial development. The Ethiopian government’s commitment to 
industrial development can also be shown through the various industrial policy instruments 
that have become particularly noticeable since 2005. 
 Table 4.2 provides a taxonomy of industrial policy instruments currently in place in 
Ethiopia. The table is based on various first and second hand data that I obtained during 
fieldwork—including readings of government documents and newspaper archives, and 
interviews with government officials and firm managers. Some categories certainly overlap, 
but the division into these eight categories reflect my personal judgements.  
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Table 4.2: Taxonomy of Ethiopia’s industrial policy instruments 
Sectoral targeting Prioritised industries are clearly articulated in national 
development plans, based on productive potential, 
labour intensity, linkages to the agricultural sector, 
technological entry barriers, and export potential. These 
include: leather, textiles, metals, agro-processing, 
chemicals and construction inputs, and pharmaceuticals.  
Expansion of ‘industrial 
bureaucracy’ 
 
Several new government agencies have been set up to 
more effectively provide state support to prioritised 
industries. Examples of such institutes would be the 
sectoral development institutes, the Industrial Parks 
Development Corporation and the Ethiopian Industrial 
Inputs Supply Enterprise.  
Credit allocation: Development 
Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) and 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
(CBE) 
These are state owned banks that provide subsidised 
credit to prioritised industries. The DBE provides 
investment capital, whereas the CBE provides working 
capital.  
 
Export promotion Several incentives are put in place to encourage exports 
in prioritised industries. These incentives are targeted at 
export-oriented firms, and include: reduced interest rate 
on loans from DBE and CBE, subsidised leasing of land, 
subsidised salaries for foreign ‘experts’, and tax 
exemptions. Currency depreciation can also be seen as 
an export promotion instrument.   
Import substitution High tariffs are applied for industries in which the 
Ethiopian government wants to ‘nurture’ and protect 
domestic producers, but these tariffs are also in place to 
limit growth of the current account deficit and to raise 
tax revenues. High tariffs are common in the heavy 
manufacturing industries, but also for finished products 
in the light manufacturing industries, such as apparel. 
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FDI attraction Several measures have been put in place to attract FDI 
in prioritised industries, in order to create employment, 
generate export earnings, and transfer technology. Such 
measures include favourable access to infrastructure 
(e.g. industrial parks and rail transport), tax exemptions 
and subsidised land leases (in some cases, free land).  
Infrastructure investments 
 
Infrastructure investments in especially power 
generation and transport are geared towards industrial 
development. 
Industrial park development The Ethiopian government has undertaken a massive 
commitment to build several industrial parks, in large 
part to cater to foreign investments, but also more 
generally to ease the logistics constraints of exporting.  
 
  
The table is self-explanatory, but it can be useful to briefly look at some sector-specific 
experiences as well.  
 One sector that has been booming in Ethiopia in recent years is the floriculture industry, 
and industrial policy has been deemed important for its growth (Abebe and Schaefer, 2015; 
Gebreeyesus and Iizuka, 2010; Oquay, 2015). While it could be debated if floriculture should 
be considered a manufacturing activity, it definitely involves stages of value addition before 
reaching the consumer, and cutting and packaging activities are organised in a similar fashion 
to traditional industrial activities. 
Government support for the floriculture industry in Ethiopia was ramped up in 2002, 
when the Prime Minister’s Office required the Ministry of Industry to prepare a five-year action 
plan for the industry (Gebreeyesus and Iizuka, 2010). First, attraction of FDI came to be seen 
as crucial in contributing to technological development and market access for the industry. 
While Ethiopian firms initially kicked off the industry, foreign firms have increased their 
investment in the sector, accounting for 63 per cent of all firms operating in the sector in 2012 
(Oqubay, 2015). The attraction of foreign investors was enabled through offering investment 
incentives, like generous tax exemption schemes. Second, air cargo logistics was facilitated. 
Suitable land at favourable lease rates were made available to investors at a reasonable distance 
from the airport, and the government subsidised air freight rates and gave exporters the 
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privilege to ship through Ethiopian Airlines on a credit basis (Abebe and Schaefer, 2015). 
Third, subsidised loans by the DBE became the prime source of long-term investment financing 
for firms in the floriculture industry—almost two-thirds of firms in the industry have relied on 
loans from the DBE. After seeing the success of DBE loans to the floriculture industry, private 
banks have now also started lending to the industry (Oqubay, 2015).  
 Cement, as already seen, is another industry that has boomed since the early 2000s. The 
state has provided support to the cement industry through both direct and indirect measures. 
Direct measures most importantly include entry incentives for domestic firms, such as long-
term loans made available for capital investments; easy access to mining resources for firms; 
and the allocation of foreign currency on preferential basis. Additionally, government 
provision of transport and energy has been crucial, including import of over 1,000 trucks and 
supplies of heavy-oil fuel, coal, pet coke and electricity (Oqubay, 2015). More indirectly, the 
government’s large-scale housing and infrastructure programmes, when combined with the 
expansion of private sector construction, have provided an important demand stimulus for 
cement. 
 Highly prioritised export-oriented manufacturing industries, such as the textile and 
leather industries, have also enjoyed various instruments of government support. Similar to the 
floriculture sector, the government has put in place a range of export incentives for both foreign 
and domestic firms. These include duty free access to imported inputs and capital goods, 
exemption of income tax for up to ten years, subsidised loans from DBE, subsidised land leases, 
and payment of salaries for foreign ‘experts’. The payment of salaries for foreign experts is 
significantly more important for domestic firms, as they are more constrained, both in terms of 
knowledge and financing, than foreign firms.  
Particularly for the apparel industry (part of the textile industry), the construction of 
industrial parks53 is becoming an essential part of the industrialisation strategy. A majority of 
the largest foreign-owned firms that have made commitments to invest in the country in the 
last two years are locating in industrial parks.  
The textile and leather industries have now become Ethiopia’s two largest 
manufacturing industries, as measured by export earnings, and the attraction of foreign 
investments are starting to play a massive role in the expansion of these industries. The rest of 
this chapter will analyse these two industries in greater detail, mapping out the growth of the 
industries, and also discussing the extent to which foreign investments in the industries are 
																																																						
53 These parks are similar to what would be known in many other countries as industrial zones, EPZs or SEZs.  
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benefitting the Ethiopian economy, especially in terms of the development of domestic 
productive capabilities. Particularly in the context of industrial policy for African countries in 
an era of GVC expansion, these two industries in the Ethiopian case serve as excellent case 
studies to build further conclusions on from the previous chapter. 
 
4.3 Ethiopia’s GVC participation and industrial policies in the textile and 
leather industries  
 
Seeing that this section is extensive, a brief overview of its structure is useful: 
 Section 4.3.1 examines the Ethiopian government’s motivation behind developing the 
textile and leather industries.  
 Section 4.3.2 turns specifically to the GVC aspect of these two industries. Why is a 
GVC participation strategy useful for Ethiopia, what do the industry value chains look like in 
today’s global context, and who are the GVC-oriented firms in these two industries in Ethiopia? 
 Section 4.3.3 breaks down the export performance of the industries, both in terms of 
product variations and export performance at the firm level (i.e. what firms account for the 
largest share of exports?). Because a GVC participation / FDI attraction strategy for developing 
countries is largely about boosting exports—which is also a key aim of industrialisation 
strategies for developing countries—this section is generally about evaluating the performance 
of the industries.  
 Section 4.3.4 looks at the factors that are motivating foreign firms to outsource 
production to Ethiopia. Some of these are related to simple cost savings by outsourcing 
production to a lower income country, while other factors are more specific to the Ethiopian 
context.   
 Section 4.3.5 analyses Ethiopia’s GVC-oriented industrial policies that are being used 
to develop the two industries. As the policy apparatus in Ethiopia does not often use the word 
‘GVC oriented’ for its industrial policies, it is not always useful (or even possible) to make a 
distinction between the ‘general’ industrial policies, and the ‘GVC-oriented’ industrial 
policies. They certainly overlap, so this section cannot avoid looking at general industrial 
policies as well. However, an effort has been made during fieldwork to investigate especially 
those policies that aim to take a GVC path for both industries (e.g. what export incentives have 
been put in place?) and to make the attraction of foreign firms benefit the domestic economy 
(i.e. what policies, if any, have been put in place to transfer technology from foreign firms to 
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the domestic economy, and to create linkages between foreign firms and the domestic 
economy?).  
 Section 4.3.6 investigates the impact that the GVC participation / FDI attraction has 
had on the development of domestic productive capabilities. The breakdown of export 
performance in section 4.3.3 will already have revealed some results. But this section will also 
look at aspects that were theorised in the last chapter, like the demonstration and competition 
effects of FDI, if and how FDI has contributed to meaningful skills development, and if any 
backward linkages to the local economy have been created (or if such prospects look bright). 
Because Ethiopia is in very early stages of a GVC participation strategy in the two industries, 
the section will also talk about the future prospects of developing domestic productive 
capabilities.  
 Section 4.3.7 looks at two key challenges for the growth of these industries through the 
GVC participation strategy—bottlenecks on the input side and high labour turnover. These are 
problems that have been discussed and analysed in the literature in the context of Ethiopia 
outside a GVC lens, but must be addressed if the GVC participation strategy is going to be 
successful.  
 
4.3.1 Why does the Ethiopian government want to develop the textile and leather 
industries? 
 
The Growth and Transformation Plan II, Ethiopia’s national development plan published in 
2015, identifies six manufacturing industries to be prioritised in the period 2015-2020 (Table 
4.2 in the previous section lists these sectors), including the textile and leather industries. As 
mentioned, the textile and leather industries currently bring in more export earnings than any 
of the other manufacturing industries, and the Ethiopian government predicts this trend to 
continue, as seen in Figure 4.4. In this sense, they will be the most important manufacturing 
industries for Ethiopia in the near future. 
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Promoting economic activities that generate foreign currency (in theory, all 
manufacturing products can be traded) is critical for Ethiopia. Figure 4.5 shows that the trade 
deficit has been growing as the import bill has mushroomed in the last decade. Because of the 
scarcity of foreign currency, foreign exchange controls are in place. It is now close to 
impossible to buy foreign currency in Ethiopia by paying with Ethiopian Birr, unless you have 
government approval to do so, by, for example, holding a diplomatic visa/passport as a 
foreigner.  
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The commitment to develop the textile and leather industries is seen as a means to ease 
this foreign exchange scarcity. In fact, interviews with industry experts in the country 
conducted during fieldwork indicate that the generation of foreign currency is one of two 
primary reasons for promoting the industries.  
The other primary reason cited is high labour-intensity and thus the industries’ 
employment generating capabilities. Both industries absorb a lot of labour, and the hope is that, 
eventually, these two industries will grow to a point where they contribute to alleviate the dire 
job situation in Ethiopia. According to the most recent Ethiopian Labour Survey, the 
unemployment rate in the country is only 4.5 per cent, but as mentioned in chapter 2, looking 
at conventional unemployment numbers is not very revealing in the African context, as most 
people who are counted as ‘employed’ are usually stuck in vulnerable jobs—working for their 
families or on non-contractual arrangements. UNDP (2015) reveals that over 70 per cent of 
young people (aged 15-29) in Ethiopia are stuck in such vulnerable jobs, requiring practically 
no formal education. Most of these young people are desperate to find consistent, remunerated 
employment as a means of living. This massive surplus of young, unskilled labour, explains in 
large part why Ethiopia can currently offer the world’s lowest ‘factory wage’ and why foreign 
companies in labour-intensive industries are setting up or relocating their factories to Ethiopia 
(more on this later). 
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Another important reason for promoting these industries is the possible economic links 
that they can provide to the agricultural sector. Because such a large share of Ethiopia’s 
population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods, industrial policy in Ethiopia has since 
the 1990s emphasised the need for developing manufacturing industries that provide linkages 
to the agricultural sector (inspired especially by the notion of backward linkages from 
Hirschman (1958)). The links to leather is the livestock, an industry which is by no measure a 
small one in Ethiopia: the country has Africa’s largest livestock population, with a cattle 
population of more than 53m, along with sheep and goat populations of 25.5m and 24.1m, 
respectively (Abebe and Schaefer, 2015). For the textile industry, the linkage is to the cotton 
industry. The linkages here are somewhat more of a challenge to develop than in the leather 
industry, as the domestic cotton sector in Ethiopia is already struggling to keep up with the 
requirements for the quality and the quantity of cotton demanded by the textile producers. 
Section 4.3.7 will discuss in greater detail the challenges on the input side of both these 
industries.  
Furthermore, the Ethiopian government’s insistence on developing these industries 
obviously relates to the party’s view of the manufacturing sector as being integral to economic 
and technological development. The choice of these manufacturing industries in particular has 
to do with the above factors already mentioned, but also an historical observation of the process 
of industrial development by frontrunners—starting out with labour-intensive industries with 
relatively low entry barriers, before moving on to more sophisticated industrial activities. 
According to Staritz and Whitfield (2017), Prime Minister Zenawi particularly stressed the 
need to develop a textile industry, as he had observed how this sector had historically been the 
first step of industrialisation in almost every country that went on to successfully industrialise.  
But even with the relatively low technological barriers, there is a recognition by the 
Ethiopian government that the entry of foreign investments is crucial to developing these 
industries, as Ethiopian companies lack the technology, capital and knowhow to be 
internationally competitive.     
  
4.3.2 The industry value chains and Ethiopia’s GVC oriented firms in these value 
chains 
 
In theory, Ethiopia’s participation in the GVCs of both the textile and leather industries could 
be in the form of Ethiopian manufacturers selling their products to lead firms (retailers and 
brand names) based in the targeted consumer markets, or even selling their products under their 
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own brands. However, very few Ethiopian companies have the necessary know-how to produce 
for markets in Europe and the US (meeting quality standards, being able to adjust to change in 
orders of both quantity and design specifications, on-time-delivery, etc.) or have the necessary 
capital for running big operations. Therefore, in line with how the global industry has come to 
work in both these sectors for a ‘typical’ least developed country, Ethiopia is inviting foreign 
manufacturers to produce for the export market. But there are some differences in Ethiopia’s 
GVC participation in the two industries that ought to be explained.  
 
4.3.2.1 The textile industry 
 
While I’m referring to the industry as the ‘textile industry’ in this chapter, some would quite 
probably call it the ‘textile AND apparel industry’. This comes from the observation that there 
are production processes in the value chain that are somewhat different from each other. Stage 
1 (in Figure 4.6) in a least developed country like Ethiopia, typically involves cotton 
cultivation, and is therefore associated with the agricultural sector. The manufacturing / 
‘factory’ stages of the value chain are associated with stages 2 to 4. In these stages, the global 
industry has gradually become separated into textile manufacturers (stages 2 to 3) and apparel 
manufacturers (stage 4).   
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Stages 2 and 3 (the ‘textiles’ part) are typically more capital intensive than the other 
stages of production. Firms that engage in stages 2 to 3, also sometimes engage in stage 4. 
There are also instances whereby firms that engage in stages 2 and 3 also engage in raw material 
production, but this is more of a rarity. Firms that have capacity to do everything from stages 
2 to 4 are commonly known as vertically integrated textile firms. 
 Because the global market for apparel is so much larger than any other finished product 
based on textiles, the growth of firms who only engage in apparel production has been immense 
with the expansion of GVCs. These firms carry out labour-intensive assembly activities on 
finished fabric, commonly known as CMT functions (CMT stands for cut-make-and-trim). The 
skill level of workers is lower than of those in textile firms and investment capital requirements 
are smaller. Global firms in this segment of the value chain are generally able to move 
operations easily, and a large chunk of FDI in the textile industry to least developed countries 
tend to concentrate on CMT functions in the apparel segment of the industry. Since the early 
2000s, CMT production has been booming in countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia and 
Vietnam, and are now starting to surge in Ethiopia. CMT firms who operate in least developed 
countries will often import fabric from slightly higher-income countries.   
 Firms that engage in stage 5 activities generally do not engage in the manufacturing 
stage of the value chains. In that sense, the textile value chain fits neatly into Gereffi’s 
characterisation of a BDVC (a term that was introduced in the last chapter), whereby those 
firms that are involved in retail typically outsource apparel production to a string of global 
manufacturers. We will see, however, that in Ethiopia’s case, some firms in the industry defy 
the typical value chain characteristics.  
 
4.3.2.1.1 Ethiopia’s GVC-oriented firms in the textile industry 
 
Ayka Addis Integrated Textile, a Turkish firm, is by many considered the ‘pioneer’ for FDI in 
the textile industry in Ethiopia. It has been producing yarn and fabric in Ethiopia since 
November 2008 in a plant located 20 km outside of Addis Ababa (Reporter, 2010), but 
expanded to include apparel in 2010 with a $100m investment (Capital, 2010). Since then, 
many other Turkish investors have followed suit, but to date, Ayka Addis is the largest exporter 
in the industry, making up between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of Ethiopia’s total exports in 
the textile industry (MoI, 2016e). Its exports are mainly headed to one buyer in Germany, 
which Ayka established a relationship with before coming to Ethiopia.  
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 Gradually, apparel manufacturers from South and East Asia have become interested in 
Ethiopia as a possible outsourcing destination, especially when the Ethiopian government 
announced that export-oriented apparel production would be a priority in the national 
development agenda and that they would build industrial parks to ease logistics constraints for 
export-oriented apparel producers. Bole Lemi 1 became the first government-owned industrial 
park to host foreign-owned firms from different countries, in both apparel and footwear 
manufacturing. Operations for most firms started in 2014. Notable apparel firms operating in 
the park include Arvind (India), JayJay Textiles (India) and Shin (South Korea) (MoI, 2016e). 
 The flagship project for export-oriented apparel production, however, is Hawassa 
Industrial Park (HIP), located approximately 250 km south of Addis Ababa. Firms in the park 
are expected to start production in mid-2017 (the park was inaugurated on June 20, 2017), and 
the park is estimated to bring in $1bn in export earnings—roughly 10 times the current figure 
for the entire textile industry—and employ over 60,000 people when operating at full capacity 
(notes from presentations at the Agro-Industry Investment Forum in Addis Ababa, October 5-
7, 2016). The park has attracted the first wave of world-leading apparel producers to Ethiopia.54 
According to several stakeholders involved in HIP, the impressive scale of the HIP project was 
enabled by the anchor investor in the park, Philip Van-Heusen (PVH), one of the world’s 
largest apparel companies. PVH owns several global apparel brands, including Calvin Klein 
and Tommy Hilfiger, and does not normally engage in manufacturing operations. In that sense, 
it is a typical example of a ‘lead firm’ in the BDVC classification: many of the apparel 
manufactures in HIP are part of PVH’s global supply chain and are there at the invitation from 
PVH.  
 While foreign-owned firms are dominating the export-oriented segment of the textile 
industry, some domestic firms that have traditionally focused on the domestic market are 
increasingly orienting themselves towards the export market. These are most notably vertically 
integrated textile firms that, in the words of one industry expert, “Come from big money” 
(Ethiopian trading company manager, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 
09, 2016). Because of the large capital requirements associated with textiles, the four largest 
vertically integrated domestic textile firms are either state owned (Bahir Dar Textile and 
Kombolcha Textile), affiliated with the TPLF’s endowment fund, EFFORT55 (Almeda 
																																																						
54 One could argue that Bole Lemi 1 also hosts some large international apparel producers, but those in HIP 
operate, on average, on a larger scale.   
55 EFFORT is the acronym for the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray. It was established and is 
still controlled (though no longer formally owned) by the TPLF. Its current CEO is Azeb Mesfin, the widow of 
former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Its total assets exceed half a billion dollars (Weis, 2016a).  
 161 
Textile), or owned by Ethiopia’s richest person, the Saudi-Ethiopian businessman Sheikh 
Mohammed Al Amoudi (MAA Garments). 
 
4.3.2.2 The leather industry 
 
The name of this industry, similar to the textile industry, could arguably be called the leather 
and leather products industry. This comes from the observation that some firms specialise in 
transforming raw hides and skins into finished leather (tanneries), while others specialise in 
transforming finished leather into leather products—predominantly shoes, but also bags, belts, 
and other leather-based accessories. Similar to the textile industry, stage 1 (Figure 4.7) is 
associated with the agricultural sector. Tanneries buy raw hides and skins from farmers, herders 
and traders. Apart from the traders, many of the stage 1 actors do not consider themselves as 
part of the leather industry, but raise and graze cattle and sheep as part of their subsistence (e.g. 
for milk and meat). The hide or skin is simply a by-product when the animal is slaughtered.  
 Tanneries are those that engage in stages 2 and 3. Like the textile industry, these are 
more capital intensive stages than stage 4. Factories that operate in stage 4 manufacture 
predominantly footwear. In some trade statistics industry classifications, like that of the WTO, 
footwear manufacturing is actually classified under the textile/apparel category—shoes made 
of both leather and of synthetic fibres (the latter of which should obviously be classified in the 
textile and the apparel category rather than the leather products category).   
  The leather industry value chain also fits into the BDVC classification as stage 5 firms 
normally do not manufacture the products themselves, but subcontract to a network of global 
suppliers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Ethiopia’s GVC-oriented firms in the leather industry 
 
Whereas the textile industry saw a pioneer wave of FDI coming from Turkey, FDI in the leather 
industry initially originated from China. On advice from then-World Bank chief economist, 
Justin Lin, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, sent a trade mission to China in 2011 to 
invite potential footwear manufactures to invest in Ethiopia (Lin and Wang, 2014). One firm, 
Huajian, visited Ethiopia later that year and decided to set up a factory in a Chinese industrial 
zone (mainly for textile and footwear manufacturers), producing women’s shoes for buyers 
and retailers in the US and Europe, similar to the firm’s operations in China. The firm started 
production in 2012, and has subsequently expanded rapidly. The number of employees 
increased from 550 in January 2012 (Lin and Wang, 2014) to 5,200 in November 2016 (Huajian 
deputy manager, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 25, 2016). The firm’s 
exports reached $16m in 2015 (MoI, 2016f), making up 46 per cent of Ethiopia’s total footwear 
exports in that year (MoI, 2016c). The firm is still growing, aiming to reach $35m in export 
revenues in 2017 (Huajian deputy manager, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, 
November 25, 2016).  
Huajian’s footwear exports are expected to reach much higher levels than that though. 
The firm has committed a $1bn investment to build ‘Ethiopia Huajian Light Industry Park’ (a 
park that has already commenced footwear production, with 700 workers at the time of writing) 
1. Raw	
materials
•Raw hides	and	
skins
2.	Making	
semi-
processed	
leather
•Pickled, wet	
blue,	crusted.	
3.	Making	
finished	
leather
•Tanning	the	
leather (ready	
for	leather	
products)
4.	Making	
leather	
products
•Footwear and	
general	goods	
(bags,	belts,	
wallets,	etc.)
•Auto	upholstery
5.	End	
services
•Retail,	branding,	
marketing,	
distribution
Figure	4.7:	Leather	industry	value	chain	
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to be completed by the end of 2020. Operating at full capacity, the park is estimated to employ 
30,000-50,000 people and generate $2bn in export revenues (Huajian, 2016).  
Other big footwear manufacturers in Ethiopia also originate from East Asia, like 
George Shoe (Taiwan) and New Wing Shoes (Hong Kong), which are the second and third 
largest footwear exporters in Ethiopia, respectively (MoI, 2016f). Both firms focus on end 
markets in the US and Europe, but George Shoe also caters to a brand that has stores in China 
and Japan. Like Huajian, George Shoe also has grand expansion plans. The company is 
building an industrial park in Mojo, the tannery hub of Ethiopia, where they plan to employ 
20,000 people and generate $250m in yearly export revenues (general manager of George 
Shoe, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 19, 2016). 
While the footwear industry is booming in Ethiopia, the inputs industry (finished 
leather) is actually larger as measured by export revenues. This, in part, comes from the long 
tradition of tanning leather in Ethiopia. Currently, 5 of the 10 largest exporters in the tanning 
industry are Ethiopian—Kolba, Dire, Mojo, Sheba and Batu (MoI, 2016f). The two largest, 
however, are foreign owned—Ethiopia Tannery, a formerly Ethiopian state-owned tannery that 
was sold to the UK leather products company, Pittards, in 2009 (Capital, 2009), and Friendship 
Tannery, a Chinese-owned tannery. An analysis of interviews conducted with tanneries during 
fieldwork shows that the tanneries in Ethiopia, both foreign-owned and local, produce for both 
foreign - and local-owned leather products manufacturers, with China being the main 
destination for exported leather. Huajian and George Shoe are among the largest domestic 
customers for finished leather. Some leather products manufacturers have their own tanneries 
(e.g. Pittards and New Wing Shoes), while others have plans of building in-house tanning 
capabilities (e.g. George Shoe).  
In contrast to the export-oriented Ethiopian tanneries, the export-oriented Ethiopian 
leather products manufacturers are at this point very small compared to the foreign ones. A 
telling example is that one of the largest local exporters is Anbessa Shoes, which exported 
shoes at a value of less than $1m in 2014 (MoI, 2016f). Consequently, foreign firms account 
for over 90 per cent of Ethiopia’s leather products exports (MoI, 2016f).  
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4.3.3 Export performance 
 
4.3.3.1 The textile industry 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.8, textile exports in Ethiopia have been booming since around 
2010, totalling $78m in 2015/16. This can chiefly be attributed to the onset of apparel 
production by the Turkish firm Ayka Addis, which, as seen in Figure 4.9, accounts for a 
massive share of Ethiopia’s apparel exports. By comparator country standards, however, $78m 
is a miniscule number. For example, in Bangladesh, textile exports totalled $30.1bn in 2014, 
and in Vietnam, the figure was 26.9bn (OEC, 2017). This is386 and 345 times the exports of 
the industry in Ethiopia, respectively. 
The export figures for these countries almost completely reflect CMT apparel 
production, so in this sense, dubbing the industry ‘textile’ is slightly misleading. In Ethiopia’s 
case, we also see that apparel accounts for the main source of export growth (Figure 4.9). Still, 
this does not mean that pure textile production (fabric) is unimportant. For some of the 
vertically integrated firms that exclusively export apparel, like MAA Garments and Ayka 
Addis, pure textile production is very much part of the production process, but it does not show 
up in the export data, as it is not sold as a finished product.  
 Some possible measurement errors with the Ethiopia data should be noted. OEC (2017) 
reports that textile exports from Ethiopia totalled $168m in 2014, whereas Figure 4.8 (data 
from the Ethiopian Ministry of Industry) shows $110m for that year. Data from Ethiopia’s 
National Planning Commission provides yet another number, $98m, for this year (NPC, 2016). 
A plausible explanation for this is that the absolute figure for Ethiopia is so small, resulting in 
a small number of firms accounting for a large share of exports, making the error/difference in 
reporting from any one firm larger in aggregate terms. 
 The significance of just a few firms in determining aggregate numbers also serves as 
an explanation as to why total exports in Ethiopia have decreased since 2013. From 2013/14 to 
2014/15, the decrease in total exports was largely due to a decrease in yarn exports by two 
firms—Selendewa Textile and Else Addis. From 2014/15 to 2015/16, Ayka Addis’ exports 
dropped dramatically, reportedly because its sole customer required fewer orders that year 
(senior official at the Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute, interviewed by the 
author in Addis Ababa, November 11, 2016).  
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4.3.3.2 The leather industry 
 
Like the textile industry, leather exports in Ethiopia have been growing in recent years (see 
Figure 4.10) but, seen from a global perspective, it is still at a low level. For example, in 2011—
a year from which the value of Ethiopia’s leather products exports has not changed 
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significantly—Africa’s leather and leather products export earnings accounted for 1 per cent 
of global exports in the industry, and Ethiopia’s share of Africa’s export earnings was less than 
1 per cent (Oqubay, 2015). 
 We can see that the composition of Ethiopia’s exports has changed though. In 2008, 
the government levied a 150 per cent export tax on raw and some semi-processed hides and 
skins56 (pickled and wet blue57) to encourage more value added in the stages processing 
(Capital, 2008). In effect, the high tax worked as a ban, and while exports took a hit in 
2009/2010, it seems to have had a positive effect on value added in later years, as the share of 
higher value added leather in exports started to increase in 2010/11, as seen in Figure 4.10. In 
2011, a similar tax was levied on the last stage of semi-processed leather (crust) for the same 
reason, which again had a positive effect on the degree of value added in exports. 
 There has been a small dip in exports since 2014/2015, mainly in finished leather. 
Numerous explanations have been offered by tanneries in personal interviews. The main one 
is that demand for leather and leather products has slowed down in Russia (one of the world’s 
largest markets for the industry) as a result of the economic sanctions imposed by the EU on 
the country in 2014, in view of Russia’s perceived role in destabilising Eastern Ukraine. 
Another explanation is that synthetic materials are increasingly substituting leather in 
traditionally leather-based products.  
 Like in the case of the textile industry, the reliability of some of the data presented in 
the below figures should be addressed. While no individual firm in the industry accounts for 
as large a share of exports as Ayka Addis does in the textile industry, the weight of few firms 
in determining export performance, in particular in the footwear industry, is heavy. For 
example, the MoI (2016e) data below estimates Huajian’s earnings at $16m in 2015/16. 
However, the company itself claims that they made $25m in that year (Huajian deputy general 
manager, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 25, 2016).  
  
 
																																																						
56 The term ‘hide’ is normally used for larger animals with thicker skin (e.g. cowhide), while the term ‘skin’ is 
normally used for smaller animals with thinner skin (e.g. sheepskin).  
57 These are the first stages of the processing. Pickling is the process of lowering the pH value of the hide/skin to 
help with the penetration of certain tanning agents, like chromium. Wet blue skin is when the leather has been 
tanned for the first time, leaving a pale blue colour. 
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4.3.4 Foreign firms’ motivation for investing in Ethiopia 
 
Earlier in this chapter, the Ethiopian government’s motivations for attracting FDI were 
discussed. But the chapter has yet to address (in detail) the reasons as to why foreign firms in 
the textile and leather industries are flocking to Ethiopia. 
 The previous chapter has given some pointers; particularly in BDVCs, foreign buyers 
or manufacturers are increasingly relocating manufacturing operations to low income countries 
in order to save production costs. In the Ethiopian context, this is also a big part of the story. 
An analysis of interviews during fieldwork with managers and representatives of foreign firms 
made clear which cost savings held a higher priority, and also pointed out some particularities 
in the Ethiopian context. Below follows a synthesis of these interviews.58 
 Cheap labour is the most important explanation for FDI inflows in both industries. 
According to foreign investors, no other prospective investment destination in the world could 
offer lower wages. In Ethiopia, wages at the operator level in assembly operations (the lowest 
skill segment, in which most local employees are hired) normally range between $30 and $45 
per month (not adjusted for purchasing power). According to ILO (2014b), Bangladesh, 
Myanmar and Sri Lanka are the countries that offer wages closest to this level, but none of 
them offer wages below $55. Whereas most investors were honest in the interviews about the 
cheap labour incentive, not all would be explicit—some would say that Ethiopia has ‘great 
demographic potential’ while others would say that ‘there is plenty of labour and most working 
people are young.’ This is not to say that a statement like the latter one is dishonest. If Ethiopia 
had cheap labour, but a demographic composition such that most working people are, say, over 
35, it would not be as attractive to invest there. In fact, most companies reported that they prefer 
to hire people who are younger than 30, in part because of health, but also because they want 
people with limited working experience. The general manager of one of the largest foreign 
footwear companies actually stated that his company prefers to hire people with no previous 
working experience. From a human capital perspective, this does not make much sense. A 
possible explanation could be that managers think that workers will be less demanding in terms 
of wages and working conditions if they have no basis for comparing the nature of their work 
to similar types of formal work.  
																																																						
58 The motivations for investing in Ethiopia are discussed in order of importance. These reflect my personal 
judgements, so it is entirely possible that a foreign investor or Ethiopian government official would rank them in 
a different order. 
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Second, preferential access to end markets plays an important role. While Ethiopia is 
not part of the WTO, it has negotiated duty-free access to the US market through the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and to the European market through the Everything But 
Arms (EBA) agreement. Both agreements include not only apparel but also a range of goods 
that African countries traditionally export, like primary commodities. The EBA agreement 
includes all least developed countries and encompasses all goods apart from arms. It is 
conceived as an initiative to help economic development in least developed countries. AGOA 
is specific to SSA and eligibility is determined every year by the US president, based on 
initiatives taken towards becoming a market-oriented economy. Additionally, AGOA places 
caps on using yarns and fabric from outside the US, both locally sourced and from ‘third party 
lesser developed countries’. However, these caps do not apply to least developed countries, 
like Ethiopia. From a US standpoint, the aim of AGOA is to strengthen commercial ties 
between countries in SSA and US companies, and eventually establish SSA as a market for 
American cotton.  
AGOA has recently been extended until 2025 and seems to be more important for 
apparel companies in Africa than EBA is, as it gives a competitive edge to companies that 
produce in Africa compared to those in Asia (Staritz et. al., 2016). In Ethiopia, companies in 
both industries underscore the importance of both trade agreements, but especially in the 
apparel industry TNCs have reported that there would be no prospect for developing the 
industry in Ethiopia without AGOA. For these companies, Bangladesh seems to be the 
benchmark comparator country in terms of cost savings, and AGOA turns the lever in favour 
of Ethiopia. A representative for one of the largest foreign apparel investors in Ethiopia said 
the following: 
 
Without AGOA, the international apparel in industry wouldn’t be here (in Ethiopia). 
With AGOA, you outcompete Asian competitors in the American market. You take 
away Bangladesh, in effect. For every t-shirt I produce here, I pay 35 cents in logistics 
costs. In Bangladesh, I would pay 10 cents. But AGOA enables $1.15 per t-shirt in duty 
savings compared to Bangladesh (representative of foreign apparel company, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 15, 2016). 
  
 Third, the price of electricity in Ethiopia is relatively low. The firms surveyed say that 
they pay the equivalent of roughly 5 US cents per kWh. By comparison, the price of electricity 
in Turkey (which, naturally, a Turkish investor compared it to) is about 20 US cents per kWh.  
 Fourth, the Ethiopian government has put in place a range of investment incentives for 
foreign investors that produce for the export market (the full details of which will be discussed 
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in section 4.3.5). These include a range of tax exemptions, subsidised loans from the DBE and 
subsidised land leases. As the Ethiopian government owns all land, they have a lot of freedom 
to allocate land on a preferential basis. Some of the larger foreign firms even reported that they 
lease land for free. 
 Finally, foreign investors also said that the risk of investing in Ethiopia was fairly low 
compared to many other countries with cheap labour costs—the political situation is stable, 
and the government is responsive. Even those investors who were interviewed after the ‘state 
of emergency’59 was declared seemed relatively undeterred, especially those from South and 
East Asia. The general manager of a foreign footwear company likened the protests to those of 
Tiananmen Square in 1989, saying that “you can’t have smooth sailing when you’re investing 
in emerging markets.” 
 
4.3.5 Industrial policies (GVC oriented) to develop the textile and leather industries 
 
4.3.5.1 Establishment and revitalisation of government support agencies 
 
Since roughly 2010, when an industrial development strategy was launched (ETIDI, 2015) 
alongside the GTP, the Ethiopian government has revitalised its efforts to improve the 
institutional apparatus for industrial development, especially in the form of new government 
support agencies under oversight by the Ministry of Industry. Table 4.3 below provides a brief 
description of these agencies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
59 On 8 October 2016, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, declared a six-month state of 
emergency following nearly a year of anti-government demonstrations. 
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Table 4.3: New or revitalised government support agencies to assist growth of the 
textile and leather industries 
Ethiopian Textile Industry 
Development Institute (ETIDI)—
under the Ministry of Industry 
Established in 2010. Mission: To assist the 
development of the textile industry through 
investment promotion, consultancy services, 
training, research, and marketing and 
laboratory/technology support services (ETIDI, 
2015). 
Ethiopian Leather Industry 
Development Institute (LIDI)—
under the Ministry of Industry 
Established as the Leather and Leather Products 
Technology Institute (LLPTI) in 1998, renamed 
LIDI in 2010. Mission: To assist the development of 
the leather industry through investment promotion, 
consultancy services, training, research, and 
marketing and laboratory/technology support 
services (LIDI, 2015). 
Ethiopian Investment Commission 
(EIC)—independent, reports 
directly to the Prime Minister 
Established in 1992, revitalised in 2014. Mission: To 
promote Ethiopia as an investment location for both 
foreign and domestic investors, and attract FDI into 
strategic industries and segments of value chains; to 
formulate incentives for investment attraction, and 
create a conducive investment climate (deputy CEOs 
of EIC, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, 
October 22, 2016).       
Industrial Parks Development 
Corporation (IPDC)—under the 
Ministry of Industry 
Established in 2014. Mission: To assist Ethiopia’s 
industrialisation process, promote exports and create 
employment opportunities by building dedicated 
industrial parks with one-stop-shop services for 
domestic and foreign investors (IPDC, 2015).  
Ethiopian Industrial Inputs 
Development Institute (EIIDE)—
under the Ministry of Industry 
Established in 2015. Mission: To assist the process 
of input provision to the domestic manufacturing 
sector of high quality and quantity, and at a stable 
price (CEO of EIIDE, interviewed by the author in 
Addis Ababa, November 03, 2016).  
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The ETIDI and the LIDI (both under the Ministry of Industry) are arguably the agencies 
that work most closely with the two industries, as their mandate is broadly to support 
development and growth of the industries through an array of interventions. As foreign firms 
generally have more know-how and capital, both the ETIDI and the LIDI are more important 
for domestic firms (though some foreign firms report that their investment support services are 
valuable). As seen in Table 4.3, their services are wide-ranging, but interviews have indicated 
that their skills-development services—either through giving training directly to firm 
employees or embarking on collaboration programmes with universities, the private sector and 
the international donor community—are among the most important ones.  
Because the development institutes themselves suffer from lack of skills, they have 
embarked on ‘twinning’ partnerships with similar institutes abroad. The LIDI has established 
partnerships with the Central Leather Research Institute of India (CLRI) and the Footwear 
Design Development Institute of India (FDDI). At any time, the LIDI hosts 10-40 employees 
from these institutes, who assist with preparing curriculums for university students, and give 
technical and marketing advice to the LIDI staff and to leather and leather products firms 
(senior official at the LIDI, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, October 20, 2016). The 
ETIDI has also established a similar partnership the National Institute for Fashion Technology 
(NIFT) in India. The ETIDI regularly sends Ethiopian staff to India for training, either through 
short term training programmes, or to embark on masters and PhD programmes. The ETIDI 
also hosts some experts from the NIFT (rotations for up to 4 years) who help prepare training 
manuals and give on-the-ground technical support to firms (senior official at the ETIDI, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 11, 2016).  
Over the course of fieldwork, interviews with firms in both industries clearly indicated 
that the LIDI provides better support than the ETIDI. As the LIDI was established 12 years 
before the ETIDI, this is not surprising.60 This difference in support capabilities became 
especially clear from the perspective of foreign firms. One representative of a foreign apparel 
company stated: “ETIDI probably has machinery worth $5m, but lots of it has never been used. 
I have a good relationship with ETIDI, and some of the young guys there are starting to learn 
things, but currently, they just don’t know much” (representative of foreign apparel company, 
																																																						
60 The LIDI was effectively established in 1998 under the name ‘Leather and Leather Products Technology 
Institute,’ but was renamed the LIDI in 2010 when the institute’s responsibility and mandate was significantly 
expanded (Abebe and Schaefer, 2013).  
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interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 15, 2016). The LIDI, on the other hand, 
is generally praised by foreign firms. The general manager of one of the largest foreign 
tanneries even called the institute an extension of their company: 
 
LIDI has always been supporting. For example, we place requests for leather 
technologists from them, they also send people here to do internships that often end up 
working for us. They also help with machinery breakdown – we recently used their 
machines for tannery when our own broke down. When we recently had a fire, they 
helped us with machinery. LIDI feels like an extension of our company (general 
manager of foreign tannery, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 24, 
2016).  
 
 The Ethiopian Investment Commission and the Industrial Parks Development 
Corporation are two additional government agencies that are vital for the development of the 
textile and leather industries. Both of them work closely together in the area of industrial parks. 
The IDPC is mostly responsible for the construction of parks—their design, size and location 
within the country. 
The EIC evaluates all investment proposals in the country, and because such a large 
share of investment proposals in the two industries are targeted at the parks, especially those 
from foreign firms, the EIC has become integral to the success of industrial parks. The EIC 
was established in 1992, but in 2014, the agency was restructured and ordered to report directly 
to the Prime Minister’s Office rather than the Ministry of Industry, which, in effect, meant 
more power. The idea of the restructuring was to transform the EIC “from a mere permit and 
licensing entity to a nucleus where foreign direct investment is directed” (Fortune, 2014, p.1). 
The EIC does not merely evaluate proposals, but also sends delegations abroad to promote 
Ethiopia as an investment location. Moreover, the EIC is responsible for formulating 
investment incentives and coordinating possible co-location between foreign and domestic 
investors in industrial parks. As such, the EIC is also integral to policies for technology and 
skill transfer from foreign to domestic firms (more on which will be discussed later in this 
section).  
 The youngest of these new or revitalised government support agencies is the Ethiopian 
Industrial Inputs Supply Enterprise. The EIIDE was established to respond to bottlenecks in 
the domestic supply chain for both apparel and leather products—export-oriented firms 
consistently reported that raw material provision (cotton, hides and skins) was not meeting the 
standards for quantity, quality and price. In some respects, the EIIDE works as a trading 
company, buying raw material from farmers and traders, and selling it on to the manufacturers. 
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Particularly domestic textile producers use the EIIDE for buying cotton (leather producers do 
not seem to be using the EIIDE that much, which might simply be because the institute has not 
been in existence long enough to establish rapport with all actors in the private sector). The 
EIIDE purchases raw material from both domestic and foreign producers. For example, when 
a textile company requires organic cotton, which is not grown in Ethiopia, the EIIDE will 
typically import organic cotton from the US or China (CEO of the EIIDE, interviewed by the 
author in Addis Ababa, November 3, 2016).  
 
4.3.5.2 Export (and investment) incentives 
 
As mentioned, the Ethiopian government sees the development of the textile and leather 
industries not only as a first step on the way to industrialisation and economic prosperity but 
also as crucial for providing export revenues. Pushing for exports does not only mean easing 
the balance of payments constraint but it also means learning about international markets, 
striving for higher productivity, and creating more jobs than would be possible if only serving 
the domestic market. Therefore, almost all incentives that the government provides to firms 
(both domestic and foreign) in these industries are linked to export performance. 
 For foreign firms, these incentives might simply be interpreted as incentives to invest 
in Ethiopia, as practically no foreign firms have any intention of selling their products on the 
domestic market anyway. For attracting foreign firms, the construction of industrial parks is a 
very important incentive. By doing so, Ethiopia is following an industrialisation model that has 
become increasingly common in developing countries since the 1990s, revolving around 
building these parks (which also go by the names SEZs, EPZs and FTZs, as explained in the 
previous chapter) primarily for foreign firms, which make it easier to concentrate dedicated 
infrastructure in a delimited area.61 Such parks also normally provide one-stop-shop services 
to firms—a multitude of logistics services efficiently and easily streamlined because of the co-
location of many firms.  
In Ethiopia, resources are put into providing dedicated infrastructure not only in and 
around the parks, but also in other areas of the country to make transport to and from the parks 
easier. The prime example is the railroad connecting Addis Ababa and various industrial parks 
in the country to Djibouti. Because Ethiopia is landlocked, foreign firms face higher transport 
and logistics costs than they normally would elsewhere. In fact, an analysis of interviews 
																																																						
61 Ranked by order of employment, most such parks/zones are in China, Mexico, Phillippines, Vietnam and 
Malaysia (Boyenge, 2007). 
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conducted with foreign firms during fieldwork revealed that this is the most common complaint 
among foreign firms. Moreover, Djibouti recognises its importance for Ethiopian exports62 and 
charges a steep price for international trade clearing. The representative of a foreign apparel 
company in Ethiopia claimed that he pays $1,100 for clearing a container in Djibouti, whereas 
in Mombasa, Kenya, the cost is only $250 (representative of a foreign apparel company, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 15, 2016). 
It is hard to understate the importance of industrial parks for industrialisation and the 
attraction of FDI in Ethiopia. As already mentioned, the flagship park in the textile industry, 
HIP, is estimated to bring in 10 times the current export revenues of the entire industry. But 
several other such massive parks are under construction (see table 4.4), all planned to be 
completed by the end of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
62 Ethiopia cannot go through Eritrea—there has been no cross border exchange between the two countries since 
the border war broke out in 1998.  
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Table 4.4: State-owned Industrial parks in Ethiopia 
Name of 
park 
Location Km 
from 
Addis 
Ababa 
Proximity 
to Djibouti 
Delimited 
land 
(hectares) 
Phase 1 
(hectares) 
Eligible 
industries 
Completion 
stage 
Bole Lemi 
I 
Addis 
Ababa 
Addis 
Ababa 
863 156 156 Apparel Operational 
Bole Lemi 
II 
Addis 
Ababa 
Addis 
Ababa 
863 186 186 Apparel Not completed 
Kilinto Addis 
Ababa 
Addis 
Ababa 
863 337 337 Food processing, 
pharmaceuticals, 
furniture, house 
appliances, 
electronics 
Not completed 
Hawassa South 275 998 300 100 Textile and 
apparel 
Under testing 
Dire Dawa East 473 380 1500 150 Textile and 
apparel, auto 
assembly, food 
processing 
Not completed 
Kombolcha North-
East 
380 480 700 50 Textile and 
apparel, food 
processing 
Not completed 
Mekelle North 760 750 1000 50 Textile and 
apparel, food 
processing 
Not completed 
Adama South-
East 
74 678 2000 100 Textile and 
apparel, auto 
assembly, food 
processing 
Not completed 
Bahir Dar North-
West 
578 985 1000 50 Textile and 
apparel, food 
processing 
Not completed 
Jimma South-
West 
346 1098 500 50 Textile and 
apparel, food 
processing 
Not completed 
Source: IPDC (2015) 
 
 
As seen from the Table, textile (fabric) and apparel production will be the main focus 
of most parks, but probably more so apparel, given the way the global industry is organised 
today. This is not to say that leather and leather products are unimportant. Leather footwear 
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production is sometimes categorised under apparel (which is clearly the case for Bole Lemi 
industrial park). Moreover, the main park project for the leather industry is Modjo Industrial 
Park, which is not owned by the government and operates separately from other industries. 
Many of the state-owned parks will carry an ecological label, and because tanneries are very 
difficult to operate in an ecological manner, it is hard to co-locate them with other industries. 
 A range of financial incentives have been put in place for export-oriented firms in the 
state-owned parks (practically all firms in the parks are export-oriented). As mentioned, these 
should not simply be seen as export incentives, but also as a way of attracting foreign investors. 
Table 4.5 present a full overview of these incentives. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Financial incentives for manufacturing firms in state-owned industrial 
parks 
 
• Income tax exemption for up to 10 years 
• Exemption from duties and other taxes on imports of capital equipment (machinery, 
construction materials, spare parts, vehicles, etc.) and raw materials (inputs needed 
in production, like cotton, yarn and/or fabric).   
• No taxes on exports 
• One-stop-shop for government services 
• Subsidised land lease: 60-80 years free of charge for factories and residential 
quarters.  
• Guaranteed remittance of capital for foreign investors 
Source: EIC (2016) 
 
 
It is not completely clear what one-stop-shop for government services entails, but 
according to the general manager of a domestic firm that is set to locate in HIP, it most 
importantly includes visa and immigration services (general manager of domestic trading 
company, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 9, 2016).  
 The list of incentives in Table 4.5 are not restricted to firms in the state-owned industrial 
parks. In fact, all export-oriented firms in Ethiopia are handed such incentives (and in some 
instances, non-export firms). However, some incentives are offered on a case-by-case basis, 
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while others are offered across the board to all export-oriented firms. For example, exemption 
of duties and taxes on imports are offered to all firms in Ethiopia if used for the purpose of 
export. Firms who sell products on the domestic market are also offered duty free access to 
imports, but only capital equipment, not raw materials, and only for a maximum of five years 
if the investment is not in manufacturing or agriculture (UNIDO, 2016b). Additionally, the 
exemption of export tax is applicable to all exporters, inside and outside of parks, with the 
exception of a few products (like semi-processed hides and skins, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter). The remittance of capital also applies to all foreign investors, regardless of being 
inside or outside an industrial park.  
 Other incentives are also determined on a case-by-case basis. Subsidised land lease is 
one of them. While there are some guidelines for land lease (see for example UNIDO, 2016b), 
interviews with foreign investors outside industrial parks indicated that the guidelines are not 
strict. Some investors pay for leasing land, while others said that they have been offered to 
lease large tracts of land for free.  From the government’s perspective, lease rates seem to be 
determined based on the desirability of the investment. Investors that indicate grand investment 
and/or expansion plans with the possibility of creating a lot of jobs seem to be offered more 
favourable lease rates.  
One can observe a similar practice with respect to income tax. While there are 
guidelines in this area as well based on the share of exports in total production, production 
activity and location (higher share of exports, and locating to an area where job absorption is 
needed, generally means more years of income tax exemption), the ‘big fish’ investors seem to 
be offered more years of income tax exemption. The general manager of one of the largest 
footwear companies claimed that income tax exemptions are offered for up to 15 years (general 
manager of foreign leather products company, interviewed by author in Addis Ababa, October 
8, 2016), whereas no official government document sets the bar at over 10 years.  
 While these financial incentives are important, Ethiopia is not doing something 
supremely novel by offering them. Many of them, such as income tax exemption (also known 
as ‘tax holidays’) and tax exemption on imports, are offered in industrial parks in many of the 
aforementioned countries (see footnote 61) that also have or are still attracting FDI into 
manufacturing industries. The owner of a foreign apparel company in Ethiopia remarked that 
in Egypt, where his company had chiefly operated in before setting up in Ethiopia, the 
government had offered him a lifelong tax holiday (owner of foreign apparel company, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, October 21, 2016). 
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 Another important incentive is credit allocation. The state plays an important role in 
capital markets in Ethiopia, as foreign banks are not allowed to operate there. The 
understanding is that they will be allowed to operate in the country only when domestic banks 
have developed the financial, managerial and technological capacities to compete against 
international banks.63 Consequently, two state-owned banks, the DBE and the CBE, dominate 
the banking sector in Ethiopia. DBE is important for long-term loans (investment capital), 
particularly for the manufacturing sector, while CBE is responsible for providing working 
capital and international banking services. Their banking services are especially important for 
domestic firms in both the textile and leather industries, as these firms are normally shorter on 
capital than foreign firms. From DBE, domestic firms can get up to 75 per cent of required 
investment capital, whereas foreign firms can get up to 50 per cent (official at the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Industry, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 23, 2016).  
According to sources in the two industries, the interest rates on loans from both banks range 
between 9 and 12 per cent, depending on the firm’s export share. The CEO of a large domestic 
textile company reported that the interest rate is set at 12 per cent for any export share below 
60 per cent, 9.5 per cent for an export share in the range of 60 to 80 per cent, and 9 per cent for 
an export share over 80 per cent (CEO of domestic textile company, interviewed by the author 
in Addis Ababa, November 7, 2016). 
 Finally, domestic export-oriented firms enjoy subsidies for hiring expatriate experts. 
While all domestic firms and government officials have confirmed the existence of such a 
scheme, the particularities are slightly unclear. Some firms have reported that the number of 
expatriate experts vary between 3 and 6 per firm, and that the subsidy covers 75 per cent of 
their total salaries during the first year of employment, 50 per cent the second year, and so on. 
The president of the Ethiopian Textile, Garment and Manufacturers Association (ETGAMA), 
however, reported that each firm is given fixed amount: $75,000 the first year of employment 
for payment of the expatriate experts, $50,000 the second year of employment, and so on. He 
also claimed that the scheme favoured in particular firms in the textile and leather industries 
(ETGAMA president, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 7, 2016).  
 
 
																																																						
63 Another reason for not liberalising its capital markets to foreign banks is to avoid intrinsic financial instability, 
vulnerability, and shocks that have in many instances plagued LDCs with high dependence on foreign capital 
(Chang, et. al., 2016). 
 180 
4.3.5.3 Policies for technology transfer and linkages 
 
The previous two sub-sections elaborated on the Ethiopian government’s renewed commitment 
to develop the textile and leather industries, in particular the export and investment incentives 
that have been put in place to do so. These focus largely on attracting foreign investors, to 
create jobs and generate export revenues. However, as seen from the previous chapter, many 
developing countries who have embarked on FDI-led industrialisation strategies have become 
stuck in low-skilled assembly tasks, failing to transfer technology from foreign companies to 
the domestic economy, and/or creating few to no linkages to the domestic economy, 
particularly backward linkages to domestic supplier industries. Is there a danger that Ethiopia 
becomes another such case? Will Ethiopia’s industrial parks be yet another example of 
‘cathedrals in the desert’? 
 In the leather industry, it has been easier to promote backward linkages than in the 
textile industry. This is partly because the raw material is more readily available. Ethiopia has 
Africa’s largest livestock population, but the country is far from meeting the same quantity and 
quality standards in cotton cultivation compared to its African counterparts. In fact, several 
tanneries and footwear producers say that the availability of raw hides and skins is part of why 
they are attracted to Ethiopia, whereas very few foreign textile or apparel manufacturers come 
to Ethiopia with the intention of using Ethiopian cotton, or other raw materials that go into 
textile production. Ethiopia has also put in place local content requirements in the leather 
industry: because of its abundance of sheepskin, the government has had in place a policy since 
2011 that bans the import of sheepskin, unless there is a shortage of sheepskin in the country. 
If a policy like this were put in place for cotton, it would most likely spark an outrage among 
export-oriented textile producers, as Ethiopian cotton does not meet international quality 
standards for fabrics finer than that of home textiles, like bed sheets and towels, for which one 
would need a longer cotton staple length that what is being grown in Ethiopia right now.64 
   Apart from the ban on importation of sheepskin, the Ethiopian government puts no 
explicit requirements on foreign investors, such as the joint venture requirements that were 
discussed in the case of both South Korea and Taiwan in the last chapter. However, as we saw 
in Taiwan’s case, its FDI strategy was relatively liberal in earlier stages of industrialisation, 
and one could arguably make the case that in Ethiopia, the gap in technological capabilities 
between domestic and foreign firms at this stage are so large that few foreign investors would 
																																																						
64 More details on the challenges facing the inputs sectors will be addressed in section 4.3.7.    
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be willing to engage in joint ventures, which, in fact, many of them have reported would be out 
of the question. Furthermore, the degree of competition among developing countries in labour-
intensive manufacturing today gives less bargaining power to the developing countries when 
making deals with foreign investors. Countries in a stage of development like Ethiopia could 
rightfully argue that any ‘requirement’ policy would simply make prospective investors source 
production from elsewhere.  
 It is clear that, like Taiwan did in earlier phases of industrialisation, Ethiopia is putting 
in place a range of incentives simply to attract FDI.  But is the country strategic in terms of 
which type of FDI it is attracting? As we saw from the Singapore example in the previous 
chapter, part of its success with FDI owed to the fact that it attracted exactly the type of FDI it 
wanted. The Ethiopian government claims that it is doing this—emphasising that it is attracting 
investors in all different segments of the value chain, so that it increases the probability of 
learning about production activities in more than just the low-value assembly like segments of 
the value chains (notes from presentation by the CEO of EIC at the Agro-Industry Investment 
Forum in Addis Ababa, 5-7 October, 2016). To some extent, this is true. In the leather industry, 
FDI has successfully been attracted to both the tanning industry and the leather products 
industry. In the textile industry, FDI from particularly Turkey has focused on a range of 
activities in the value chain. Ethiopia has also managed to secure a whopping $350m 
investment from a Chinese wool textile company (Reuters, 2016). However, the general trend 
in the textile industry is that a growing share of companies focus exclusively on CMT functions 
in the apparel segment, which is contributing to a worrying trend of increasing dependence on 
fabric imports (more on this in section 4.3.6 and section 4.3.7).  
 Even if foreign companies are attracted in a range of activities in the value chains 
though, the challenge of transferring technology and skills from these companies to the 
domestic economy remains. A special adviser to the prime minister expressed belief that this 
would partly happen through demonstration effects—domestic firms being exposed to foreign 
firms’ products, production processes and marketing strategies—and competition effects—the 
simple presence of foreign firms will expose greater pressure on competing domestic firms to 
be more productive (special adviser to the prime minister, interviewed by the author in Addis 
Ababa, May 13, 2015). Moreover, there is some evidence of skills development at higher levels 
than simple operator training, without the Ethiopian government explicitly calling for it—many 
foreign firms actually send Ethiopian workers in technical or managerial positions to their 
home countries for training or train such workers through elaborate training programmes at 
their own facilities in Ethiopia (details of which will be discussed in the following section). 
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This is not an act of ‘benevolence’, as firms simply save money by having a lower dependence 
on expatriate workers.  
But the degree of perceived benevolence of foreign firms is also an issue that the 
Ethiopian government does indeed consider when going abroad to court investors, as strange 
as this might sound. The CEO and owner of one of the few exported-oriented domestic apparel 
firms in Ethiopia stated that he trusts the government’s ability to attract the right type of apparel 
investors to the country, recognising that the global industry is full of ‘bad’ investors with pure 
profit motives who move to whichever country has the cheapest labour, investors he referred 
to as ‘hunter-buyers’: “The textile sector is a bird. There are always hunter-buyers. We see 
which they are by inviting them and testing them” (CEO of domestic apparel company, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, 3 November 2016).  
 While these strategies for transferring technology do not come across as very 
interventionist, there is however one explicit technology transfer policy, very recently put in 
place, that is worth noting: In all the government owned industrial parks under construction, 
the government plans to allocate at least 20 per cent of sheds to domestic firms. HIP is piloting 
this scheme, and at the time of writing it is not completely clear what the role of domestic firms 
will be in relation to foreign firms, but the EIC reports that they intend for the foreign firms to 
act as ‘midwives’ for the domestic firms, explicitly stating that the scheme is put in place with 
the intention of transferring technology. (Deputy CEOs of EIC, interviewed by the author in 
Addis Ababa on October 22, 2016). When asked about the scheme, the representative of a 
foreign apparel company set to locate in HIP confirmed that the role of domestic investors was 
unclear, and that the EIC, the foreign investors and the domestic investors are in the process of 
meeting each other and figuring this out. To him, the most feasible solution seemed to be using 
the domestic firms as subcontractors or as suppliers of certain inputs (representative of foreign 
apparel company, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 15, 2016). 
 An interesting feature of the scheme is the subsidies that the Ethiopian government is 
putting in place for the domestic investors. Once all domestic investors have been selected 
(through a competitive tender process), they are offered the following, in addition to the 
industrial park incentives given to all investors (see Table 4.5): 1) The opportunity to borrow 
up to 85 per cent of needed investment capital from DBE, at an interest rate of 9 per cent; 2) 
85 per cent coverage of employee training programmes, including those that involve sending 
employees abroad for training. This subsidy will decrease by 10 percentage points each year; 
3) 85 per cent coverage of the salaries of expatriate ‘experts’. This subsidy will also decrease 
by 10 percentage points each year. An agreement has not yet been reached on the number of 
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expatriate experts each firm is allowed to hire, but according to different sources, it will be in 
the range of 5-10 (deputy CEO of EIC, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 
01, 2016; and general manager of domestic apparel company set to locate in HIP, interviewed 
by the author in Addis Ababa, November 09, 2016).    
 
4.3.6 Results achieved and future potential of technology transfer through attracting 
FDI  
 
The influx of FDI has contributed to an increase in export earnings in the respective industries, 
as already seen. It is also absorbing labour, steadily providing jobs for people in the areas where 
the firms establish factories and industrial zones. The previous section went beyond this, 
looking at policies to transfer technology to domestic firms and create linkages to the domestic 
economy. What results have been achieved so far, and what do prospects for the future look 
like? 
 
4.3.6.1 Technology transfer through demonstration effect, competition effect, spillovers and 
backward linkages  
 
When asked in interviews how they saw the entry of foreign firms, most domestic firms in the 
textile and leather industries responded positively, while some took a neutral position. It was a 
rarity to find domestic firms that saw entry of foreign firms as something ‘bad.’ One reason for 
the optimism was the chance to learn about technologies, management practices and business 
practices of foreign firms. The CEO of one the largest domestic vertically integrated textile 
firms, whose main buyer is H&M, elaborated on this point: 
 
One of the main factors for our success is that buyers are coming to Ethiopia. The 
foreign investments are helping to put Ethiopia on the map. We need foreign 
companies, as they are coming with full technology. Technology transfer will happen 
through teaching the Ethiopian people. They will demonstrate for us, but their 
competition is also good for us. Leaders, like myself, will be pressured by FDI…My 
company has the best linen in the country because we saw how foreign firms are doing 
it (CEO of domestic textile firm, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 
07, 2016).  
 
His statement builds on one of the theories outlined in the previous chapter: technology 
transfer happening through simple demonstration, as domestic firms are exposed to TNCs’ 
products, production processes and marketing strategies. Furthermore, this particular CEO 
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looked at competition as something beneficial, the logic being that the presence of foreign firms 
will exert greater pressure on competing domestic firms to be more productive. 
 In a similar vein, the general manager of a domestic apparel company set to locate in 
HIP stated that, “Operating in the export market will be the main facilitator of technological 
transfer” (general manager of domestic apparel company, interviewed by the author in Addis 
Ababa, 09 November, 2016). He also noted that technological spillovers would happen through 
direct backward linkages to domestic suppliers: 
 
Foreign buyers will help domestic suppliers with the process…There will also be 
collaboration with machinery and technology providers. They are coming to help us in 
Hawassa Industrial Park. JUKI, the famous sewing company, has even set up an office 
here. 
 
His account also relates to a theory outlined in the previous chapter: technological 
spillovers happening through backward linkages with local suppliers in the host country, when 
TNCs provide technical assistance, training and other information to raise the quality of 
suppliers’ products and help them meet on-time delivery.  
This type of channel for technology transfer was more commonly referred to in 
interviews. For example, one of the largest foreign footwear companies that exclusively 
sources leather locally assist the domestic tanneries with ensuring high quality leather: “We 
help the local tanneries understand how to improve their leather. For example, we send them 
technicians to help solve the problem if they have problem with making quality leather” 
(deputy general manager of foreign footwear company, interviewed by the author in Addis 
Ababa, November 25, 2016).  
While backward linkages in the textile industry are rarer than in the leather industry, 
one foreign textile company reported how they have one stable domestic supplier of yarn, and 
how they collaborate: 
 
We use yarn from a local spinning factory. 100 per cent of our yarn in the last year 
came from them. Before that, we imported yarn from Turkey, India and Pakistan. It’s a 
bit more expensive from the local spinning factory, but geographical proximity and 
reliability is a plus. For our production type, we are happy with yarn from them…We 
describe to them how they should produce our yarn. We share some recipes (exports 
and sales manager of foreign textile company, interviewed by the author in Addis 
Ababa, 07 December, 2016).  
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There are also such positive accounts from the perspective of domestic firms. The 
deputy manager of a domestic textile firm described what he foresees as a future beneficial 
supplier relationship with a foreign apparel firm, i.e. the prospect of supplying fabric to the 
foreign apparel firm: 
 
We may get something in the future from foreign firms, and we believe we will. We 
may be able to supply them with inputs. Still, nothing, but they are on the way. We 
have talked to one foreign apparel firm in particular. We have good communication 
with them. In fact, they had experts from their home country that came here and gave 
us knowledge sharing, and recommended and consulted on our machinery and 
technology. They did this for free, as they see us as a potential supplier someday (deputy 
manager of domestic state-owned textile company, interviewed by the author in 
Kombolcha, November 22, 2016).   
 
However, while there are optimistic accounts of technology transfer, there are also 
those who worry that the lack of clear technology transfer policies is leaving the degree of 
technology transfer to the ‘whims’ of foreign firms. An official at the ETIDI reported how he 
heard that some of the expatriate workers from the home country of one of the largest vertically 
integrated textile firms would send Ethiopian workers in semi-skilled positions to run errands 
whenever there was a machinery defect—the expatriate workers were worried that Ethiopian 
workers would learn skills that would take their jobs, so they sent the Ethiopian workers away 
because they did not want them to see how the machine is fixed (official at ETIDI, interviewed 
by the author in Addis Ababa, November 11, 2016). Similarly, the Ethiopian general manager 
of a foreign-owned tannery said how she had received clear instructions from the headquarters 
in the home country not to transfer technology to local workers – she had to keep in line with 
the practice of encrypting tanning recipes (general manager of foreign tannery, interviewed by 
the author in Addis Ababa, November 23, 2016).  
 Other than the planned technology transfer scheme in HIP, there are in fact no clear 
policies for technology transfer from foreign to domestic firms. One of the larger domestic 
footwear companies was actually calling for joint ventures, arguing that clearer government 
policies are needed to ensure that domestic firms are learning more and exporting more (general 
manager of domestic footwear company, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, 13 
October, 2015).    
 While these interview accounts are interesting and help shed light on the big picture, 
by no means can a sound, aggregate conclusion be drawn. They give us some indication for 
future potential of productivity growth, but, as seen in the section on export performance, 
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which is the only sound indicator of aggregate performance achieved thus far, the current 
situation is that foreign firms account for the largest share of export growth in both the 
industries, clearly indicating that there is a significant gap in productive capabilities between 
foreign and domestic firms. 
 In terms of backward linkages, while there seems to be strongly established ties 
between foreign footwear producers and local tanneries, the trend is more worrying in the 
textile industry, even if there are some positive accounts, as indicated above. Figure 4.12 shows 
that Ethiopia’s import dependency on textile-based products has increased considerably with 
the growth of the apparel segment of the textile industry. Linkages between foreign apparel 
producers and domestic textile firms are more the exception rather than the rule. In fact, very 
few of the apparel investors coming from abroad say that they intend to source local fabric for 
at least the next five years. 
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4.3.6.2 Technology transfer through skills development 
 
The effect that FDI has on skills (human capital) development is an additional facet of 
technology transfer that warrants a discussion. In the context of labour-intensive manufacturing 
in Ethiopia, there are two lenses one can study this through. One is the skills development that 
happens at the operator level: to what extent will training of people in assembly-like tasks result 
in building capabilities that can further industrialisation, both for firms in the prioritised 
industries (domestic and foreign) and for other industries? The other is higher-level skills 
development: is there any indication that Ethiopians are being employed or trained for 
technical, managerial and administrative positions that typically require vocational or 
university-level education? 
 
4.3.6.2.1 ‘Simple’ skills—the creation of a modern industrial workforce? 
 
The case studies in the previous chapter made it clear that the second type of skills development 
is more desirable for sustained industrialisation. For example, in the case of Mexico, the 
computer industry in Guadalajara only attracted footloose operations from US companies that 
could easily be sourced elsewhere if a cost advantage should arise. A big problem was that 
domestic employees were engaged in little more than assembly tasks. Among employees of 
foreign firms in Guadalajara, only 6.9 per cent had graduated from high school.  
 However, the Ethiopian context is a unique one, as the majority of people currently 
entering the industrial workforce have little or no previous formal employment experience. 
Without being asked, many representatives of foreign firms urged me to look at ‘work culture’ 
and the lack of time management as an issue underpinning lack of productivity. The general 
manager of one of the largest foreign footwear companies, which also has operations in China, 
naturally compared Ethiopian and Chinese workers. “In China, work, work, work. Here, it is 
different. In China, they will do exactly what they tell you to do. The Ethiopian workers are 
willing to learn though, that is important” (general manager of foreign footwear company, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, October 08, 2016). In a similar vein, the general 
manager of a foreign tannery that has been in the country for over a decade commented, 
“Ethiopian tanneries are not as productive as foreign tanneries because of the culture of the 
workforce. The concept of time has a different meaning here in Ethiopia” (general manager of 
foreign tannery, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 24, 2016). Interestingly, 
the general manager of a foreign apparel company stated that that although the work culture 
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was an issue in the country, this was simply because it had not industrialised yet, and with 
industrialisation, this would change (general manager of foreign apparel company, interviewed 
by the author in Addis Ababa, October 24, 2016). Chang (2007) provides rich historical 
evidence that supports this idea, and concludes, “Culture is the result, as well as the cause, of 
economic development. It would be far more accurate to say that countries become 
‘hardworking’ and ‘disciplined’ (and acquire other good cultural traits) because of economic 
development, rather than the other way around” (Chang, 2007, p.197).  
A question, then, naturally arises: is it possible that the simple absorption of labour by 
foreign manufacturing firms will assist in producing a modern industrial workforce with 
factory-like work discipline and the habit of keeping time? A classic article that theorises this 
is E.P. Thompson’s (1967) “Time, Work-Discpline and Industrial Capitalism”, in which he 
talks at length about the importance of disciplining English workers for the success of the 
industrial revolution. “Mature industrial societies of all varieties are marked by time-thrift and 
by a clear demarcation between ‘work’ and ‘life’…Without time-discipline we could not have 
the insistent energies of industrial man” (Thompson, 1967, p.93). The development economist 
Arthur Lewis also underscored the importance of ‘factory routines’ for productivity growth, 
“The opportunities for greater productivity exist whatever level of work people may fix 
upon…some of these opportunities depend on willingness to make regular effort; factory 
routines, for example, require regular attendance and regular hours” (Lewis, 1955, pp.39-40). 
According to Sugihara (2013), productivity growth in the textile industry in Japan during the 
Meji period required women who were disciplined, punctual, and willing to respond to various 
incentive schemes instituted by firm managers, although skill levels required to carry out their 
tasks remained simple. 
 As Ethiopia is in a nascent stage of industrialisation, there is no evidence that this large-
scale creation of a modern industrial workforce has yet happened. In fact, many foreign firms 
report problems of high labour turnover because Ethiopian workers cannot cope with the 
demands and stress during work hours, as they are not used to the clear division between work 
and leisure (more on the issues of labour turnover in section 4.3.7). But given that employment 
looks to increase massively in the next few years in these labour-intensive industries and that 
this will involve employing a substantial number of people that have little or no previous 
experience with industrial style work, it is not unlikely that the attraction of foreign investments 
in the textile and leather industries will assist in producing a ‘modern’ industrial workforce.  
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4.3.6.2.2 Higher level skills training 
 
The type of skills training whereby domestic workers develop abilities to do to more than 
simple assembly-type work are ultimately more important. In this regard, industry-specific 
training institutes, like the LIDI and the ETIDI, as well as universities and vocational schools 
are important. Foreign firms can play an important role as well. While it is a common belief 
that host governments have to incentivise or push foreign firms to engage in this type of 
training, it is not unusual for foreign firms do this on their own initiative—many of them 
actually save costs by reducing the number of expatriate workers needed for operations abroad. 
 In Ethiopia, it seems that Chinese companies are particularly engaged in the practice of 
sending their Ethiopian employees back to China for training. This might be related to 
language—Chinese companies in Ethiopia generally have a strong desire for Ethiopian workers 
to learn Chinese. One Chinese textile company that has not commenced production yet but has 
made the initial investment, reported the following: 
 
Technicians are very important for the industry. We hired 30 Ethiopian candidates who 
specialise in IT and textile technology. First, we train them in Chinese for 7 months 
here in Ethiopia. Then, we bring them to China for technical training for 6 months. 
These are graduates from Bahir Dar, Wollo and Hawassa University. These people will 
train at our factory in China (general manager of Chinese textile company, interviewed 
by the author in Addis Ababa, November 7, 2016).  
 
A Chinese footwear company has had a similar practice of sending Ethiopian workers 
to China for training: 
 
Right now, we mostly have Chinese people in skilled positions, but we are training 
Ethiopians in skilled positions. The company pays for training them in HQ in China. 
This training is in management, technical and production operation. Each year, we send 
about 100 Ethiopians to China for a period of 6-12 months. We’re basically training 
future supervisors. And it saves us money. We are also building supervisor training 
here (general manager of Chinese footwear company, interviewed by the author in 
Addis Ababa, October 08, 2016).  
 
The general manager of a non-Chinese foreign leather products company also 
emphasised the point of costs-savings by reducing the number of foreign workers (mostly 
Chinese) needed. She said that the company had successfully reduced the number of foreign 
workers in mechanics and design from 15 to 5, in part because they send 5 Ethiopians abroad 
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every year to train in their headquarters (general manager of Chinese leather products company, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 24, 2016).  
Some foreign companies engage in higher-level skills training in collaboration with the 
government and the international development community. For example, one of the anchor 
investors in Hawassa Industrial Park, PVH, has recruited 140 textile graduates from Bahir Dar 
University and has managed to get the German Development Agency (GIZ) to hire vocational 
teachers from Germany to train them intensively for 5 weeks in technical and managerial skills, 
in collaboration with the ETIDI (representative of foreign apparel company, interviewed by 
the author in Addis Ababa, November 15, 2016). 
Thus seen, there is some evidence that foreign investors are training their Ethiopian 
employees in more than simple assembly work, without the Ethiopian government demanding 
it. However, there is no evidence of any R&D activities being relocated to Ethiopia, and unless 
the Ethiopian government explicitly calls for it, or formulates policies to attract it (by for 
example handing out financial incentives for relocating R&D activities—as seen from last 
chapter, Taiwan enabled tax-write offs for R&D activities for foreign companies), there is no 
clear indication that these foreign companies will start investing in R&D in Ethiopia. The 
observations in Ethiopia resonate with those of Dicken (2011), in that TNCs tend to offshore 
parts of the results of their innovations but not the innovative capabilities themselves, and that 
relatively few R&D activities tend to be relocated to developing countries in the process of 
offshoring.  
 
4.3.7 Key challenges for growth of the industries through the GVC participation 
strategy 
 
The slew of incentives and policies that the Ethiopian government is designing to support 
growth of the textile and leather industries gives reason for optimism, but as seen, the 
performance of the industries as measured by export value is not that impressive at this point. 
Interviews in Ethiopia pointed out two key challenges that, if addressed, would provide further 
optimism for growth of the industries: 1) The lack of domestically available inputs—the 
quantity and quality of hides, skins, and cotton does not meet international requirements; 2) 
High labour turnover in footwear and apparel factories.  
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4.3.7.1 The input problem   
 
As highlighted numerous times in this and the previous chapter, successful FDI attraction 
strategies in developing countries have stressed the creation of backward linkages to domestic 
supplier industries. This could be done better in Ethiopia, and the challenge is not simply about 
inducing foreign investors to do so.  
 
4.3.7.1.1 The leather industry 
 
Recent research has highlighted the lack of marketisation of hides and skins and the prevalence 
of traditional animal husbandry practices as a problem that has led to poor quality of hides and 
skins (Abebe and Schafer, 2013; Oqubay, 2015). As for the lack of marketisation, which results 
in insufficient supply of skins to tanneries, Oqubay (2015) presents some worrying figures. In 
2012, 61 per cent of skins and 48 per cent of hides in Ethiopia were not marketed, but used 
within producer households. Moreover, due to traditional animal husbandry practices, the 
estimated reproductive rate of Ethiopian livestock is 37 per cent, one of the lowest in the world. 
Besides, as a result of predominantly traditional slaughtering methods and poor handling of 
raw hides and skins during collection, the quality of hides and skins have deteriorated. In 1980, 
50 per cent of tanneries received top quality ratings, compared to only 20 per cent in 2012 
(Oqubay, 2015). According to Oquaby, the major reason for this is ectoparasites, which 
agricultural extension services and veterinary services in Ethiopia have failed to address thus 
far.  
 Abebe and Schefer (2013) point out how market imperfections (or, rather, the 
informality of the market) has created problems on the input side. For example, no formal 
system of quality assessment or objective grading rules for hides and skins exist. Quality and 
prices are negotiated on eyeball to eyeball basis, which has sometimes led to bitter 
disagreements between tanneries and traders on the quality of hides and skins. This has created 
mistrust between sellers and buyers, which, in turn, reduces the number of transactions in the 
market.  
 Interviews during fieldwork confirm these problems. In particular, the quality and poor 
preservation of hides and skins were brought up numerous times. The general manager of one 
of the largest foreign tanneries said the following: 
 
Unfortunately, the quality of skins in Ethiopia has been deteriorating. Parasites, knife 
cuts, preservation. Don’t understand why the government fails to improve in this areas. 
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Animals have to be treated not only for the meat, but also by-product. We also need a 
proper way of trading. Today, skin traders go around, and do not properly preserve. 
They don’t handle, salt is also an issue. We don’t think EIIDE will solve things, we 
deliberately did not sign up for their services (general manager of foreign tannery, 
interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, 24 November, 2016). 
 
The EIIDE was created to respond to the aforementioned problems, but as the reflection 
of the general manager shows, the EIIDE has yet to gain the confidence of the tanneries—it 
was hardly mentioned in interviews with other tanneries.  
 Oqubay (2015) suggests that the prolonged difficulties on the input side of the sector is 
a result of path dependency; the system of smallholder livestock management, whereby 
slaughtering is part of subsistence rather than ultimately making leather products, has been in 
place for such a long time, making it difficult to effectively change practices through policy. 
He suggests exploring the experiences of countries that have gone through similar problems in 
the livestock sector, such as Brazil, Botswana and South Africa. Abebe and Schafer (2013) 
propose that existing extension and veterinary services must be improved, especially to address 
the quality issue. There is some hope that this will be more effectively addressed in the future, 
not only because of the establishment of the EIIDE but also seeing that a new Ministry of 
Livestock (and Fisheries) was established in 2016 to engage more in depth with slaughtering 
and preservation practices (senior official at the Ministry of Industry, interviewed by the author 
in Addis Ababa, 26 October, 2016).  
 
4.3.7.1.2 The textile industry 
 
The challenges on the input side in the textile industry are not too different from those of the 
leather industry, but the bottlenecks are more severe. Whereas export-oriented leather products 
manufacturers use local hides and skins, hardly any export-oriented apparel manufacturers use 
locally made fabric, yarn or cotton, as mentioned in the previous section. The declining prices 
that international apparel manufacturers are offered from retailers and buyers in end markets 
(as detailed in last chapter), combined with an almost complete dependence on inputs of raw 
materials, leaves a very small segment of the value chain in Ethiopia, and at that, one that does 
not add a lot of value.  
The operations manager of a foreign apparel company pointed out that if Ethiopia wants 
to generate export revenues, they need to get serious about the raw materials segment of the 
value chain: “The government needs to focus on the raw materials, like cotton and fabric. This 
is 70 per cent of the value of the finished product!” (operations manager of foreign apparel 
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company, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 16, 2016). Thus seen, Ethiopia 
has an input problem that needs to be addressed, even if they simply want the textile industry 
to be a cash cow for foreign currency.   
A key issue in terms of upgrading the inputs industry is the quality of cotton.  According 
to MoI-ITC (2016), the crucial factors affecting quality are outdated production, post-
harvesting and ginning techniques and technology; inadequate extension services; and the lack 
of finance for farmers. Furthermore, the amount of land being cultivated for cotton in Ethiopia 
is far below the potential. According to ITC (2015), Ethiopia has 3m hectares of land suitable 
for cotton cultivation. This is almost equal to the land under cotton cultivation in Pakistan, the 
4th largest cotton producer in the world. Only 4 per cent of this land is currently being used for 
cotton cultivation in Ethiopia.   
 The government has taken some actions to address the inputs problem. The EIIDE was 
established in 2015 and in 2016, the Ministry of Industry launched a detailed cotton and textile 
roadmap (MoI-ITC, 2016). Some domestic textile producers have confirmed that they find the 
EIIDE’s services useful. Especially as the EIIDE has put in place an internationally 
benchmarked grading and price system for all cotton producers, the producers report that they 
don’t have to deal with the volatility of cotton prices that they had problems with in the past. 
 However, in a personal interview on 26 November, 2016, the head of an association of 
cotton producers and ginners expressed scepticism about the government’s proposed solutions. 
He had 4 main objections:  
1) There is an illogical fragmentation of responsibilities within the government. On the 
one hand, the ETIDI is formulating policy for the cotton sector. On the other hand, the Ministry 
of Agriculture leases the land, conducts research and carries out extension services. A cotton 
development agency that incorporates all these responsibilities would come closer to solving 
the organisational mess.  
2) The EIIDEs grading system is punitive and inconsistent. It has only established three 
grading centres in Ethiopia, making for an unnecessary long journey for many cotton 
producers. It could potentially waste cotton producers’ time and raise their costs, should they 
refuse to take the EIIDEs price—they may simply end up transporting the cotton to the grading 
centre and back, without having sold any. The EIIDEs inconsistency is reflected in its price 
setting. It claims to set prices based on the international spot price, but this price fluctuates 
every day, whereas the EIIDE updates prices only every few months.  
3) Cotton producers have insufficient access to finance. The DBE requires collateral in 
the form of property in Addis Ababa. Very few cotton producers in Southern Afar, where 
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Ethiopia has traditionally produced 50 per cent of its cotton, can offer that type of collateral 
and consequently they are not granted loans for capital investments.  
4) There is a widening geographical asymmetry between cotton producers and 
ginneries, which increases logistics costs. The government has started leasing out land in the 
Western belt of Ethiopia to large scale cotton producers, but the ginneries (that are mostly 
located in the East (Southern Afar)) have not followed.  
There are additional problems to be addressed in the domestic textile production 
segment. Ethiopia has applied high tariffs on imported textiles and apparel sold in the domestic 
market, in order to protect domestic producers. According to some, this has created 
disincentives for domestic fabric producing firms to supply the export-oriented apparel 
producers. They can be comfortable in the domestic market, where the price of fabric is 
reportedly higher than on the international market. The general manager of a trading company 
in the industry said that he pays less for knitted fabric from Pakistan, including the transport 
costs, than for any of the domestically knitted fabric (general manager of domestic apparel 
company, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, 09 November, 2016). Not only is the 
price higher, but the quality (which relates to the cotton quality, as discussed) and the diversity 
of fabric types do not meet international market standards. Linking up to export-oriented 
apparel producers is key in order to upgrade the production process (MoI-ITC, 2016). This 
could change with the numerous financial incentives recently put in place to encourage exports, 
but so far it does not seem to have had any effect, with the exception of the few links mentioned 
in the previous section.   
 
4.3.7.2. Labour turnover 
 
High labour turnover is one of the most problematic issues reported by investors and managers 
in the textile and leather industries in Ethiopia. This makes Ethiopia little different from other 
catch-up economies: In Japan, Saxonhouse (1978) reports that due to great similarity in wages 
and equipment across firms, a high degree of turnover was present in the Japanese textile sector 
during the Meiji era. The poor quality of jobs as well as the short-term orientation of workers 
towards their work has also been discussed by Deyo (1989) as reasons for high turnover in the 
export-oriented industries of the East Asian developmental states in the 1960s and 1970s. Koo 
(2001) suggests that at an early stage in the process of proletarianisation, ‘exit’ tends to be a 
predominant strategy amongst workers, due to a lack of occupational identity and the low status 
associated with industrial work. 
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While high turnover rates are to be expected in these labour-intensive industries, the 
problem should be taken seriously, as it is reported as one of the main bottlenecks for output 
growth in these industries in Ethiopia. In Bole Lemi industrial park, output has fallen short of 
expectations, according to government officials and firm managers. Interviews with firm 
managers in the park pointed to high labour turnover as the main cause, and various 
explanations for this were offered: 
1) Low wages. It is almost impossible to cover the relatively high cost of living in 
Ethiopia, especially in Addis Ababa (where Bole Lemi is located), with a monthly 
wage ranging between $40 and $55 per month, which is the reported wage range of 
workers at the operator level in Bole Lemi. The general manager of a foreign 
apparel company remarked that it is difficult for firms to offer higher wages than 
they already do, as food and transport subsidies on top of the monthly wage make 
the total cost per worker come out to roughly $90 per month (general manager of 
foreign apparel company, interviewed by the author in Addis Ababa, November 08, 
2016).  
2) The Ethiopian workforce is not accustomed to industrial work, time-management 
and expectations of efficiency at the workplace. Most of those who enter the 
industrial workforce in Ethiopia today are young people who have never been in 
any employment capacity before, raised in a family living off subsistence farming.  
3) Competition from other industries. The construction and services industries are 
booming in Addis Ababa, and many factory workers who live in the vicinity of the 
city often leave factory work for slightly higher paid work in the construction and 
services sectors. 
4) Many people see work in an apparel or footwear factory as something temporary. 
Over 80 per cent of workers in apparel factories in Bole Lemi are women between 
the ages of 18 and 25. Eventually, these women want to get married or they meet 
expectations of marriage from their families. Firm managers have also reported 
maternity leave as an issue.  
In addition to lay interpretations of the turnover problem, one academic explanation has 
been proposed. Blattman and Dercon (2016) argue from an economic perspective that the high 
turnover found in Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector is the result of a combination of ‘learning 
and matching’ and workers’ responses to shocks. The first explanation suggests that workers 
take up industrial jobs without a clear understanding of the effort levels and non-wage 
characteristics, and quit after finding out that these do not match their expectations (related to 
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point 2 above). The ‘shocks’ explanation on the other hand proposes that industrial work is 
known to be unpleasant, but serves as a stop-gap solution while workers await better 
alternatives (related to point 4 above). While these are indeed plausible suggestions, the 
underlying structural features of Ethiopia`s low-skilled labour market and a consistent 
treatment of the ‘micro-agency’ of labour are not integrated by the authors into their analysis. 
Hardy and Hauge (2017) suggest that industrial workers quit at high rates because 
organizational exit is perceived to be the only recourse to change, similar alternatives are 
readily available, and there is no system in place to penalize workers for leaving an employer. 
For firms to reduce turnover, keep labour costs down and develop a capacity to produce 
to the standards of the international market, Hardy and Hauge suggest two solutions.  
First, a key strategy would be for firms to rationalise their internal labour markets. In 
segments of the labour market where firms offer few or poor promotion prospects, high quit 
rates can be interpreted as a rational strategy as workers seek to obtain the maximum economic 
and psychological rewards. Given preoccupations with status and ‘hierarchical’ power 
relations in Ethiopia (Vaughn and Tronvoll, 2003), a clear structure for salaries and promotion 
ladders is likely to be especially important in order to retain workers in the manufacturing 
sector. 
Hardy and Hauge’s second recommendation is to provide greater support and room for 
the Confederation of Ethiopia’s Trade Unions’ (CETU) legitimacy to grow amongst workers 
at the level of the shop-floor. If indeed, a developmental state is to emerge without following 
the ‘low road’ of authoritarianism, trade unions must acquire some level of collective 
legitimacy. The model of Singapore’s National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) could represent 
a useful blueprint. The state-supported NTUC emerged as a formal partner to the ruling 
People’s Action Party, yet managed to gain legitimacy amongst workers through the provision 
of benefits and services as well as its effective position within the governance structure (Deyo, 
1989; Wong, 2000). 
 
4.4 Summary and conclusion  
 
For those interested in industrial policy and industrialisation in the African context, Ethiopia is 
a fascinating case. Since 2004, the manufacturing sector in Ethiopia has been growing fast in 
absolute terms, and has doubled its share of merchandise exports. But yet, MVA  a share of 
GDP remains a lowly 4.8 per cent, and manufacturing exports in prioritised industries are far 
from reaching the levels of countries one step ahead, like Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam.  
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Despite this, there is an industrialisation ‘buzz’ in Ethiopia. Part of this buzz can be 
attributed to the massive public investments in infrastructure that aims to create a conducive 
environment for manufacturing production, like investments in road networks, rail systems, 
power generation and industrial parks. Another part comes from the observation that the ruling 
party is putting industrialisation at the forefront of its development agenda, as evidenced not 
only by the infrastructure investments but also by national development plans and a slew of 
industrial policies. There has been a clear expansion of the ‘industrial bureaucracy’, the state 
has ramped up support for investment and working capital to the manufacturing sector through 
its state-owned banks, several incentives to attract manufacturing FDI and promote 
manufacturing exports have been put in place, and an import-substitution strategy has been 
implemented for industries that the government wants to protect and nourish. The Ethiopian 
government’s commitment to industrialisation has also become clear from the explicit 
inspiration that the EPRDF draws from the East Asian industrialisation experience. Given this, 
some are labelling Ethiopia as Africa’s ‘developmental state.’  
 Ethiopia also serves as an excellent case study of a country with a GVC-oriented 
industrialisation trajectory, so our story in this chapter builds well on the previous chapter. In 
its two most highly prioritised manufacturing industries, the textile and leather industries, the 
crux of industrial policy for Ethiopia has been about attracting foreign investors and inserting 
itself into GVCs, primarily to boost export earnings and to create jobs. Incentives for export-
oriented investors (both domestic and foreign) include subsidised land lease rates, access to 
favourable infrastructure (industrial parks, road networks and rail networks), income tax 
exemption for up to 10 years, duty free access to imported capital equipment and raw materials, 
guaranteed remittance of capital for foreign investors, and below-market interest rates on loans 
from the state-owned banks.   
Results so far show that the industries are on a good track for achieving what the 
government is setting out for: export earnings in the two industries are growing fast (although 
from a low base) and big commitments by export-oriented foreign investors have been made, 
meaning that exports are likely to keep growing. And because of the labour-intensive nature of 
these two industries, the growth in exports is resulting in job growth as well. Lucrative trade 
agreements with Europe and especially the US, the world’s cheapest labour, and cheap 
electricity, have now made Ethiopia one of the world’s most attractive outsourcing locations 
for global apparel and footwear producers. It is not a long shot to predict that Ethiopia will 
become Africa’s export powerhouse in these two manufacturing industries in the near future. 
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 The Ethiopian government has also indicated that they are attracting foreign investors 
in these industries to transfer technology—raising the level of productivity for domestic firms 
by learning about new production techniques and practices, management practices, and 
acquiring knowledge of international markets and trade—and to create linkages, especially 
backward linkages, to the domestic economy. Some policies have been formulated to achieve 
this. For example, to ensure linkages between footwear producers and tanneries, the 
government has had a policy in place since 2011 that bans the importation of sheepskins unless 
there is a shortage of sheepskin in the country. Furthermore, the government is planning to co-
locate domestic and foreign firms in the state-owned industrial parks (HIP being the pilot 
project) to ensure technology transfer, although how this will happen has yet be detailed. 
 But for the most part, the Ethiopian government is not putting requirements on foreign 
firms in the form of joint venture requirements, local content requirements (apart from the 
sheepskin) and R&D requirements, like we saw in the previous chapter that Taiwan and South 
Korea did during their years of rapid industrialisation. Ethiopian government officials seem to 
believe that a large part of the technology transfer will happen through demonstration and 
competition effects prompted by foreign firms, and by attracting ‘the right type’ of FDI. Also, 
by attracting firms in many segments of the value chain, the Ethiopian government’s strategy 
is to learn about more than just the low-skill assembly tasks. They ultimately hope that foreign 
manufacturers will choose to source inputs domestically based on cost considerations, when 
the domestic firms are producing inputs to a satisfactory level of quality. 
 There is some evidence that this is working. Most domestic firms are positive about the 
entry of foreign firms and some say that it has helped put Ethiopia on the global map in the 
respective industries, drawing global buyers not only to the foreign manufacturers in the 
country but also the domestic ones. With respect to linkages, many foreign footwear producers 
in the leather products industry are using leather from domestic tanneries, and sometimes even 
helping them improve production techniques. There is also some evidence that Ethiopian 
employees in foreign firms are being trained in technical, managerial and administrative 
positions. Moreover, the massive absorption of unskilled labour that the influx of foreign firms 
is accounting for can very well assist in creating an ‘industrial workforce’—one that has the 
habit of time-management and factory routines.  
 Nevertheless, aggregate data gives some cause for worry. No domestic firm is close to 
reaching the levels of export volumes and productivity that foreign firms have reached and are 
predicted to reach in the near future. Moreover, while many of the foreign leather producers in 
Ethiopia are sourcing local inputs, the trend looks bleaker for the apparel industry. The 
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importation of textiles (fabric) has been growing rapidly with the growth of the apparel 
industry, an industry which is growing faster in Ethiopia and has higher global demand than 
the leather products industry. Most foreign apparel manufacturers have said that they do not 
foresee any local fabric/cotton sourcing for at least the next five years, indicating that Ethiopia 
will largely be carrying out CMT functions on imported fabric. Given the low value that this 
activity accounts for, the industry might not even serve as the export cash cow that the 
government primarily wants it to.  
 This underscores a very important conclusion drawn in the previous chapter: vertically 
specialised industrialisation (i.e. inserting oneself in a value chain rather than building fully 
integrated production structures) is not enough for a sustained industrialisation path for 
developing countries. We saw how in some countries in Latin America, particularly Mexico, 
TNC’s ultimately transferred only low-skilled, low-wage and footloose operations (Gallagher 
and Zarsky, 2007). China, which is trying to avoid this by gradually increasing its domestic 
content in low-tech industries, like the textile industry, has now surpassed Mexico in terms of 
manufacturing sector wages (Johnson, 2017). A balance needs to be struck between the benefits 
that vertical specialisation can bring about, and the need to develop domestic productive 
capabilities. But as Ethiopian government officials have pointed out, it is difficult to put 
requirements on foreign firms to source locally, especially when the quality of inputs does not 
meet international standards. Therefore, while technology transfer policies are important, 
policies that address bottlenecks on the inputs side that go beyond simply GVC-oriented 
industrial policies, must be formulated in parallel (as discussed in section 4.3.7).  
In addition to the industrial policies already in place, a recommendation for the 
Ethiopian government would be to formulate incentives that make foreign companies source 
locally. One example would be to grant tax exemptions depending on the degree of local 
sourcing (e.g. Brazil’s automotive industry), or granting firms cash subsidies for exports made 
of locally produced inputs (e.g. Bangladesh’s apparel industry). Ethiopian government officials 
do recognise this problem. An official at the Ministry of Industry said that in the future, they 
would like to organise clusters of domestic firms around industrial parks, like what has been 
done in Bangladesh (special advisor the Minister of Industry, interviewed by the author in 
Addis Ababa on November 23, 2016). And given the affinity and knowledge Ethiopian 
government officials have of industrial policy and other countries’ experiences with it, it might 
well be that many more such policies are brewing and will soon be put in place. 
 
 
 200 
 
 
  
 201 
Chapter 5  
	
Conclusion 
 
 
5.1 Summary of the main chapters 
 
If one person can be said to embody Ethiopia’s vision of development, it is Meles Zenawi, the 
country’s strongman from 1991 to 2012. In chapter 4, I highlighted an interview he gave with 
an African news magazine in 2011, in which he said that a number of industrialisation 
experiences in East Asia support the validity of Ethiopia’s approach to economic development. 
Fast forward 6 years and the vision of Ethiopia following in the footsteps of the Asian tigers 
still stands strong: in July 2017, the Financial Times published a ‘Big Read’ on Ethiopia’s 
development model, focusing on Ethiopia’s low-tech manufacturing boom and how the country 
is, “Trying to ape the centrepiece of Asia-style industrialisation” (Aglionby, 2017, p.3). 
Zemedeneh Negatu, a prominent Ethiopian business leader, is quoted in the article, saying that 
the Ethiopian government is, “Piggybacking on the best elements of China and South Korea, 
and perhaps, some aspects of Singapore, with an Ethiopian flavour. And if they get it right, 
they have a high probability of creating an Asian Tiger-like economy in Africa” (Aglionby, 
2017, p.9).  
 Negatu’s quote, and generally Ethiopia’s approach to development, epitomises the 
methodological staple of this dissertation and its most important policy implication: when 
formulating industrial policy, learning from past and current experiences of industrial policy is 
invaluable. As made clear in the introductory chapter, the historical-comparative method has 
been central to my research approach, looking ‘backwards’ and ‘sideways’ to establish best 
practices. There is no reason why today’s developing countries can only learn from other 
developing countries that have developed in the same global economic era, as some scholars 
would undoubtedly suggest. This is why I have placed such heavy emphasis on industrial 
policies in countries like South Korea and Taiwan, whose industrialisation experiences 30-60 
years ago still hold valuable policy lessons for today’s African countries, as Ethiopia’s 
approach to industrialisation clearly proves.   
 In chapter 2, I focused on four justifications for industrial policy, anchoring these 
particularly in the Asian tigers’ industrialisation experiences: industries in developing 
countries need government support in their infancies (infant industry argument); the market 
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can fail to allocate resources efficiently (market failures); in many instances, the government 
has the best ability to take on the risk of venturing into possibly long-term profitable activities 
(the ‘deepest pocket’ argument); and the need to coordinate and take advantage of the 
interdependence between industries calls for government action (interdependence between 
industries). The reason for discussing and analysing both the theoretical and empirical 
justifications for industrial policy for economic development at length is because in Africa—
which has been the starting point as a unit of analysis for this dissertation—there is practically 
no industry. I carried out a thorough investigation of the manufacturing capabilities of all 54 
countries in Africa and found that the lack of manufacturing is so severe, you will have a hard 
time naming any internationally competitive manufacturing firm with a home base in an 
African country. This, I argued, in large part explains why GDP per capita growth rates in 
Africa have been low and why the continent struggles with alarmingly high rates of extreme 
poverty and vulnerable employment. 
This depiction of Africa, as a continent lagging behind other regions of developing 
countries in terms of economic development, stands in stark contrast to the ‘Africa rising’ 
narrative that the business media, amongst others, has been promoting in recent years. Given 
the following that this narrative has gained, I devoted a part of chapter 2 to investigate whether 
this narrative is ‘fact’ or ‘myth’. I found that Africa indeed has positive developments to show 
for itself since the year 2000 (the approximate starting point of Africa’s supposed ‘rise’), like 
significant improvements in health indicators and a clear reduction in violent conflicts. But in 
terms of the development of productive capabilities, the essence of economic development, 
Africa does not look very different from what it looked like in the 1960s. I therefore concluded 
that industrial policy must be reintroduced on the development agenda in Africa. 
However, we have witnessed a globalisation of production since the 1990s, which 
might call for new approaches to industrial policy in developing countries. Reduction in 
transport costs, advances in information and communication technology and lowered trade and 
investment barriers have led to the geographical dispersion and fragmentation of production 
systems, popularly referred to as the expansion of global value chains.  
Chapter 3 turned to this issue, asking if and how the expansion of global value chains 
affects the productive structures of developing countries, particularly those in Africa, and what 
the implications are for industrial policy. Some scholars have already approached this topic, 
most notably those who study industrialisation and development issues from a GVC 
perspective, a perspective I have been referring to as the ‘GVC lens’. The GVC lens suggests 
that the industrial policies implemented by the Asian tigers pre-1990s are largely outdated, and 
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that we have now entered an era where joining a global value chain—also known as ‘niche 
specialisation’ or ‘vertically specialised industrialisation’ (VSI)—rather than building a 
domestic value chain, has become more important. For example, Milberg et. al. (2014, p. 170) 
writes that: 
 
The first challenges under VSI is to shift from the traditional industrial policy stance 
aimed at developing ‘industry’, where ‘industry’ was conceived as a fully integrated 
production structure. With GVCs, competitive improvements come not with the 
development of the fully integrated scope of activities in an industry but by moving into 
higher-valued tasks associated with the industry. 
 
Similarly, Baldwin (2011, p.3) states that, “Before 1985, successful industrialisation 
meant building a domestic supply chain. Today, industrialisers join supply chains and grow 
rapidly because offshored production brings elements that took Korea and Taiwan decades to 
develop domestically.” 
 The GVC lens has taken the discussion on industrial policy in some useful directions. 
The expansion of GVCs since the 1990s is definitely real—we have seen a massive increase in 
inflows of FDI from predominately industrialised to developing countries, which is part of this 
globalisation of production. This has increased the opportunities for developing countries to 
capitalise on FDI and link up to TNCs, for example through niche specialisation, such as 
assembly activities in EPZs.   
However, I argued that the GVC lens is missing out on some important aspects of 
history and, consequently, pointed out some flaws in its new industrial policy framework. First 
of all, I pointed out that, although the scale of GVCs has increased, GVCs are not something 
supremely new that have only existed since the 1990s. Countries like South Korea and Taiwan 
actually inserted themselves in GVCs as part of their industrialisation strategies. Building on 
this observation, I claimed that the GVC lens fails to acknowledge and study the important role 
of policies for GVC participation in the most notable industrialisation experiences before 1990. 
Through adopting a Statist lens—the lens through which industrial policy is most thoroughly 
studied—I presented case studies of GVC-oriented industrial policies from roughly 1960 to 
1990 in South Korea and Taiwan (and shorter case studies of other countries), focusing 
particularly on industrial policy and how it was used to develop domestic productive 
capabilities by participating in international trade and attracting FDI. From this, I concluded 
that, while production networks have indeed become more fragmented since the 1990s, ‘old 
style’ industrial policy still holds relevance. 
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Towards the end of chapter 3, I introduced a new framework for GVC-oriented 
industrial policies aimed to serve today’s African countries. This framework largely builds on 
the GVC-oriented industrial policies that the successful catch-up industrialisers adopted before 
the 1990s. These were about inducing foreign firms to transfer technology (through 
mechanisms such as joint venture requirements with domestic firms, employment of domestic 
workers in managerial positions, or requirements on conducting R&D activities in the host 
country, all of which were often offered with financial incentives in return), local content 
requirements and carefully balancing and combining ‘EOI and ISI’ strategies for the purpose 
of industrialisation.  
I also pointed out how today’s developing countries specialising in low-tech 
manufacturing have ended up with lower profit margins in their value chains, and consequently 
suggested that African countries should not shy away from incorporating elements of 
ambitiousness and risk-taking in their industrial policies—which is what has characterised the 
really successful catch-up industrialisers—especially in the area of producer services. 
Chapter 4 contextualised issues raised in the previous chapters by analysing the 
industrialisation trajectory and the GVC-oriented industrial policies of Ethiopia. While the 
manufacturing sector in Ethiopia constitutes a small share of GDP, it is arguably Africa’s 
clearest example of a country that puts industrialisation at the forefront of its development 
agenda. The Ethiopian government makes the goal of industrialisation—particularly in the 
image of the Asian tigers—highly explicit: the state has invested massively in infrastructure 
that aims to create a conducive environment for manufacturing production (like investments in 
road networks, rail systems, power generation and industrial parks), and a range of industrial 
policies have been formulated to support the growth of the manufacturing sector.  
Ethiopia is also an interesting case to study from the perspective of GVC participation. 
In its two most highly prioritised manufacturing industries, the textile and leather industries, 
the Ethiopian government is attracting massive amounts of FDI and inserting itself into GVCs. 
The model is based on attracting foreign manufacturers (OEMs from slightly higher income 
countries, like China, India and Turkey), whose products are predominantly sold in the West 
under European or American brand names. The OEMs willingly relocate their operations to 
Ethiopia because production costs are lower. The OEMs either come on their own initiative or 
on the initiative of the lead firm in the value chain (like in the case of HIP). Results thus far 
show that the industries are on track for achieving what the government initially set out for: 
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export earnings in the two industries are growing fast and big commitments by export-oriented 
foreign investors are increasing, meaning that exports are likely to keep growing. 
However, in terms of the development of domestic productive capabilities, the results 
are more ambiguous.  
On the upside, domestic firms are positive towards the entry of foreign firms and some 
say that it has helped put Ethiopia on the global map in the respective industries, drawing global 
buyers to both foreign and domestic manufacturers in the country. With respect to linkages, 
many foreign footwear producers in the leather products industry are using leather from 
domestic tanneries, and sometimes even helping them improve production techniques. There 
is also some evidence that Ethiopian employees in foreign firms are being trained in technical, 
managerial and administrative positions. 
On the downside, Ethiopian firms constitute a very small share of the export earnings 
in the textile and leather industries. Moreover, the government is not putting requirements on 
foreign firms in the form of joint venture requirements, local content requirements (apart from 
the sheepskin) and R&D requirements, like Taiwan and South Korea did during their years of 
rapid industrialisation. Ethiopian government officials seem to believe that a large part of the 
technology transfer will happen through demonstration and competition effects prompted by 
foreign firms, and by attracting ‘the right type’ of FDI. 
Furthermore, while many of the foreign leather products manufacturers in Ethiopia are 
sourcing local inputs, the trend looks bleaker for the apparel industry. Most foreign apparel 
producers say that they do not foresee using domestically produced fabric for at least another 
five years. Given that CMT operations make up a small share of the value in the textile value 
chain, the apparel industry (which looks to grow more rapidly in Ethiopia than the footwear 
industry) might end up being completely dependent in imported fabric, and consequently not 
serve as the export cash-cow that the Ethiopian government wants it to. This underscores a 
very important point that was highlighted in chapter 3: while inserting oneself in a GVC can 
bring about short-term benefits, niche specialisation is not enough for a sustained 
industrialisation path. 
So, while the Ethiopian industrial policy model is impressive in many ways, it has yet 
to figure out how to make the GVC-participation strategy work for the development of 
domestic productive capabilities. But Ethiopia is in very early stages of development, and it 
might just be that policies for technology transfer and local content are brewing (like seen in 
the case of HIP), and that we will soon see GVC-oriented industrial policies that are, in the 
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words of Zemedeneh Negatu, inspired by China, South Korea and Singapore, with an Ethiopian 
flavour. 
 
5.2 Related directions of research 
 
This dissertation analysed how one aspect of change in the global economy affects 
industrialisation prospects and industrial policy in African countries and, more generally, 
developing countries. However, there are several other global economic changes, some more 
related to the expansion of GVCs than others, that has had an impact on industrial policy in 
developing countries and that warrants more analysis and debate in future years than what this 
dissertation has scope for. 
 One is the increased difficulty of industrialisation for today’s developing countries, 
particularly those in Africa. Rodrik (2014, p.11) writes that, “I have the suspicion that the 
obstacles facing industrialisation in Africa are more deep-seated, and go beyond specific 
African circumstances. For various reasons that we do not quite understand, industrialisation 
has become really hard for all countries of the world.” While Rodrik rightly points out that the 
industrialisation obstacles go beyond specific African circumstances, he is wrong to argue that 
the developments leading to this are beyond our understanding. In chapter 3, I discussed some 
of these. One is that the competition between developing countries, particularly in low-tech 
manufacturing, has become incredibly fierce, leading to a price-decline of these goods. The 
other is that TNCs in the West are consolidating and expanding, appropriating profits in the 
producer services segment over a larger market. Nolan (2007) analyses this second point in 
greater detail and suggests that this ‘global business revolution’, whereby TNCs based in the 
West are consolidating their global power, largely explains why we have not seen a single 
country in the world make the transition from poor to rich, after the Asian tigers did so between 
roughly 1960 and 1990. 
 Another factor that makes industrialisation prospects for today’s developing countries 
more worrisome is increased automation of labour-intensive industries. While the concern that 
machines are taking over our jobs is far from new—it started over 200 years ago with the 
Luddites’ protests in England in the early 19th century—we have to take this argument 
seriously. For example, Adidas, the famous German footwear and sports accessories company, 
has already started ‘reshoring’ shoe production from China to a highly-automated factory near 
Ansbach, Germany. For companies like Adidas, reshoring is not only about simplifying the 
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production process through automation, but also about simplifying what is currently an 
immensely complex supply chain. The former chief executive of Adidas, Herbert Hainer, says 
that reshoring will reduce logistics and storage costs, shorten lead times and make the company 
more flexible in terms of how it makes its shoes. (Shotter and Whipp, 2016).   
 In Ethiopia, when asked about the likelihood of automation, many foreign investors in 
the apparel and footwear industry predicted that in 10-15 years, automation would radically 
change the nature of the industry and that it is crucial that Ethiopia takes advantage of the 
current ‘window of opportunity’ for labour–intensive industrialisation. Ethiopia and other 
African countries are probably the ones that will suffer most severely should full automation 
of current labour-intensive production processes become reality. As this dissertation has 
already highlighted, thus far, Africa has been unable to create formal employment opportunities 
for most of its workforce consisting of approximately 500m people, a number which is 
expected to rise to 800m by 2030.  
 International policy developments are also making it more difficult for developing 
countries to industrialise. With the proliferation of international trade agreements, particularly 
the establishment of the WTO, the developing countries of today do not have the same 
industrial policy space that the Asian tigers had during their industrialisation push. The WTO 
is pushing all its member states to lower their tariffs, and they strictly prohibit member states 
to use export subsidies and local content requirements. In chapter 3, we saw how important 
these instruments have been for the industrialisation process of South Korea and Taiwan. 
Chang et. al. (2016, chapter 5.1) points out that although there are some loopholes for African 
countries to take advantage of even if they are members of the WTO and have signed the 
European Partnership Agreements (EPAs),65 these trade agreements are definitely limiting the 
policy autonomy African countries have for nurturing their infant industries. 
 With respect to international trade agreements, it is not only about pushing the research 
agenda to figure out how industrial policy can respond to these complex sets of trade rules, but 
also about advocating for more global justice and democracy. Although the WTO in principle 
reflects a one-country-one-vote system, rich countries have far more resources to spend on 
negotiating international trade agreements and lobbying at WTO meetings. It would be naive 
to think that current international trade agreements are not tilted in favour of the West. Hickel 
																																																						
65 The EPAs are reciprocal trade agreements between the EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries.  
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(2017) suggests setting up a common fund for poorer countries that cannot afford a permanent 
contingent at the WTO headquarters in Geneva or that cannot pay for the staff they need to 
attend negotiating meetings.  
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